DISARMAMENT

The United Nations and Disarmament since 1945

United Nations
Preface

The cover reproduces the emblem of the United Nations and the emblem of the World Disarmament Campaign, a global information programme on arms limitation, disarmament and international security, launched by the General Assembly in 1982 at its second special session devoted to disarmament. The programme has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding of and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. In order to achieve those goals, the programme is carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

As part of the programme's activities, the Department for Disarmament Affairs provides information materials on arms limitation and disarmament issues to the non-specialized reader. Such materials cover, in an easily accessible style, issues which may be of particular interest to a broad public. This is one such publication. It is published in the official languages of the United Nations and intended for worldwide dissemination free of charge.

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The United Nations and Disarmament since 1945

Introduction
The founding of the United Nations at San Francisco, during the final months of the Second World War, in the summer of 1945, symbolized the beginning of a new era in international relations. The Charter of the United Nations embodied principles and provided a forum to discourage war as an instrument of policy between nations. The first of those principles was the commitment to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Moreover, within the framework of the Charter, the world Organization offered opportunities for Member States to develop new forums, methods and international machinery of cooperation for international peace and security. To help achieve that goal, the Charter entrusted the General Assembly and the Security Council with the responsibility for dealing with questions of arms limitation and disarmament.

Only days after the signing of the Charter, the world entered into a dramatic new era—the nuclear age—which, as it turned out, gave a completely new dimension to all human endeavours. The newly formed United Nations was thus confronted with unprecedented military and political problems. The Charter had envisaged arms limitation and disarmament as elements in the progressive establishment of an international security system. However, the revolutionary changes brought about by the
discovery of nuclear energy gave significant additional emphasis to disarmament in international politics and security.

A few months after the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations General Assembly adopted its first resolution: it was on disarmament, and specifically on the establishment of a commission—the Atomic Energy Commission—whose terms of reference were designed to ensure the elimination of atomic and all other weapons of mass destruction and the use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. The General Assembly also underlined, later that year in resolution 41(I), the connection between the questions of disarmament and of peace and security.

Since that time, the United Nations has, over the years, dealt with disarmament questions using a variety of bodies, methods, techniques and approaches. The problems involved are complex and are often seen to affect the vital security interests of States. The political compromises necessary to solve them have therefore often been difficult to reach, and the results achieved have often been characterized as modest.

In recent years the General Assembly, its First Committee and the Disarmament Commission have been the main United Nations deliberative bodies in the field of disarmament. The General Assembly sometimes also establishes ad hoc committees to deal with specific disarmament matters. In addition, since 1962 a
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum—now known as the Conference on Disarmament—has been in place in Geneva. The Conference on Disarmament, with 39 participating States, has a unique relationship with the United Nations. While it defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, it takes into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly and reports to the Assembly annually or, as appropriate, more frequently.

Changing approaches to disarmament

The needs and the basic objectives of disarmament have remained constant through the years, but the approach to the subject and the scope of negotiations have changed, as a reflection of varying political realities and international conditions. The technical problems related to disarmament have also changed along with the rapid technological and scientific advances that have been made.

At the outset, the scope of negotiations was very broad. The Atomic Energy Commission and another body—the Commission for Conventional Armaments (established in 1947)—envisaged immediate plans to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes and that all armaments and armed forces would be regulated and reduced under an international system of control and inspection. In fact, up until the early 1950s the objective was the regulation, limitation and balanced
reduction by stages of all armed forces and armaments in a coordinated, comprehensive programme.

With little progress towards agreement on a coordinated, comprehensive programme, more impetus was given in the late 1950s to a "partial approach". It was hoped that the achievement of some first, though limited, steps would increase confidence and create a more favourable atmosphere for comprehensive agreements.

Although in 1959 the General Assembly stressed general and complete disarmament under effective international control as a goal to be actively sought, partial disarmament measures continued to be pursued also. It was felt that devoting parallel and, at times, even primary attention to "collateral" measures—designed to reduce tension and build up confidence—would facilitate the complex task of achieving general and complete disarmament. The immediate hopes and expectations of the great majority of nations centred on two such measures—the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

By the mid-1960s it became widely accepted, however, that general and complete disarmament was not an attainable goal in any short or specific period. For the next fifteen years, the tendency was, therefore, to regard general disarmament as the ultimate goal and to concentrate increasingly on partial objectives.

In terms of concrete multilateral achievements, the period of 1963 to 1978 was distinctly productive. Nevertheless, the measures achieved (listed below), although
significant, were not adequate to curb the arms race or to alleviate the nuclear threat. They proscribed certain particularly undesirable developments, but did not in most cases result in substantial reductions of any of the major important weapons systems. In reaction to what they called inadequate progress on those central issues, non-aligned States took an initiative, which led to the convening of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978.

The General Assembly convened special sessions devoted to disarmament also in 1982 and 1988. The special sessions have focused international attention on the subject and have sought to identify generally acceptable ways of promoting international peace and security at significantly lower levels of armaments and armed forces.

The first special session adopted a Final Document setting out agreed goals, principles and priorities in arms limitation and disarmament. The Document stressed that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field and specified measures intended to strengthen the international and multilateral machinery that deals with disarmament issues within the United Nations system.

The following two special sessions were unable to work out similar consensus documents. However, the special session in 1988, held in a highly constructive atmosphere, contributed to a certain narrowing of differences to the extent that several proposals put forward during the session made their way into subsequent regular
sessions of the General Assembly and are being addressed more vigorously by Member States.

The Conference on Disarmament has in the last decade been primarily engaged in negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Its agenda also includes many other complex questions, for instance, a nuclear-test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Between 1986 and 1988, the General Assembly, in recognition of the increasing importance of the regional and subregional dimensions of arms limitation and disarmament, established three Regional Centres to provide substantive support for the initiatives and activities of Member States aimed at building mutual confidence and security within their respective regions and encouraging arms limitation and disarmament. The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, located in Lomé, Togo, was established in 1986; the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, located in Lima, Peru, was established in 1987; and the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, located in Kathmandu, Nepal, was established in 1988.
Main achievements
Since the beginning of the United Nations, the combined efforts of Governments at
global, regional and bilateral levels have led to a body of important agreements, treaties
and conventions committing their parties to various arms limitation and disarmament
measures. The multilateral instruments concluded so far are as follows:

Global multilateral treaties

—The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and under Water (partial test-ban Treaty) of 1963 prohibits all nuclear explosions, military
or peaceful, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It is a partial measure in
that it does not ban underground tests. The General Assembly has repeatedly urged
conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all tests by all States, including those
conducted underground.

—The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (outer space
Treaty) of 1967 bans the placing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in
Earth orbit, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space or on celestial bodies. It also
forbids the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of
any type of weapon and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.
—The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (non-proliferation Treaty) of 1968 aims at the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon countries, at promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and at facilitating access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all parties to the Treaty.

—The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (sea-bed Treaty) of 1971 bans the placement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and facilities for such weapons on or under the sea-bed anywhere outside a 12-mile limit from the coastal line.

—The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (biological weapons Convention) of 1972 bans and eliminates all forms of biological weapons. It is the first international agreement providing for a genuine measure of disarmament, in the sense that it not only prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological (bacteriological) agents or toxins and of weapons and means of delivery for such agents for hostile purposes, but also mandates their destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes.

—The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) of 1977 prohibits the use
of techniques that would have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects through deliberate manipulation of natural processes and cause such phenomena as earthquakes, tidal waves and changes in climate and in weather patterns.

—the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Agreement on celestial bodies) of 1979 complements the outer space Treaty of 1967. It prohibits, inter alia, the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes.

—the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (inhumane weapons Convention) of 1981 restricts or prohibits the use of mines and booby traps, incendiary weapons and fragments not readily detectable in the human body. These rules range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their use in conditions which would cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects.

Regional multilateral treaties

—the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 provides for the demilitarization of Antarctica and is the first treaty to put into practice the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It prohibits in the Antarctic region any type of military activity, including the testing of any kind of weapon, any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastes.
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) of 1967 creates the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area. It commits parties to the Treaty not to test, produce or acquire nuclear weapons themselves or to permit any other Power to do so or to deploy such weapons in the zone. It was the first arms limitation agreement to provide for verification by an international organization. Two Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty. According to those Protocols, respectively, States outside the region with international responsibility there would undertake to apply the Treaty’s provisions to those territories and all nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) of 1985 forbids its parties to manufacture, acquire, possess or control any nuclear explosive device inside or outside the zone. It also prohibits its parties from carrying out nuclear testing and commits them to refrain from and prevent the dumping of nuclear materials at sea anywhere within the zone. Three Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty, by which respectively, States which are internationally responsible for territories in the zone would undertake to apply provisions of the Treaty to those territories; all nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty; all nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves to refrain from the testing of nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone.
Recent changes in international relations have made possible the following additional regional agreements:

—The Vienna Document 1990 on confidence- and security-building measures, agreed on by the then 34 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), deals, *inter alia*, with annual exchanges of information on the command organization and deployment of military forces and weapons systems, on plans for future deployment, and on military budgets (giving itemized defence expenditures). These measures are integrated with a set of concrete, militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures previously worked out at the Stockholm Conference and adopted by it in 1986. Designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, the measures included, for example, prior notification and observation of certain military activities, exchange of data, and compliance and verification provisions. The Vienna and Stockholm Documents have evolved as a part of the CSCE process initiated at the first meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which, in 1975 in Helsinki, incorporated a document on confidence-building measures into its Final Act, known as the Helsinki Final Act.

—The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990, between member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), seeks to establish a stable and secure balance of
conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces and the capability to launch a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. The Treaty puts equal ceilings and subceilings for the two sides on tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It also sets up an elaborate system of verification, including data exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection and on-site monitoring of the destruction of military equipment to be reduced.

**Bilateral treaties**

Negotiations between the two major Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have produced a number of bilateral agreements, including:

—The *Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems* (ABM Treaty) of 1972 restricts in general the development of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and specifically limits deployment of ABM systems to two sites with no more than 100 launchers each. By a Protocol of 1974, the deployment of ABM systems is further limited to a single area, with no more than 100 launchers.

—The *Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* of 1972 (SALT I) established limitations for a five-year period—which could be extended—on the number of launchers of strategic weapons.
—Under the *Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War* of 1973, the two parties agree to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an objective of their policies and to make all efforts towards guaranteeing stability and peace.


—The *Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes* (peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty) of 1976 prohibits the carrying out of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, or any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons. The Treaty entered into force in 1990 following the conclusion of a protocol on verification.

—The *Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* of 1979 (SALT II) established limits on the number and types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The Treaty never entered into force.

—The *Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers* of 1987 establishes centres in Washington and Moscow to be used for exchanging data and providing notifications as required under certain current agreements, including the
The Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) of 1987 provides for the elimination of all United States and Soviet ground-launched intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles, their launchers and all their support equipment. A notable aspect of the Treaty is found in its verification provisions, which include on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and national technical means of verification (satellite observation).

The Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles of 1988 stipulates 24 hours advance notification of the date, launch area and area of impact of missile launches.

The Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons of 1990 provides that each party will begin the destruction of its chemical weapons by 31 December 1992 and will have reduced its arsenal by 31 December 2002 to not more than 5,000 agent tons. Each party will not produce chemical weapons as of the date that the Agreement enters into force.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 stipulates that each side will be limited to a ceiling of 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles— interconti-
nental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their launchers, and heavy bombers—and to 6,000 “accountable” warheads deployed on these systems. The Treaty, which is the first agreement to actually reduce strategic nuclear weapons, will do so by approximately 30 per cent over 7 years under very stringent verification.

The present and future
For more than 45 years no subject has received more continuous and increasing attention at the United Nations than has arms limitation and disarmament. While there has been some progress on arms regulation and limitation, the disarmament agreements concluded since the founding of the United Nations have not lessened the need for further measures. World military expenditure has risen to an estimated level of more than $US 900 billion a year. Armaments have accumulated and become more sophisticated, absorbing scarce resources to the detriment of economic and social development in many countries. Some 150 wars, fought with non-nuclear weapons, have taken place since the end of the Second World War, leaving a death toll of around 20 million persons, most of them civilians.

Also, some 50,000 nuclear weapons remain deployed worldwide, enough to destroy the world many times over. It is true that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, and with fundamental changes in Europe and in the major-Power relationship the fear of a nuclear confrontation is fading. However, nuclear proliferation
is often seen as a continued danger and the risk of nuclear weapons being used—whether willfully or by accident—remains a central concern of the international community.

Furthermore, the possibility of the further refinement of existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of nuclear weapons by additional States continues to be a deep concern. Also, in recent years, reports on the increasing number of countries developing short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and seeking to develop or acquire a chemical-weapon capability have given rise to added concern. The question of conventional arms transfers, too, has deserved increased attention by the international community in the past few years and particularly after the hostilities in the Persian Gulf in early 1991. These issues may be expected to gain further attention in the present decade.

This is, in brief, the general framework that surrounds the debate of the General Assembly's First Committee. The United Nations, through its Assembly resolutions, brings new problems to the forefront of attention. Issues on the present disarmament agenda of the General Assembly include a comprehensive test ban; arms transfers; confidence- and security-building; regional arms and force limitation; measures relating to naval arms and forces; relationship between environment and security, such as nuclear waste dumping and destruction of chemical weapons; and the impact of scientific and technological advances on armaments and disarmament, for instance, the transfer of dual-use technologies and the development of verification technologies. The relationship between disarmament and development was the subject
of an International Conference held at United Nations Headquarters in 1987. As arms and armed forces are reduced, this question has of necessity re-emerged in a somewhat different light. Attention has begun to focus on the issue of a "peace dividend" and on the problems of conversion from military to civilian production and services.

While the United Nations helps to give prominence to arms limitation and disarmament on the international agenda, the state of affairs on the international scene profoundly affects the opportunity for meaningful results in this field. Recent changes in international relations are therefore viewed as a welcome development. Notably in this regard, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". The successful conclusion and implementation of the INF Treaty of 1987 represents a milestone in the quest for nuclear disarmament. The United States-Soviet negotiation on reductions in their strategic offensive arms (START), concluded in July 1991, will result in cuts of about one third in their strategic nuclear arsenals—the most drastic cuts in nuclear weapons since the beginning of the nuclear age.

In the non-nuclear sphere, ground-breaking confidence- and security-building measures, designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe, were agreed on in 1986. A new set of confidence- and security-building measures was adopted on 17 November 1990 by the States—35 as of 19 June 1991—participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Also, the historic CFE Treaty was signed by representatives of the 22 member States of NATO and of the WTO on

As the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stressed, since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations and agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament should be seen as complementary.

As was also stressed by the Final Document, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. In this regard, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General, is the component of the United Nations Secretariat which assists and advises the Secretary-General in dealing with arms limitation and disarmament matters within the United Nations framework. It provides secretariat, administrative and substantive services to the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and ad hoc bodies, as well as to expert groups assisting the Secretary-General in undertaking disarmament studies. It publishes a variety of information materials on disarmament issues; provides guidance and coordination within the United Nations for the activities of the global information programme on arms limitation and disarmament questions launched as the World
Disarmament Campaign by the General Assembly at its 1982 special session; and maintains relations with governmental and non-governmental organizations and research institutes. The Department also carries out a Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme. Furthermore, it administers the United Nations Regional Centres for disarmament, established by the General Assembly in Africa, in Asia and the Pacific, and in Latin America and the Caribbean.

While the Conference on Disarmament offers a forum for the actual negotiation of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the United Nations functions as a forum for exchanging views and identifying common ground, and as a barometer of international consensus on issues of security, arms limitation and disarmament. For instance, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus, in 1988, principles on verification and guidelines for confidence-building measures at the global and regional levels, and in 1990, a broad range of general guidelines on how to approach and deal with conventional disarmament. In addition, disarmament studies of the United Nations—altogether 46 as of the fall of 1991, with two more still in progress—being neither theoretical research of an abstract nature nor diplomatic negotiations between Governments, are intended to produce a careful and comprehensive assessment of complex issues, often serving as “pre-negotiation” exploration of topical subjects.

More recently, due to extensive and rapid changes on the international scene, the United Nations has been increasingly called upon by the international community to
assume new and important responsibilities. For example, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, the United Nations is, for the first time, given the responsibility of overseeing the actual destruction of a State's war capabilities. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which sets specific terms for a formal cease-fire to end the hostilities in the Persian Gulf area, the Secretary-General has established a Special Commission to carry out, with the assistance of the United Nations, the dismantling of Iraq's mass-destruction-weapon capabilities. This includes the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and all related components and facilities for their production and, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of all similar capabilities relating to nuclear weapons.

Looking ahead, issues of security, arms limitation and disarmament will remain high on the agenda of the international community. The United Nations, as the only universal organization that offers a possibility of viewing the issues of war, peace and security from a global perspective, will remain a major vehicle for the realization of arms limitation and disarmament objectives.

However, we must bear in mind that disarmament is a long and arduous process. Progress in this respect, therefore, cannot be measured solely by the number and frequency of new agreements or conventions. This process usually goes through several phases. It often starts with an in-depth study of the issue by small groups of experts, where problems are identified and alternative approaches are suggested and
clarified. It then moves to a second, wider deliberative stage, clearing the way for a consensus among States that may lead to active negotiations in a third stage. If successful, this stage is crowned by the completion of an agreement. A fourth stage occurs when an agreement is implemented. Here the initial institutional arrangements for such measures as reductions and data exchange are carried out. A fifth stage involves monitoring and the verification of compliance. Problems which arise may be dealt with through consultation among parties and, if necessary, enforcement activity aimed at offsetting violations. Finally, in a sixth stage, an agreement may be modified, amended, or extended, based on the findings of a periodic review process that serves as a tool to review the operation and implementation of treaty provisions.

The objectives of arms limitation and disarmament pursued at the United Nations cannot be achieved without the political will of Member States and their determined collective effort. It is therefore fundamental that, in the search for meaningful measures of arms limitation and disarmament, the legitimate security interests of each and every sovereign State be fully respected and taken into account. Disarmament, in fact, will be the result of a growing sense of security among the members of the international community. In the nuclear age, no State can hope to attain security for itself if it entails lowering or undermining the security—real or perceived—of other States; the goal therefore is to enhance security through fewer arms, not through increasing levels of nuclear and conventional forces.
In this regard, the United Nations is but a tool, an instrument which the international community has voluntarily devised to deal with issues that affect humanity. The extent to which this tool is used to good effect lies with the Member States. In the field of disarmament, the potential of this unique and universal organization has yet to be fully realized.
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