

TRN/IL7600590

IA-LD-10-3

SET OF RULES

SOR 2

REACTOR SITE CRITERIA

ISRAEL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Licensing Division

June 1976

SET OF RULES
SOR 3
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Set of Rules

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ISRAEL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
LICENSING DIVISION

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Israel Atomic Energy Commission

Set of Rules No. 3

Reactor Site Criteria

Draft

June 1976

Chapter 1 - General Provisions

1.1 Purpose

1.11 It is the purpose of this set of rules to describe criteria which guide the Director in his evaluation of the suitability of proposed sites for stationary power and testing reactors subject to SOR 2.

1.12 Insufficient experience has been accumulated to permit the writing of detailed standards that would provide a quantitative correlation of all factors significant to the question of acceptability of reactor sites. This part is intended as an interim guide to identify a number of factors considered by the Director in the evaluation of reactor sites and the general criteria used at this time as guides in approving or disapproving proposed sites. Any applicant who believes that factors other than those set forth in the guide should be considered by the Director will be expected to demonstrate the applicability and significance of such factors.

1.2 Scope

1.21 This part applies to applications filed under SOR 2.

1.22 The site criteria contained in this part apply primarily to reactors of a general type and design on which experience has been developed, but can also be applied to other reactor types.

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In particular, for reactors that are novel in design and unproven as prototypes or pilot plants, it is expected that these basic criteria will be applied in a manner that takes into account the lack of experience. In the application of these criteria which are deliberately flexible, the safeguards provided - either site isolation or engineered features - should reflect the lack of certainty that only experience can provide.

Chapter 2 - Site Evaluation Factors

2.1 Factors to be considered when evaluating sites

Factors considered in the evaluation of sites include those relating both to the proposed reactor design and the characteristics peculiar to the site. It is expected that reactors will reflect through their design, construction and operation an extremely low probability for accidents that could result in release of significant quantities of radioactive fission products. In addition, the site location and the engineered features included as safeguards against the hazardous consequences of an accident, should one occur, should insure a low risk of public exposure. In particular, the Director will take the following factors into consideration in determining the acceptability of a site for a power or testing reactor:

2.11 Characteristics of reactor design and proposed operation including:

- (1) Intended use of the reactor including the proposed maximum power level and the nature and inventory of contained radioactive materials;
- (2) The extent to which generally accepted engineering standards are applied to the design of the reactor;

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(3) The extent to which the reactor incorporates unique or unusual features having a significant bearing on the probability or consequences of accidental release of radioactive materials.

(4) The safety features that are to be engineered into the facility and those barriers that must be breached as a result of an accident before a release of radioactive material to the environment can occur.

2.12 Physical characteristics of the site, including seismology, meteorology, geology and hydrology.

(1) Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants", describes the nature of investigations required to obtain the geologic and seismic data necessary to determine site suitability and to provide reasonable assurance that a nuclear power plant can be constructed and operated at a proposed site without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

It describes procedures for determining the quantitative vibratory ground motion design basis at a site due to earthquakes and describes information needed to determine whether and to what extent a nuclear power plant need be designed to withstand the effects of surface faulting.

(2) Meteorological conditions at the site and in the surrounding area should be considered.

(3) Geological and hydrological characteristics of the proposed site may have a bearing on the consequences of an escape of radioactive material from the facility. Special precautions should be planned if a reactor is to be located at a site where a significant quantity of radioactive effluent might accidentally flow into nearby streams or the sea or might find ready access to underground water tables.

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2.13 Appendix B, "Population Density and Population Dose Criteria", specifies the Licensing Division's position as to population density and population dose consideration around a proposed nuclear power plant site.

2.14 Where unfavorable physical characteristics of the site exist, the proposed site may nevertheless be found to be acceptable if the design of the facility includes appropriate and adequate compensating engineering safeguards.

APPENDIX A.—SEISMIC AND GEOLOGIC SITING CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

I. PURPOSE

General Design Criterion 2 of Appendix A to *10 CFR Part 50* requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components be designed to be able to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and tsches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. It is the purpose of these criteria to set forth the principal seismic and geologic considerations which guide the licensee's evaluation of the suitability of proposed sites for nuclear power plants and the suitability of the plant design has established in consideration of the seismic and geologic characteristics of the proposed sites. These criteria are based on the limited geophysical and geological information available to date concerning faults and earthquake occurrence and effect. They will be revised as necessary when more complete information becomes available.

II. SCOPE

These criteria, which apply to nuclear power plants, describe the nature of the investigations required to obtain the geologic and seismic data necessary to determine site suitability and provide reasonable assurance that a nuclear power plant can be constructed and operated at a proposed site without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. They describe procedures for determining the quantitative vibratory ground motion design basis at a site due to earthquakes and describe information needed to determine whether and to what extent a nuclear power plant need be designed to withstand the effects of surface faulting. Other geologic and seismic factors required to be taken into account in the siting and design of nuclear power plants are identified.

Each applicant for a construction permit shall investigate all seismic and geologic factors that may affect the design and operation of the proposed nuclear power plant irrespective of whether such factors are explicitly included in these criteria. Additional investigations and/or more conservative determinations than those included in these criteria may be required for sites located in areas having complex geology or in areas of high seismicity. If an applicant believes that the particular seismology and geology of a site indicate that some of these criteria, or portions thereof, need not be satisfied, the specific sections of these criteria should be identified in the license application, and supporting data to justify clearly such departures should be presented.

These criteria do not address investigations of volcanic phenomena required for sites located in areas of volcanic activity. Investigations of the volcanic aspects of such sites will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

III. DEFINITIONS

As used in these criteria:

- (a) The "magnitude" of an earthquake is a measure of the size of an earthquake and is related to the energy released in the form of seismic waves. "Magnitude" means the numerical value on a Richter scale.
- (b) The "intensity" of an earthquake is a measure of its effects on man, on man-built structures, and on the earth's surface at a particular location. "Intensity" means the numerical value on the Modified Mercalli scale.
- (c) The "Safe Shutdown Earthquake" is that earthquake which is based upon an evaluation of the maximum earthquake

potential considering the regional and local geology and seismology and specific characteristics of local subsurface material. It is that earthquake which produces the maximum vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components are designed to remain functional. These structures, systems, and components are those necessary to assure:

- (1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
- (2) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or
- (3) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of this part.
- (d) The "Operating Basis Earthquake" is that earthquake which, considering the regional and local geology and seismology and specific characteristics of local subsurface material, could reasonably be expected to affect the plant site during the operating life of the plant; it is that earthquake which produces the vibratory ground motion for which the structures of the reactor and the plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public are designed to remain functional.

(e) A "fault" is a tectonic structure along which differential slippage of the adjacent earth masses has occurred parallel to the fracture plane. It is distinct from other types of ground disruptions such as landslides, fissures, and crevasses. A fault may have gouge or breccia between its two walls and includes any associated monoclinical flexure or other similar geologic structural features.

(f) "Surface faulting" is differential ground displacement at or near the surface caused directly by fault movement and is distinct from nontectonic types of ground disruptions, such as landslides, fissures, and crevasses.

(g) A "capable fault" is a fault which has exhibited one or more of the following characteristics:

- (1) Movement at or near the ground surface at least once within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring nature within the past 500,000 years.
- (2) Macro-seismology instrumentally determined with records of sufficient precision to demonstrate a direct relationship with the fault.
- (3) A structural relationship to a capable fault according to characteristics (1) or (2) of this paragraph, such that movement on one could be reasonably expected to be accompanied by movement on the other.

In some cases, the geologic evidence of past activity at or near the ground surface along a particular fault may be obscured at the site. This might occur, for example, at a site having a deep overburden. For these cases, evidence may exist elsewhere along the fault from which an evaluation of its characteristics in the vicinity of the site can be reasonably based. Such evidence shall be used in determining whether the fault is a capable fault within this definition.

Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraphs III(g)(1), (2) and (3), structural association of a fault with geologic structural features of volcanic geologic origin (at least pre-Quaternary) such as many of those found in the Eastern region of the United States shall, in the absence of conflicting evidence, demonstrate that the fault is not a capable fault within this definition.

(h) A "tectonic province" is a region characterized by a relative consistency of the geologic structural features contained therein.

(i) A "tectonic structure" is a large scale dislocation or distortion within the earth's crust. Its extent is measured in miles.

(j) Those requiring detailed faulting investigations in a zone within which a nuclear power reactor may not be located unless a

"Safe Shutdown Earthquake" defines the earthquake which has commonly been referred to as the "Design Basis Earthquake."

detailed investigation of the regional and local geologic and seismic characteristics of the site demonstrates that the need to design for surface faulting has been properly determined.

(k) The "control width" of a fault is the maximum width of the zone containing mapped fault traces, including all faults which can be reasonably inferred to have existed, and sufficient to represent the Quaternary times and which join or can reasonably be inferred to join the main fault trace, measured within 10 miles along the fault's trend in both directions from the point of nearest approach to the site. (See Figure 1 of this appendix.)

(l) A "response spectrum" is a plot of the maximum responses (acceleration, velocity or displacement) of a family of idealized single-degree-of-freedom damped oscillators against natural frequencies (or periods) of the oscillators to a specified vibratory motion input at their supports.

IV. REQUIRED INVESTIGATIONS

The geologic, seismic and engineering characteristics of a site and its environs shall be investigated in sufficient scope and detail to provide reasonable assurance that they are sufficiently well understood to permit an adequate evaluation of the proposed site, and to provide sufficient information to support the determinations required by these criteria and to permit adequate engineering solutions to actual or potential geologic and seismic effects at the proposed site. The size of the region to be investigated and the type of data pertinent to the investigations shall be determined by the nature of the region surrounding the proposed site. The investigations shall be carried out by a review of the pertinent literature and field investigations and shall include the steps outlined in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section.

(a) Required investigations for Vibratory Ground Motion. The purpose of the investigations required by this paragraph is to obtain information needed to describe the vibratory ground motion produced by the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. All of the steps in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section may not be carried out if the Safe Shutdown Earthquake can be clearly established by investigations and determinations of a lesser scope. The investigations required by this paragraph provide an adequate basis for selection of an Operating Basis Earthquake. The investigations shall include the following:

- (1) Determination of the lithologic, stratigraphic, hydrologic, and structural geologic conditions of the site and the region surrounding the site, including its geologic history.
- (2) Identification and evaluation of tectonic structures underlying the site and the region surrounding the site, whether buried or expressed at the surface. In seismo-

tectonic areas of unusual geological complexity, it may be necessary to operate a network of sensitive seismographs having microearthquake recording capability within a few tens of kilometers of the site for a period of up to three years.

The evaluation should consider the possible effects caused by man's activities such as withdrawal of fluids from or addition of fluids to the aquifers, the extraction of minerals, or the loading effect of dams or reservoirs;

(3) Evaluation of physical evidence concerning the behavior during prior earthquakes of the structural geologic features of the subsurface underlying the site from the lithologic, stratigraphic, and structural geo-

logic studies;

(4) Determination of the static and dynamic engineering properties of the materials underlying the site. Included should be properties needed to determine the behavior of the underlying material during earthquakes and the characteristics of the underlying material in transmitting earthquake-induced motions to the foundations of the plant, such as seismic wave velocities, density, water content, porosity, and strength.

Empirical verification, through direct in-situ measurements, of site vibratory characteristics are needed in those cases where theoretical methods of determining the site response are of questionable applicability.

(5) Listing of all historically reported earthquakes which have affected or which could reasonably be expected to have affected the site, including the date of occurrence and the following measured or estimated data: magnitude or highest intensity, and a plot of the epicenter or location of highest intensity. Where historically reported earthquakes could have caused a maximum ground acceleration of at least one-tenth the acceleration of gravity (0.1g) at the foundations of the proposed nuclear power plant structures, the acceleration or intensity and duration of ground shaking at these foundations shall also be estimated. Since earthquakes have been reported in terms of seismic parameters such as magnitude, intensity at a given location, and effect on ground, structures, and people at a specific location, some of these data may have to be estimated by use of appropriate empirical relationships. The comparative characteristics of the material underlying the site in the location or region of highest intensity and of the material underlying the site in transmitting earthquake vibratory motion shall be considered;

(6) Correlation of epicenters or locations of highest intensity of historically reported earthquakes, where possible, with tectonic structures any part of which is located within 200 miles of the site. Epicenters or locations of highest intensity which cannot be reasonably correlated with tectonic structures shall be identified with tectonic provinces any part of which is located within 200 miles of the site.

(7) For faults, any part of which is within 200 miles of the site and which may be of significance in establishing the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, determination of whether these faults are to be considered as capable faults. This determination is required in order to permit appropriate consideration of the geologic history of such faults in establishing the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. For guidance in determining which faults may

be of significance in determining the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, Table 1 of this appendix presents the minimum length of fault to be considered versus distance from site. Capable faults of lesser length than those indicated in Table 1 and faults which are not capable faults need not be considered in determining the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, except where unusual circumstances indicate such consideration is appropriate;

TABLE 1

Distance from the site (miles):	Minimum length: 1
0 to 20.....	1
Greater than 20 to 50.....	5
Greater than 50 to 100.....	10
Greater than 100 to 150.....	20
Greater than 150 to 200.....	40

(8) For capable faults, any part of which is within 200 miles of the site and which may be of significance in establishing the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, determination of:

- (i) The length of the fault;
 - (ii) The relationship of the fault to regional tectonic structures; and
 - (iii) The nature, amount, and geologic history of displacements along the fault, including particularly the estimated amount of the maximum Quaternary displacement related to any one earthquake along the fault.
- (b) *Required Investigation for Surface Faulting.* The purpose of the investigations required by this paragraph is to obtain information to determine whether and to what extent the nuclear power plant need be designed for surface faulting. If the design basis for surface faulting can be clearly established by investigations of a lesser scope, not all of the steps in paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(7) of this section need be carried out. The investigations shall include the following:

- (1) Determination of the lithologic, stratigraphic, hydrologic, and structural geologic conditions of the site and the area surrounding the site, including its geologic history;
- (2) Evaluation of tectonic structures underlying the site, whether buried or expressed at the surface, with regard to their potential for causing surface displacement at or near the site. The evaluation shall consider the possible effects caused by man's activities such as withdrawal of fluid from or addition of fluid to the subsurface, extraction of minerals, or the loading effects of dams or reservoirs;
- (3) Determination of geologic evidence of fault offset at or near the ground surface at or near the site;
- (4) For faults greater than 1000 feet long, any part of which is within 5 miles of the site, determination of whether these faults are to be considered as capable faults;
- (5) Listing of all historically reported earthquakes which can reasonably be associated with capable faults greater than 1000 feet long, any part of which is within 5 miles of the site, including the date of occurrence.

*Minimum length of fault (miles) which shall be considered in establishing Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

*If the design basis for surface faulting can be determined from a fault closer than 5 miles to the site, the procedures of paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(7) of this section need not be carried out for successively more remote faults.

*In the absence of absolute dating, evidence of reactivity of movement may be obtained by applying relative dating techniques to ruptured, offset, warped or otherwise structurally disturbed surface or near-surface material or geomorphic features.

*The applicant shall evaluate whether or not a fault is a capable fault with respect to the characteristics outlined in paragraphs III(g)(1), (2), and (3) by conducting a reasonable investigation using suitable geologic and geophysical techniques.

occurrence and the following measured or estimated data: magnitude or highest intensity, and a plot of the epicenter or region of highest intensity;

(6) Correlation of epicenters or locations of highest intensity of historically reported earthquakes with capable faults greater than 1000 feet long, any part of which is located within 5 miles of the site;

(7) For faults, any part of which is within 5 miles of the site, determination of:

- (i) The length of the fault;
- (ii) The relationship of the fault to regional tectonic structures; and
- (iii) The nature, amount, and geologic history of displacements along the fault, including particularly the estimated amount of the maximum Quaternary displacement related to any one earthquake along the fault; and
- (iv) The outer limits of the fault established by mapping Quaternary fault traces for 10 miles along its trend in both directions from the point of its nearest approach to the site.

(c) *Required Investigation for Seismically Induced Floods and Water Waves.* (1) For coastal sites, the investigations shall include the determination of:

- (i) Information regarding distantly and locally generated waves or tsunami which have affected or could have affected the site. Available evidence regarding the runup and drawdown associated with historic tsunamis in the same coastal region as the site shall also be included;
- (ii) Local features of coastal topography which might tend to modify tsunami runup or drawdown. Appropriate available evidence regarding historic local modifications in tsunami runup or drawdown at coastal locations having topography similar to that of the site shall also be obtained; and
- (iii) Appropriate geologic and seismic evidence to provide information for establishing the design basis for seismically induced floods or water waves from a local offshore earthquake, from local offshore effects of an offshore earthquake, or from coastal subsidence. This evidence shall be determined to the extent practical, by a procedure similar to that required in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. The probable slip characteristics of offshore faults shall also be considered as well as the potential for offshore slides in submarine material.

(2) For sites located near lakes and rivers, investigations similar to those required in paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall be carried out, as appropriate, to determine the potential for the nuclear power plant to be exposed to seismically induced floods and water waves as, for example, from the failure during an earthquake of an upstream dam or from slides of earth or debris into a nearby lake.

V. SEISMIC AND GEOLOGIC DESIGN BASIS

(a) *Determination of Design Basis for Vibratory Ground Motion.* The design of each nuclear power plant shall take into account the potential effects of vibratory ground motion caused by earthquakes. The design basis for the maximum vibratory ground motion and the expected vibratory ground motion should be determined through evaluation of the seismology, geology, and the seismic and geologic history of the area surrounding the region. The most severe earthquakes associated with tectonic structures or tectonic provinces in the region surrounding the site should be identified, considering those historically reported earthquakes that can be associated with these structures or provinces and other relevant factors. If faults in the region surrounding the site are capable faults, the most severe earthquakes associated with these faults should be determined by also considering their geologic history. The vibratory ground motion at the site should be then determined by assuming that the epicenters or locations of highest intensity of the earthquakes are situated at the point on the tectonic structures or tectonic provinces nearest to the site. The earthquakes

*If the Safe Shutdown Earthquake can be associated with a fault closer than 200 miles to the site, the procedures of paragraphs (a) (7) and (a) (8) of this section need not be carried out for successively more remote faults.

*In the absence of absolute dating, evidence of reactivity of movement may be obtained by applying relative dating techniques to ruptured, offset, warped or otherwise structurally disturbed surface or near-surface material or geomorphic features.

*The applicant shall evaluate whether or not a fault is a capable fault with respect to the characteristics outlined in paragraphs III(g)(1), (2), and (3) by conducting a reasonable investigation using suitable geologic and geophysical techniques.

which could cause the maximum vibratory ground motion at the site should be designated the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The specific procedures for determining the design basis for vibratory ground motion are given in the following paragraphs.

(1) *Determination of maximum Shutdown Earthquake.* The Safe Shutdown Earthquake shall be identified through evaluation of seismic and geologic information developed pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (1)(i), as follows:

(i) The historic earthquakes of greatest magnitude or intensity which have been correlated with tectonic structures pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (a) (8) of Section IV shall be determined. In addition, for capable faults, the information required by paragraph (a) (8) of Section IV shall also be taken into account in determining the earthquakes of greatest magnitude related to the faults. The magnitude or intensity of earthquakes based on geologic evidence may be less than that of maximum earthquakes historically recorded. The accelerations at the site shall be determined assuming that the epicenters of the earthquakes of greatest magnitude or the locations of the closest intense tectonic structures are situated at the point on the structures closest to the site;

(ii) Where epicenters or locations of highest intensity of historically reported earthquakes cannot be reasonably related to tectonic structures but are identified pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (a) (8) of Section IV with tectonic provinces in which the site is located, the accelerations at the site shall be determined assuming that these earthquakes occur at the site.

(iii) Where epicenters or locations of the highest intensity of historically reported earthquakes cannot be reasonably related to tectonic structures but are identified pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (a) (8) of Section IV with tectonic provinces in which the site is not located, the accelerations at the site shall be determined assuming that the epicenters or locations of highest intensity of these earthquakes are at the closest point to the site to the boundary of the tectonic province;

(iv) The earthquake producing the maximum vibratory acceleration at the site, as determined from paragraph (a) (1) (i) through (iii) of this section shall be designated the safe Shutdown Earthquake for vibratory ground motion, except as noted in paragraph (a) (1) (v) of this section. The characteristics of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake shall be identified in a conservative manner using an earthquake determined from paragraph (a) (1) (i) through (iii) of this section, where necessary to assure that the maximum vibratory acceleration at the site throughout the frequency range of interest is indicated. In the case where a causative nuclear power plant is the effect of proximity of an earthquake on the spectral characteristics of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake shall be taken into account. In order to compensate for the limited data, the procedures in paragraphs (a) (1) (i) through (iii) of this section shall be applied in a conservative manner. The maximum vibratory accelerations of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake at each of the various foundation locations of the nuclear power plant structures at the site shall be determined taking into account the characteristics of the underlying soil material in transmitting the earthquake-induced motions, obtained pursuant to paragraphs (a) (1), (3), and (4) of section IV. The Safe Shutdown Earthquake shall be identified by response spectra corresponding to the maximum vibratory accelerations as outlined in paragraph (a) of section VII; and

(v) Where the maximum vibratory accelerations of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake at the foundations of the nuclear power plant structures are determined to be less

than one-tenth the acceleration of gravity (0.1 g) as a result of the steps required in paragraphs (a) (1) (i) through (iv) of this section, it shall be assumed that the maximum vibratory accelerations of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake at these foundations are at least 0.1 g.

(2) *Determination of Operating Basis Earthquake.* The Operating Basis Earthquake shall be specified by the applicant after considering the seismology and geology of the region surrounding the site. If vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the Operating Basis Earthquake occurs, shutdown of the nuclear power plant will be required. Prior to resuming operations, the licensee will be required to demonstrate to the Director that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The maximum vibratory ground acceleration of the Operating Basis Earthquake shall be at least one-half that of the maximum vibratory acceleration of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

(b) *Determination of Need to Design for Surface Faulting.* In order to determine whether a nuclear power plant is required to be designed to withstand the effects of surface faulting, the location of the nuclear power plant with respect to capable faults shall be considered. The area over which each of these faults has caused surface faulting in the past is identified by mapping its fault traces in the vicinity of the site. The faults are mapped and the control width of the fault for 10 miles in both directions from the point of its nearest approach to the nuclear power plant because, for example, traces may be observed along portions of the fault. The maximum width of the mapped fault traces, called the control width, is then determined from this map. Because surface faulting has sometimes occurred beyond the limit of mapped fault traces or where fault traces have not been previously recognized, the control width of the fault is increased by a factor which is dependent upon the largest potential earthquake related to the fault.

This larger width delineates a zone, called the zone requiring detailed faulting investigation, in which the possibility of surface faulting is to be determined. The following paragraphs outline the specific procedures for determining the zone requiring detailed faulting investigation for a capable fault.

(1) *Determination of Zone Requiring Detailed Faulting Investigation.* The zone requiring detailed faulting investigation for a capable fault which was investigated pursuant to the requirement of paragraph (b) (7) of Section IV shall be determined through use of the following table:

TABLE 2
Determination of Zone Requiring Detailed Faulting Investigation

Magnitude of earthquake:	Width of zone requiring detailed faulting investigation (See Fig. 1)
Less than 5.5.....	1 x control width
5.5-6.4.....	2 x control width
6.5-7.5.....	3 x control width
Greater than 7.5.....	4 x control width

The largest magnitude earthquake related to the fault shall be used in Table 2. This earthquake shall be determined from the information developed pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b) of Section IV for the fault, taking into account the information developed pursuant to paragraph (b) of Section IV. The control width used in Table 2 is determined by mapping the outer limits of the fault traces from information developed pursuant to paragraph (b) (7) (1) of section IV. The control width shall be used in Table 2 unless the characteristics of the fault are obscured for a significant portion of the 10 miles on either side of the point of

nearest approach to the nuclear power plant. In this event, the use in Table 2 of the width of mapped fault traces more than 10 miles from the point of nearest approach to the nuclear power plant may be appropriate.

The zone requiring detailed faulting investigation, as determined from Table 2, shall be used for the fault except where:

- (1) The zone requiring detailed faulting investigation from Table 2 is less than one-half mile in width. In this case the zone shall be at least one-half mile in width; or
- (ii) Definitive evidence concerning the regional and local characteristics of the fault justifies use of a different value. For example, thrust or bedding-plane faults may require an increase in width of the zone to account for the projected dip of the fault plane, or
- (iii) More detailed three-dimensional information, such as that obtained from pre-located investigative techniques, may justify the use of a narrower zone. Possible examples of such techniques are the use of accurate records from closely spaced grid holes or from closely spaced, high-resolution offshore geophysical surveys.

In delineating the zone requiring detailed faulting investigation for a fault, the center of the zone shall coincide with the center of the fault at the point of nearest approach of the fault to the nuclear power plant as illustrated in Figure 1.

(c) *Determination of Design Bases for Seismically Induced Floods and Water Waves.* The size of seismically induced floods and water waves which could affect a site from either locally or distantly generated seismic activity shall be determined, taking into consideration the results of the investigation required by paragraph (c) of section IV. Local topographic characteristics which might tend to modify the possible runup and drawdown at the site shall be considered. Adverse tide conditions shall also be taken into account in determining the effect of the floods and waves on the site. The characteristics of the earthquake to be used in evaluating the offshore effects of earthquakes shall be determined by a procedure similar to that used to determine the characteristics of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake in paragraph (1)(a).

(d) *Determination of Other Design Conditions.* (1) Soil Stability. Vibratory ground motion associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake can cause soil instability due to ground disruption such as fissuring, differential consolidation, liquefaction, and cratering which is not directly related to surface faulting. The following geological features which could affect the foundations of the proposed nuclear power plant structures shall be evaluated, taking into account the information concerning the physical properties of materials underlying the site developed pursuant to paragraphs (b) (1), (3), and (4) of Section IV and the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake:

- (a) Areas of actual or potential surface or subsurface subsidence, uplift, or collapse resulting from:
 - (i) Natural features such as tectonic depressions and cavernous or karst terraine, particularly those underlain by calcareous or other soluble deposits;
 - (ii) Man's activities such as withdrawal of fluid from or addition of fluid to the subsurface, extraction of minerals, or loading effects of dams or reservoirs; and
- (c) Regional deformation
- (ii) *Deformational zones such as shears, joints, fractures, folds, or combinations of these features.*
- (iii) Zones of alteration or irregular weathering, fracturing and zones of structural weakness composed of crushed or disturbed materials.
- (iv) Unrelieved residual stresses in bedrock.
- (v) Rocks or soils that might be unstable

because of their mineralogy, lack of consolidation, water content, or potentially undesirable response to seismic or other events. Seismic response characteristics to be considered shall include effects of stress anisotropy, differential consolidation, cratering, and fissuring.

(2) *Slope stability.* Steepness of all slopes, both natural and artificial, the failure of which could adversely affect the nuclear power plant, shall be considered. An assessment shall be made of the potential effects of erosion or deposition and of combinations of erosion or deposition with seismic activity, taking into account information concerning the physical property of the materials underlying the site developed pursuant to paragraph (a) (1), (2), and (4) of Section IV and the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

(3) *Cooling Water Supply.* Assurance of adequate cooling water supply for emergency and long-term shutdown decay heat removal shall be considered in the design of the nuclear power plant, taking into account information concerning the physical properties of the materials underlying the site developed pursuant to paragraphs (a) (1), (3), and (4) of section IV and the effects of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and the design basis for surface faulting. Consideration of river blockage or diversion or other failures which may block the flow of cooling water, coastal uplift or subsidence, or tsunami runup and drawdown, and failure of dams and intake structures shall be included in the evaluation, where appropriate.

(4) *Structures.* Structures whose foundations are not located in the immediate vicinity of the site but which are safety related shall be designed to withstand the effect of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and the design basis for surface faulting determined on a comparable basis to that of the nuclear power plant taking into account the material underlying the structures and the different location with respect to that of the site.

VI. APPLICATION TO ENGINEERING DESIGN

(a) *Vibratory Ground Motion.*—(1) *Safe Shutdown Earthquake.* The vibratory ground motion produced by the Safe Shutdown Earthquake shall be defined by response spectra corresponding to the maximum vibratory accelerations at the elevations of the foundations of the nuclear power plant structures determining pursuant to paragraph (a) (1) of Section V. The response spectra shall relate the response of the foundations of the nuclear power plant structures to the vibratory ground motion, considering such foundations to be single-degree-of-freedom damped oscillators and neglecting soil-structure interaction effects. In view of the limited data available on vibratory ground motions of strong earthquakes, it usually will be appropriate that the response spectra be smoothed design spectra developed from a series of response spectra related to the vibratory motions caused by more than one earthquakes.

The nuclear power plant shall be designed so that, if the Safe Shutdown Earthquake occurs, certain structures, systems, and components will remain functional. These structures, systems, and components are those necessary to assure (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of this part. In addition to seismic loads, including aftershocks, applicable concurrent functional and accident-induced loads shall be taken into account in the design of these safety-related structures, systems, and components. The design of the nuclear power plant shall also take into account the possible effects of the Safe

Shutdown Earthquake on the facility foundations by ground disruption, such as fissuring, differential consolidation, cratering, liquefaction, and landsliding, as required in paragraph (d) of section V.

The engineering method used to assure that the required safety functions are maintained during and after the vibratory ground motion associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake shall involve the use of either a suitable dynamic analysis or a suitable qualification test to demonstrate that structures, systems and components can withstand the seismic and other concurrent loads, except where it can be demonstrated that the use of an equivalent static load method provides adequate conservatism.

The analysis or test shall take into account soil-structure interaction effects and the expected duration of vibratory motion. It is permissible to design for strain limits in excess of yield strain in some of these safety-related structures, systems, and components in order to demonstrate that structures, systems and components can withstand the seismic and other concurrent loads, provided that the necessary safety functions are maintained.

(2) *Operating Basis Earthquake.* The Operating Basis Earthquake shall be defined by response spectra. All structures, systems, and components of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public shall be designed to remain functional and within applicable stress and deformation limits when subjected to the effects of the vibratory motion of the Operating Basis Earthquake in combination with normal operating loads. The engineering method used to ensure that these structures, systems, and components are capable of withstanding the effects of the Operating Basis Earthquake shall involve the use of either a suitable dynamic analysis or a suitable qualification test to demonstrate that the structures, systems and components can withstand the seismic and other concurrent loads, except where it can be demonstrated that the use of an equivalent static load method provides adequate conservatism. The analysis or test shall take into account soil-structure interaction effects and the expected duration of vibratory motion.

(3) *Required Seismic Instrumentation.* Suitable instrumentation shall be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features important to safety can be determined promptly to permit comparison of such response with that used as the design basis. Such a comparison is needed to decide whether the plant can continue to be operated safely and to permit such timely action as may be appropriate.

These criteria do not address the need for instrumentation that would automatically shut down a nuclear power plant when an earthquake occurs which exceeds a predetermined intensity. The need for such instrumentation is under consideration.

(b) *Surface Faulting.* (1) If the nuclear power plant is to be located within a zone requiring detailed faulting investigation, a detailed investigation of the regional and local geologic and seismic characteristics of the site shall be carried out to determine the need to take into account surface faulting in the design of the nuclear power plant. Where it is determined that surface faulting need not be taken into account, sufficient data to clearly justify the determination shall be presented in the license application.

(2) Where it is determined that surface faulting must be taken into account, the applicant shall, in establishing the design basis for surface faulting on a site take into account evidence concerning the regional and local geologic and seismic characteristics of the site and on any other relevant data.

(3) The design basis for surface faulting shall be taken into account in the design of the nuclear power plant by providing rea-

sonable assurance that in the event of such displacement during faulting certain structures, systems, and components will remain functional. These structures, systems, and components are those necessary to assure (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of this part. In addition to seismic loads, including aftershocks, applicable concurrent functional and accident-induced loads shall be taken into account in the design of such safety features. The design provisions shall be based on an assumption that the design basis for surface faulting can occur in any direction and azimuth and under any part of the nuclear power plant, unless evidence indicates this assumption is not appropriate, and shall take into account the estimated rate at which the surface faulting may occur.

(c) *Seismically Induced Floods and Water Waves and Other Design Conditions.* The design basis for seismically induced floods and water waves from either locally or distantly generated seismic activity and other design conditions determined pursuant to paragraphs (c) and (d) of Section V, shall be taken into account in the design of the nuclear power plant so as to prevent undue risk to the health and safety of the public.




FIGURE 1—DIAGRAMMATIC ILLUSTRATION OF DELINEATION OF ZONES REQUIRING DETAILED FAULTING INVESTIGATIONS FOR SPECIFIC NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LOCATION.

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Appendix B to SOR 3

Population Density and Population Dose Criteria

1. Definitions
 - 1.1 "Exclusion Area" - means an area immediately surrounding the nuclear power plant which is under complete control of the licensee.
 - 1.2 "Low Population Zone" - means the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area inhabited by residents, the total number and density of which are such that the licensee can prove that appropriate protective measures (such as evacuation or sheltering) could be taken on their behalf in case of an accident.
 - 1.3 "Accident" - means a postulated combination of a single process failure and a failure of a safety system, followed by a release of fission products into the atmosphere, at a rate which should not exceed 0.1% per day of the fission products inventory readily available for leaking.
2. Conditions
 - 2.1 Exclusion area
 - 2.1.1 There shall be no permanent habitation within the exclusion area.
 - 2.1.2 The distance from the nuclear facility to the outer boundary of the exclusion area shall not be smaller than 2 km.
 - 2.1.3 The predicted dose to any individual located at any point on the outer boundary for 2 hours immediately following onset of an accident shall not exceed:
 - 2.1.3.1 25 Rem - Whole body dose.
 - 2.1.3.2 300 Rem - Thyroid dose.

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2.2 Low Population Zone

2.2.1 The predicted dose to any individual located at any point on its outer boundary during the entire period of the cloud passage resulting from an accident.

2.2.1.1 25 Rem - Whole body dose

2.2.1.2 300 Rem - Thyroid dose

2.3 Population Dose

2.3.1 The predicted total whole body population dose caused by an accident shall not exceed 10^6 Man-Rem.

3. Multiple Reactor Sites

3.1 For sites for multiple reactor facilities, consideration should be given to the following:

3.1.1 If the reactors are independent to the extent that an accident in one reactor would not initiate an accident in another, conditions 2.1.3, 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 shall be fulfilled with respect to each reactor individually. The envelopes of the plan overlay of the areas so calculated shall then be taken as their respective boundaries.

3.1.2 If the reactors are interconnected to the extent that an accident in one reactor could affect the safety of operation of any other, conditions 2.1.3, 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 shall be fulfilled, assuming that all interconnected reactors emit their postulated fission products inventory simultaneously.

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This requirement may be reduced in relation to the degree of coupling between reactors, the probability of concomitant accidents and the probability that an individual would not be exposed to the radiation effects from simultaneous releases. The applicant shall be expected to justify, to the satisfaction of the Licensing Division, the basis of such a reduction in the source term.

- 3.1.3 The applicant is required to show that the simultaneous operation of multiple reactors at a site will not result in total radioactive effluent releases beyond the allowable limits of applicable regulations.

