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**TWO CITIZEN TASK FORCES AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE  
EVOLVING NUCLEAR WASTE SITING PROCESS**

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TWO CITIZEN TASK FORCES AND THE CHALLENGE  
OF THE EVOLVING NUCLEAR WASTE SITING PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

Siting any nuclear waste facility is problematic in today's climate of distrust toward nuclear agencies and fear of nuclear waste. This study compares and contrasts the siting and public participation processes as two citizen task forces dealt with their difficult responsibilities. Though one dealt with a high level waste (Monitored Retrievable Storage - MRS) proposal in Tennessee in 1985-6 and the other with a proposed low level waste facility in Illinois (1988 and still ongoing), the needs of citizen decision makers were very similar. Key differences were found in the communities themselves as well as in the siting and public participation (PP) processes. As a result, the two task forces performed different functions in these different contexts. Conclusions and recommendations for working with site stakeholders are outlined after comparison and analysis of the two cases.

TWO CITIZEN TASK FORCES GRAPPLE WITH NUCLEAR  
WASTE SITING

A. The MRS Task Force in Oak  
Ridge/Roane County, Tennessee

In brief, the Clinch River MRS Task Force (TF) evaluated the proposed siting of a monitored retrievable storage facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee in 1985. After deciding that the facility could be safe but that there would be negative impacts of siting, the task force considered conditions which would change the net impact balance from negative to positive. Their 29 conditions included economic compensation as well as non-economic incentives such as limited power-sharing and rights to shut down the facility under certain conditions, access to information, a local oversight committee, independent environmental monitoring and data

collection, and several transportation safety requirements.<sup>1</sup> Their principal concerns were about long-term arrangements, guarantees and accountability of the federal government for the 50-year life of the facility.

Many TF conditions had been accepted by DOE when the State of Tennessee stopped the entire siting process with a lawsuit. Elsewhere in the state, opposition was high and resulted in the governor's rejection of the siting on grounds of lack of need and concern that nuclear waste (NW) stigma would cause regional economic damage.<sup>2</sup> The entire Tennessee national congressional delegation also was opposed. The task force's internal processes of evaluation and decisionmaking have been documented elsewhere.<sup>3,4</sup> The TF reached conclusions, its report was accepted by both local government bodies (city and county), and the DOE was significantly responsive to the task force throughout its work. The local public participation process was judged successful though incomplete (in contrast to that at the state level)<sup>5</sup> by criteria given below.

B. Wayne County Citizens Review  
Committee

1. CRC mired in controversy.  
Governor stops process. CRC abolished.

Unlike the MRS task force, the Wayne County Citizens Review Committee (CRC) was unable to finish evaluating the safety and suitability of a low level radioactive waste facility proposed by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) under the Illinois-Kentucky compact. After months of stalemate and internal argument among a divided CRC, and unsuccessful efforts to get leading opponents to resign, the county board abolished the group in December, 1989, almost 2 years after its appointment. The PP process

had foundered repeatedly, Wayne County was admittedly the second choice of the IDNS, and the controversy had boiled over at the state level also. After charges by state environmental groups that the IDNS had doctored hydrogeological data at the other site (Martinsville), the governor intervened to delay and overhaul the process in October, 1989, until he could be assured that "a safe site was being chosen."<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, the Illinois state senate is investigating the IDNS siting process, citing problems noted in the CRC interim report, but hearings are postponed until March, 1990. The governor has appointed a retired state supreme court justice to conduct hearings about the adequacy of the siting process.<sup>6</sup> Since the governor now requires two complete license applications, a site choice is delayed another year until these investigations are over, and site characterization work has resumed at the Wayne County site.<sup>7</sup> A majority of the citizenry in Martinsville (the other site), the city government and its Citizens Advisory Committee are apparently in agreement that their locale would welcome the proposed LLW facility.

## 2. Extensive opposition surfaces after Wayne County Board initiates process.

The Wayne County Board had initiated the process in early 1988 by responding to invitation from IDNS to allow investigation of possible LLW sites in exchange for payments from the state. Local opponents have vigorously opposed the facility throughout, having dominated the discussion and framed the issues since successfully demanding an advisory referendum early in the process. The resulting vote in November, 1988 showed 68% of the voters in opposition to the facility. After encouragement from state officials during the senate hearings about process problems, the organized opposition (ICE - Individuals for a Clean Environment) is preparing for another referendum in March, 1990, in hopes of sending a further message to state officials and IDNS about citizen opinion that differs markedly from that of local elected officials, particularly the county board chairman.

## 3. CRC cites problems in siting process.

The interim (now, final) report of the CRC in July, 1989, listed many difficulties with their participation in the siting process, such as not having received information in a timely way, change of contractor in

mid-stream (July, 1989), and inability to establish a working relationship with the IDNS.<sup>8</sup> It recommended to the Wayne County Board that no further positive action be taken concerning the facility until a majority of the citizens of the county are more favorable toward the project. In May, 1989, the CRC had notified IDNS that it would not negotiate further on a possible contract until seven major categories of information were received from IDNS. Because of the particular "parallel paths" designed by IDNS for the technical and public acceptance tracks for testing and licensing the site, some of these categories of information will not be available until well after the time IDNS had scheduled local contracts to be signed. Thus, the site characterization data available to the Wayne County CRC was incomplete in May and would still have been incomplete in October, 1989, when the IDNS director originally planned to make his determination of site suitability.

## 4. Internal divisions on external proposal.

Though the decision on Wayne County's technical (and, likely political) suitability as a LLW site will be made outside the county, local politics and pre-existing divisions and suspicion have colored and directed the argument internally. The most intense disagreement and hostility is within the county, rather than between the county and IDNS or its contractors. Opponents focused primarily upon the issue of community consent and the action of the County Board in voting to continue site characterization despite the overwhelming referendum vote. Protests before the County Board are met with silence or brief acknowledgment. Because IDNS is viewed by most citizens with distrust, every new development caused more speculation and cynicism. Most citizen energy is devoted to stalemating or defeating their fellow citizens who favor the facility. Concerns about future violence are voiced frequently by opponents "unless this thing is stopped." Because of declining county tax base, compensation and payments for participation in the LLW siting process attracted the County Board to enter the process. Opponents view this arrangement as a bribe and attack the County Board for opening the door to Pandora's Box and refusing to respond to majority opinion opposing the siting.

## 5. Proponents work behind the scenes.

Meanwhile, proponents have been largely silent after initial support made business

and professional interests the target of verbal abuse and economic boycotts. Many fear that Fairfield and Wayne County are dying from continuing economic decline, and would welcome new jobs and new residents. Opponents made no distinction between those willing to consider a facility, those in favor of a facility or those wanting to continue the process. They lumped all shades of non-opposition opinion together, attacking them as irresponsible, self-centered, undemocratic, and willing to put all citizens in jeopardy from the dangers of a nuclear waste facility. The hostility and rancor run deep, often separating families, neighbors, and friends. Both on and off the CRC, proponents remained fairly passive in public, preferring to work behind the scenes. While most proponents are uneasy or unhappy over the way the IDNS has conducted the process, they consider much of the opposition "misguided" and the activities of the CRC as "unfortunate." Proponents see major benefits for Wayne County from a "world class facility" being located there and feel that it can be safely operated. At the same time, they are skeptical that the final decision on siting will be made within the county. Persons on both sides assured the author that no middle ground remained.

#### 6. CRC reflects community division.

In this polarized and contentious environment, the CRC had difficulty focusing upon its evaluation and information tasks. Early months were spent defining its powers and arguing internally, precipitating resignations from among the few technical people originally appointed. Subsequent appointments by the County Board chairman resulted in a majority who favored the facility, including the chairman and another County Board member. Because of disputes between the two co-chairs, the CRC obtained the services of an outside consultant as moderator to conduct its meetings and organize the agenda. This step brought order and some civility back to the CRC meetings, but failed to modify their polarization. Because of the passivity of proponents, the opponents continued to dominate the agenda despite their minority status. In the vacuum of proponent inactivity, the CRC became the voice for skeptics and opponents, led by the opposing co-chair, who scheduled a continuing series of critical outside speakers and hired an independent, out-of-state geologist to review the geological work of the IDNS at the Wayne County site.

#### 7. Disputes over information and expertise.

Arguments about information were continuous - over its adequacy, source, validity, or timeliness. CRC members who oppose the facility have declined to participate in IDNS-sponsored fact-finding trips to Barnwell, S.C. or other relevant sites. Barnwell is the currently licensed LLW facility operated by Chem-Nuclear, now designated the proposed facility designer and operator. Many opponents both on and off the CRC objected vigorously to the author's recommendation to the CRC that all go to Barnwell and judge for themselves the adequacy of Chem-Nuclear's operation and stewardship of the facility. This recommendation was viewed as "taking sides" or "selling out." Anti-facility CRC members objected repeatedly to the "non-information" included in or non-credibility of IDNS' regular reports to the CRC and in summer '89 limited the time available to the IDNS spokesperson at their meetings. Proponents, on the other hand, made no effort to schedule speakers of their own but objected to the particular speakers arranged by opposition members of the CRC. Credibility and credentials were matters of dispute and challenge in CRC meetings or in the local media. Extensive IDNS staff resumes were distributed at one meeting after such challenges. Pleas for cooperation and focus upon the tasks at hand by the author in the role of outside consultant in order to safeguard the county's future options had little influence, as both sides continued their efforts to defeat or stalemate the other. By late summer, 1989, when IDNS arranged a trip to France to review LLW efforts there, no CRC opponents were invited to attend.

#### 8. CRC bypassed, then abolished.

By summer, 1989, both the County Board and IDNS increasingly bypassed the CRC altogether in discussions and negotiations. When two key overworked IDNS community affairs staffers resigned, complaints increased about neglect of Wayne Co. IDNS then sent two highly-paid technical consultants to discuss the facility and its advantages with local decisionmakers and the county board. Their reports to IDNS, one of which was obtained by opponents and published in the local press, described efforts at influencing local influentials apart from the CRC. Then the process was stopped by the governor, as described previously. After a particularly contentious meeting of the CRC, the Wayne County Board abolished the CRC in early December, thereby effectively depriving

the opposition group of any official voice in the proceedings in Wayne County. Letters to the editor by opponents had already been restricted by the local press.

## METHODS AND ANALYSIS

### A. Questions for Analysis

What characteristics of communities lead to such differences in evaluating impacts and costs or in considering ways to grasp the benefits which might occur from waste siting? Why does one community concentrate upon averting risks through opposing siting while another looks for ways to turn disadvantages and risks to benefits through negotiation of compensation and mitigating conditions? What differences in siting process and siting agency actions are important to siting outcomes? Can generalizations about siting process requirements be drawn from the unique characteristics of individual communities and their experiences with evaluating technical projects with long-term impacts? What role did public participation and compensation play in developing institutional arrangements in each case? Was the technical expertise available to each TF adequate to the demands and needs of the area? Can hiring outside technical expertise compensate for lack of in-house technical expertise in a potential non-nuclear host area? How did the risk-bearers evaluate the process in each case? These working questions guided the initial conceptualization and analysis.

New questions were added as the two cases became more dissimilar with unexpected developments in the still-unfolding saga of Illinois LLW siting. These were: What non-local factors impinge upon the PP process, affecting outcomes and the ability of local TFs to serve local needs? What are the special needs of volunteer host sites whose initial perception of economic benefits draws them into the process? Is voluntarism in siting a Trojan horse or spider's parlor ("Come into my parlor," said the spider to the fly...) as local opponents see this process and its offers of compensation? What constitutes "community consent" in controversial areas of waste siting? What measures beyond consent of local elected officials should be obtained?

### B. Methods

The methods involved participant observation and intensive interviews of the major players in both cases. The author was a volunteer-consultant to the socioeconomic subcommittee of the MRS task force and a paid

consultant to the Wayne County CRC for seven months in 1989. Whereas the sampling of 13 (of 31) MRS TF members was judged adequate to give the initial range of views and represent the three subcommittees, two geographical jurisdictions and technical/non-technical members, the complexity of the Illinois situation and its variety of actors required a much larger set of interviews. Initially some 70 Wayne County interviewees were contacted, which included the full set of current (and some past) CRC members, about half of the County Board, most of the opponent leadership, and several community, business, commercial and oil industry leaders. As one upheaval after another occurred, those involved outside Wayne County expanded to include state environmental groups, a new contractor, the IDNS state-wide Citizens Advisory Group, the governor and state senate. Therefore 15 additional interviewees from these groups were added. The changing circumstances and highly contentious nature of events necessitated a significant amount of re-interviewing of the group of 85 informants to follow their views of events and to test disputed facts and events. For about 20 key informants, one to five additional contacts were made.

Secondary data collection in both cases involved obtaining and reviewing numerous reports, minutes, information from DOE and IDNS, as well as local newspapers over the entire period of task force operation (siting process).

### C. Analysis - Contrasts and Comparisons

Comparison of similarities and differences between the two cases was undertaken in an effort to identify commonalities as well as unique characteristics of the two potential host areas and how these affected the outcomes. We sought to identify common and unique features of the community involvement/public participation/information evaluation aspects of the high level and low level waste siting processes.

Successful public participation (PP) is defined here as any interactive siting process whose outcomes reduce conflict between stakeholders and agency proponents and which results in a lasting decision.<sup>5</sup> Criteria for evaluating the PP process included the pre-conditions defined in Carnes<sup>9</sup> and elsewhere.

Although this report concentrates only on Wayne County, Illinois, it should be noted in fairness to IDNS that the PP/siting process at the primary Illinois LLW site, Martinsville, has received substantial public

acceptance and is moving toward likely siting. This very different outcome deserves equal attention and comparison to that in Wayne County, but a full evaluation of the LLW siting and PP process in Illinois is not attempted here.

As seen in the three tables following, the two cases reflect very different local circumstances, resources, siting processes, and had very different outcomes. Table 1 compares the two host areas on selected community and economic indicators. Both areas were concerned over their declining economic prospects though their economic bases differed considerably. Whereas the City of Oak Ridge practiced relatively open government and a well-developed variety of citizen participation activities, both counties were more closed and had less citizen participation.

In Table 2, the different characteristics and operating modes of the two task forces are seen in almost every category. The Wayne County CRC functioned in a different manner than proposed, disagreeing with the County Board chairman who had appointed it. But the CRC closely reflected the pre-existing divisions of the county which were exacerbated by the prospect of a LLW facility.

Except for the action of their respective states in stopping the siting process, there is very little similarity between the two cases in their siting processes, as shown in Table 3. Even in that instance, the two

states acted for different reasons. It is expected that the LLW siting process will be resumed in Illinois when current difficulties are ironed out.

## CONCLUSIONS

### A. From Comparisons of the Two Counties

- Prior local experience with active public participation in community affairs and local government is probably necessary to enable a successful public participation experience for such a difficult task as nuclear waste facility siting. It is too much to expect a successful PP experience when NW siting presents the FIRST such opportunity to participate actively in decisions affecting its future as in Wayne County.
- Local experience with large, federal nuclear projects provided a supportive, knowledgeable climate for the Oak Ridge-Roane County TF. Lack of similar experience proved a major barrier to developing information or acceptance in Illinois.
- Past history of extensive local conflicts and division should probably disqualify areas from being considered as "volunteers" for NW siting. Lack of practice with consensus building is a key indicator for difficulty.
- Economic need impelled both areas into the siting process and into considering the proposed waste facility. Other factors then determined the success or failure of the process.

Table 1. Comparison of Two Host Areas - Communities

	Oak Ridge & Roane County	Wayne County, Illinois
Local public particip. experience	Yes - City Oak Ridge Some- Roane County	No
Open government	Yes - City Oak Ridge. Some- Roane County.	No
N-industry background	Yes, for entire area	No
Economic base	Dependent on federal nuclear plants & labs.	Rural agricultural area. Declining oil extraction economy
Employment	17,000 N-employment, but programs cut back.	High unemployment (10-14%)
Major prior conflicts	No	Yes. Same factional divisions in this dispute.

Table 2. Comparison of Two Citizen Task Forces - Characteristics & Operation

	MRS Task Force (TN)	Wayne Co. CRC (IL)
Appointment of TF	OR City Council votes on volunteer resumes. Roane Co. exec. appoints.	Co. Bd. chairman appts.
Leadership experience	Yes. Experienced asst. city manager	No prior civic experience
In house technical experience	Yes. 50% have tech. experience in nuclear science.	No. Two w. oil industry backgr. Other technical resign early.
Funding	\$100,000 from DOE via state. Used for staff support, expenses, trips.	\$150,000 from Compact Commission. Only 1/3 spent.
Time elapsed	3.5 mo for final report 6 mo. for total	17 mo. to interim report. 21 mo. until abolished.
TF charge	Assess safety, evaluate impacts Negotiate conditions w. DOE.	Assess safety & suitability.
TF actual function	Same as above.	No info to assess safety, decided facil. unsuitable. Forum & safety valve for skeptics & opponents.
Consensus reached?	Yes, even among initial opponents.	No. CRC deeply divided
TF turnover	Very little. Only 2 of 31 inactive.	Much. 6 resignations. 7 replacements.
Public attendance at TF meetings	Variable. Public input meetings. Special forum for opponents.	Much. Reg. attendance by 20-50 opponents.
TF work accepted by local government?	Yes. City & co. govts. received & adopted TF report.	No. Co. Bd. never acted on interim report. Abolished CRC after 21 months.

B. From Comparisons of the Two Task Forces

- Task force leadership is a key to success or failure. The MRS task force was led by an experienced assistant city manager who set objectives and schedules and had knowledge of the federal EIS process. Neither co-chair of the Wayne Co. CRC had prior civic or community experience and one was a new resident.

- TF roles differed because of differences in the communities and siting process. The MRS TF role of assessment, evaluation and negotiation with a single, authoritative local DOE representative was possible because of the relatively uncomplicated, defined process and the lack of significant local opposition. They did not have to deal with vocal local opponents, with a changing process whose outcome depended in part on their

work, or with myriad additional state level actors, as did the Wayne Co. CRC.

- Because of the split in Wayne County (and CRC) views, the CRC assumed a defacto role as safety valve/reflector of this internal conflict. It became the forum and outlet for majority skeptical and opposing opinion. The CRC could not function as evaluator of the LLW proposal, given the context of pre-existing community divisions and local power struggles.

- In-house technical expertise is critical to the functioning of any citizen task force. Such expertise was available in the MRS TF but not in Wayne County except for some experience of oil industry personnel with radionuclides. Two-thirds of the designated Compact Commission funds of \$150,000 for outside consultants was still unspent when

Table 3. Siting Process Comparisons - High Level Vs. Low Level Radioactive Waste

	MRS - HLW - Federal Process	Wayne Co. - LLW-State Process
Siting decision timing	Made by DOE before process began	To be made by IDNS at end
Local initiation	No	Yes. Wayne Co. Bd. responds to IDNS offer of payments for site characterization.
State role	Tenn. strongly opposes siting.	Ill. favors siting. IDNS is proponent.
State action	Tenn. vetoes siting after TF finished. Stops process.	Gov. stops process temporarily to permit resolving questions.
Degree process evolving	Some. TF-DOE negotiating stance changes during process.	Major upheavals: Contractor changes, charges of IDNS doctoring data, Gov. stops process, Senate investigates. Special hearings called.
Major actors involved	Few that affect TF work.	Many. Numerous agendas affect Task Force
Strength of local opposition	Very weak in Oak Ridge. Some in Roane County.	Strong. 68% oppose facility

CRC was abolished, due to reluctance of both the County Bd. and CRC to spend the funds.

- Task force legitimacy remains a problem, and can be easily undermined by actions of the proposer or the political body which appoints the TF.

### C. Comparing the Two Public Participation Processes

- Community consent remains the central issue and needs to be considered in a broader context than mere approval by elected representatives. Because of the refusal of local elected representatives to acknowledge the difference in views about the facility between them and the majority of voters in Wayne County, the entire CRC effort became focused toward this conflict. "Democracy" became the watchword and campaign of the opposition which was outraged by the situation.

- The greater complexity, uncertainty and changing players of the Illinois LLW process and the large number of actors at the state level strongly influenced the CRC effort as well as causing local confusion and alienation.

- The two cases differed greatly in the nature and authority of local proposer staff available on site to deal with the task force, provide information and negotiate. Whereas the MRS TF dealt directly and daily with an authoritative local DOE representative, the Wayne Co. CRC had to rely on monthly visits by IDNS community affairs staff who largely carried messages back and forth. IDNS legal staff rejected conditions proposed by either side with little discussion.

- Building trust and countering distrust in potential host areas remains the most difficult task for NW proposers. Responsiveness to local concerns and information needs remains the major avenue for building trust by proposers. The criterion that the siting agency must be seen as being both competent and having sufficient authority to negotiate was largely fulfilled in Oak Ridge. IDNS staff were not perceived as competent by most Wayne Countians and did not have adequate authority to carry out their tasks there.

- In both cases, the public participation process evolved and changed over time. In Tennessee, the evolution was minor involving

internal process and negotiating stance with DOE. In Illinois, the changes were so abrupt and unexpected as to give the impression of chaos rather than evolution.

- Despite the totally different interest of the two states, both states acted to stop the siting process. In Tennessee, the state exercised its veto over the proposed MRS siting in its role as opponent, while the governor of Illinois stopped the LLW siting process temporarily because of charges of improper actions by IDNS, the state agency acting as licensing agent and promoter.

- IDNS laid out the Illinois process to meet its own administrative and legal deadlines without regard for citizen needs for certain types of information (safety and technology adequacy) in a certain order. Making the decision on safety first<sup>8</sup> was impossible when the contractor changed after a year. Second, the IDNS schedule required negotiating and signing a possible contract BEFORE information from site characterization was available. These proposer-enforced deadlines forced the PP process off track, confusing and alienating most citizens, and deepening distrust.

- A well defined playing field is a clear advantage to the siting process. Too many uncertainties, outside interference or abrupt changes can damage the process seriously.

- Generous compensation not tied to effective, interactive PP process can have a negative effect as in Wayne County where distrust of government and proposer performance is high.

- Though neither potential host area is likely to actually be chosen as a site, one (Wayne County) has been damaged by its participation in the LLW siting process which exacerbated and deepened old divisions, intensifying conflict. The other (Oak Ridge-Roane County) has suffered few if any negative effects from its participation in the MRS siting process.

- Equity problems are equally difficult in LLW as in HLW siting. State management of LLW, intended to reduce political, equity and siting problems has not done so.<sup>10</sup> Instead, equity struggles are merely reformatted, with the state agency (IDNS) instead of the feds as the bad outsider. Potential host areas in rural, economically depressed areas still resent the efforts of more populous, energy-consuming areas to ship their wastes elsewhere.

- The prospects of voluntary public acceptance of nuclear wastes in return for compensation, jobs, and resources for self-assessment remain problematic in the Illinois experience and that of other LLW state compacts. True voluntarism is very difficult to develop since assent by local elected officials is not synonymous with broad local support. Local public acceptance was achieved at Oak Ridge and apparently in California (LLW) where siting decisions were made solely by the protagonists, but where other aspects of public involvement were highly developed.

- Melding the technical and public participation (public acceptance) tracks remains the basic NW siting problem. In Illinois, problems arose in every area - timing, technical standards, public acceptance plan, and implementation, liability arrangements with contractors. The technical track was badly out of synch with public participation requirements for 1) making the decision on safety of the site and technology first and 2) only then addressing conditions for mitigation and compensation. The enforced delay by state governor and senate will have the result of enabling a much higher level of technical data to be obtained before a siting choice is made. Thus the effect is to bring the two tracks closer together belatedly at the Wayne County site, to more nearly the same stage of readiness for decision. It is doubtful that this action will have any positive effect at this late stage.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- The evolving public participation process should be recognized, protected and encouraged by all parties. Too much change can be as damaging as too little flexibility in adapted to unexpected problems. Proposers should recognize that their demands for public decisions before information is available may scuttle the PP process.

- More attention should be given to implementation of public participation plans at every stage since neglect at any stage may derail the process altogether.

- The proposer must have a continuing, effective local presence of senior personnel empowered to interact with local groups, provide information and to conduct negotiations.

- Special care is required to prevent further damaging the prospects of voluntarism in NW siting, with attention to the complex interaction of community consent, local

evaluation of impacts, and determination of appropriate levels and types of compensation.

- A satisfactory siting process is still elusive, complex and very difficult. Melding the technical and public participation (acceptance) tracks is a great challenge. Joint information development between the proposer and potential host site as well as some power sharing is likely required in order to be successful, i.e., legitimate and durable. The partnership approach has rarely been tried, but still offers considerable hope despite many siting failures.

- Care should be taken by proposers that the useful role of compensation in siting is not undermined or de-legitimized by their actions.

- Building public confidence and countering distrust requires trained personnel, significant resources and management priority by the proposer to assure sensitivity to local information needs and concerns.

- The role of any citizen task force needs to be clearly defined with regard to community consent, evaluation, information gathering, devising and negotiating contracts. Community consent requirements are probably better served by addressing them outside the TF through the usual local representative government bodies and/or binding referenda after the TF has finished its evaluation function.

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