SIGNATURE DE LA CONVENTION
D'INTERDICTION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES
Paris 13-15 Janvier 1993
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The cover photograph shows the podium during the Signing Ceremony for the chemical weapons Convention held at UNESCO House, Paris from 13 to 15 January 1993. To the right of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, and an unidentified interpreter. To the left of the Secretary-General is President Francois Mitterrand of France, Roland Dumas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, and Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO.

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Russia and the United States sign START II

On 3 January 1993, President Bush and President Yeltsin signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It codifies the Joint Understanding signed by the two Presidents on 17 June 1992 at the Washington Summit. START I provides for cutting the number of warheads for all strategic weapons from 9,000–10,000 on each side to about 6,500 for the Soviet successor States and 8,500 for the United States. START II is to reduce these numbers to 3,000 for Russia and 3,500 for the United States. START II will ban all long-range, land-based missiles with multiple nuclear warheads. These MIRVED missiles, long regarded as the most destabilizing of nuclear weapons, include Russia's SS-18s.

A final negotiating concern was the Russian desire to limit its compliance costs. Consequently it was agreed that:
• Russia would keep 90 of its fixed silos for single-warhead missiles, but pour five metres of concrete in the bottom to prevent any possible reuse by SS-18s;
• 105 of the 170 Russian SS-19 multiple-warhead missiles will not be destroyed, but converted into single-warhead missiles.

Under START II, the United States is to:
• Convert 100 additional strategic bombers to conventional roles, and reduce the number of weapons carried on its strategic bombers by 36%, from 3,700 warheads to 1,272.
• Cut its sea-based strategic weapons arsenal in half to 1,750. (At the same time, Russia is to cut its 2,780 warhead SLBM force to 1,650–1,750 warheads.)

Welcoming the START II agreement, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed out that the reductions to be carried out under the Treaty will, for the first time in the long history of nuclear weapons, bring their total numbers down to the levels which had existed in the 1960s. He also expressed his earnest hope that the Treaty would expeditiously be brought into effect with the full cooperation of all those concerned. START II will not come into force until START I and its additional protocol signed at Lisbon last May have been ratified by all parties—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States. The Lisbon Protocol specifies that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine shall adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, which Belarus has done.

When the United States Senate approved START I on 1 October 1992 by a vote of 93–6, it stipulated that a failure of any of its three new States parties to adhere to the NPT would constitute a violation of START.

When the Russian Parliament approved START I on 4 November 1992, the Supreme Soviet specified that the treaty could not come into force until all parties met their commitment in the Lisbon Protocol.

Belarus and Kazakhstan have ratified START I and have also agreed to become non-nuclear weapon States in accordance with the Lisbon Protocol, but the Parliament of Ukraine has not yet acted. Ukrainian President Kravchuk has agreed to transfer all 176 strategic nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory to Russia, but he is asking for security assurances from Russia and the United States, and for $1.5 billion to dismantle the missiles.
CWC signed at Paris

130 States signed the chemical weapons Convention during the Signing Ceremony held at Paris on 13, 14 and 15 January 1993. An additional 58 States attended the meeting but did not sign, although seven more did by 8 February. See page 6 for the list.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, goes far beyond the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which banned only the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. The new Convention will not only prohibit the use of poisonous gases and asphyxiants, but will also prohibit research, development, production and stockpiling. It also provides for the destruction of existing chemical weapons and CW production facilities.

The CWC will come into force on 13 January 1995 if, by that time, at least 65 States have ratified it. The Convention is of unlimited duration and permits no reservations.

Implementation of the Convention will be based on the declarations to be made by each State party with respect to:
• whether it owns or possesses any chemical weapons;
• the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons under its jurisdiction;
• any chemical weapons on its territory owned by another State or under its jurisdiction and located on the territory of another State;
• whether it has transferred or received any chemical weapons since 1 January 1946;
• providing a general plan for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities that it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons, each State party is to declare whether it has any on its territory or on the territory of other States and is to provide information on them.

As regards chemical weapons production facilities, each State party is to:
• declare whether it has had any at any time since 1 January 1946;
• specify any it has or has had except any on its territory that another State owns;
• declare whether it has transferred or received any equipment for the production of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946;
• provide a general plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is in any place under its jurisdiction or control, including the time-frame for measures and the methods of destruction;
• specify actions to be taken for closure of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located under its jurisdiction with a description of the measures taken to inactivate the facility;
• provide its general plan for any temporary conversion of any CW facility into a CW destruction facility.

With respect to other facilities, each party is to specify the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment under its ownership, possession, jurisdiction or control that has been designed, constructed or used since January 1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons, including laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

As regards riot control agents, each party is to specify the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for riot control purposes. This declaration is to be updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective.

Each State party is to adopt measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred or used for purposes not prohibited under the CWC. To this end, the chemicals that are prohibited are listed in three schedules.

The Convention will establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to ensure implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it.
NGO Forum on the chemical weapons Convention

On 29 October 1992, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) and the Department of Public Information (DPI), in cooperation with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, held a Forum on the chemical weapons Convention.

The meeting, chaired by Farouk Mawlawi of DPI, was addressed by representatives of Australia, Chile, Germany, Iran and the United States.

Opening the meeting, Mr. Mawlawi quoted from the 27 October statement of the Secretary-General: “It is easier to make war than to make peace. It would be an abandonment of our essential duties if we did not equip ourselves with the means to make peace. Disarmament is the first of those means”.

In an introductory statement, Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, said that the CWC closed the circle in providing a legal foundation for dealing with weapons of mass destruction.

Speaking as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany said the Convention was unique:

- Compared to the NPT, it was absolutely non-discriminatory and treats all parties alike.
- Compared to the biological weapons Convention, it contains a verification regime which was unique in a universally applicable treaty.

The CWC provides for a cooperative legal instrument to eliminate the spectre of chemical warfare once and for all, he stated. The unique character of its contents is strengthened by the consistent application of two principles to which we adhered during the last rounds of negotiations: the overall balance, and the applicability to future needs.

Future States parties are offered a balanced legal instrument providing clarity on the fundamental obligations, and also enough subtlety on matters of implementation so that with the consent of States parties, the respective provisions may still mature and evolve in the course of future practice. Ambassador von Wagner then outlined the main provisions of the Convention (as summarized in the next article).

Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States made a number of points which he said would be relatively journalistic. As the CD operates by consensus, he said one might presume that the result would be a consensus document, but this was not the case. There had been a number of very grave differences in the negotiations—“so compromise was very much the order of the day”.

As the CD operates by consensus, he said one might presume that the result would be a consensus document, but this was not the case. There had been a number of very grave differences in the negotiations—“so compromise was very much the order of the day”.

Ambassador Ledogar expressed concern that neither China nor any of the Arab States were among the sponsors (144 finally) of the General Assembly resolution endorsing the Convention.

(At the Signing Ceremony from 13–15 January, and in the following weeks, Algeria, China, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen became early signatory States.)

Ambassador Ledogar stressed that, “the universality of the Convention, once it enters into force, is extremely important”. To the extent that the Organization functions properly, demonstrating that cheating is really likely to be discovered, and politically very dangerous, he thought there would be important progress towards the effect the CWC was trying to achieve.

“In connection with universality, we have tried to build into the endeavour certain incentives to assist in the direction of universality to make it attractive to join, to make it unattractive to stay outside. Certain articles in the Convention provide for assistance that will be rendered to ensure the security of all participants and allow for the elimination of export controls that were designed to inhibit trade in dangerous chemicals, and other economic measures are in the nature of incentives to join in this,” Ambassador Ledogar stated.

Mr. Hassan Mashhadi of Iran described the Convention as the first global treaty aiming at removing a category of weapons of mass destruction—weapons which had been used in the 1980s.
Unlike other Treaties such as the NPT, where the parties are divided into possessors which are allowed to keep their weapons, and those which should not possess any, under the CWC, no party is permitted to maintain its chemical weapons stockpiles. This gives a nondiscriminatory character to the convention, Mr. Mashhadi stated.

Also, for the first time, a global system of verification is being established. It will provide a mechanism to verify destruction of existing chemical weapons, and, through the control of the chemical industries, to insure that these weapons are not produced again.

The economic aspect of the CWC, as perceived by the developing countries, is a major concern because of the costs of the Convention and the less direct costs for States parties for compliance.

Mr. Mashhadi identified five aspects in the verification process: the destruction of chemical weapons, the destruction of CW production facilities, to ensure that the activities prohibited under the Convention are traced and checked, verification of permitted production in the chemical industry, and investigations related to concerns of noncompliance.

In addition to verification costs, which he said had been estimated as some $163 million per year, there were administrative, maintenance and other costs which would be new costs for developing countries, and would, it was feared, lead to added costs for chemical products imported from industrialized countries. For the developing countries, an important incentive would be the transfer of technology in the chemical field among the States parties.

Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan discussed what is to happen after the Convention is signed. Governments will have to implement the Convention within their own areas.

Secondly, there will be, based in the Hague, a new international institution.

Its Preparatory Commission will have to build up a new international institution, administer itself, reach out to the chemical industry around the world, liaise with States that have signed and those that have not and work to ensure initial funding for the Prep. Comm. and create a framework for national programmes training people from developing countries in skills required for the Convention.

Mr. Julio Fiol of Chile said an analysis of the First Committee statements regarding the CWC showed wide recognition that the draft was the best that could be achieved as a compromise between different approaches.

One concern for Chile was the international responsibility for destroying chemical weapons. They believed that the States that possess chemical weapons should have major responsibility for destroying them.

None the less, it was the task of all States to consolidate worldwide the legal regime that would be established by the Convention.

In answer to a question on the number of countries manufacturing chemical weapons, Ambassador von Wagner said this was not known. It was known that the United States, the Russian Federation and Iraq possessed chemical weapons, but the rest was either secret service information or guesses. There was a "magic figure" cited that about 20 countries have chemical weapons, but which they were, he would not dare to say. He did not know.

In answer to a question on the relationship between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN, Ambassador O'Sullivan said that, while the Secretary-General is the CWC depositary, the relationship would have to emerge over time out of the decisions of the parties to the treaty.

Regarding the role of NGOs—another question asked, Ambassador O'Sullivan said that governments could include in their delegations representatives outside governments, and also might include representatives of the chemical industry or others in the national bodies responsible for cooperation with OPCW.

At the end of the meeting Mr. Davinic remarked that, having briefed NGOs on the Conference on Disarmament many times and having had to explain why CW negotiations had not led to agreement, he was delighted to participate in a meeting when such a group of distinguished speakers told why a CWC was possible.
CWC initial signatory States

During the Signing Ceremony from 13 to 15 January and subsequently up through 8 February, the following 137 States signed the CWC:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhkstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

An article by article guide to the chemical weapons Convention

The following summary description of the Convention is based on the statement of Ambassador von Wagner to the NGO Forum on 29 October 1992.

Article I incorporates the basic undertakings of the Convention, adding up to a total ban of chemical weapons and any activities aiming at or contributing to their use. It makes it clear that the ban extends also to the means of delivery and other devices specifically designed for the use of chemical weapons. It obliges parties to destroy all their chemical weapons, including abandoned chemical weapons, and CW production facilities.

Article II defines all important terms in the Convention, delineating precisely the scope of the basic obligations of Article I.

Under article III, the parties are to submit to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force, their declarations with respect to chemical weapons, old and abandoned chemical weapons and CW production facilities.

Articles IV and V, together with the verification annex, contain provisions governing the destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities. Complete destruction is to be achieved within ten years from entry into force, although, in exceptional cases, a State may take longer—for financial or ecological reasons—or may convert to commercial uses instead of destroying a plant.

Article VI sets out a comprehensive regime for international monitoring through declarations and on site inspections of activities not prohibited, as in the chemical industry of parties.

Article VII sets out the undertakings of States parties to ensure national implementation of the Convention and outlines their relations with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The structure and function of the Organization are described in article VIII.

Article IX deals with the challenge inspection system whereby any State party may request a challenge inspection of any facility or location of another party to clarify any questions concerning possible non-compliance. The request will then be multilateralized and the inspected State must permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the inspection and is obliged to grant access to the Organization's inspection team, although it may protect installations which it considers unrelated to the inspection request.

Article X provides a safeguard to protect parties against the hypothetically continuing risk of being threatened or attacked by chemical weapons. It provides for setting up a voluntary fund so that the Conference of States Parties could assist any party thus threatened or attacked.

Article XI aims at promoting expanded international trade, technological development and economic cooperation in the chemical sector. It encourages the progressive removal of existing restrictions in parallel with the implementation of verification in the chemical industry.

The remaining articles and annexes concern:

- Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions. (art. XII)
- Relation of the CWC to other international agreements. (art. XIII)
- Settlement of disputes. (art. XIV)
- Amendments. (art. XV)
- Duration and withdrawal. (art. XVI)
- Status of the annexes. (art. XVII)
- Signature. (art. XVIII)
- Ratification. (art. XIX)
- Accession. (art. XX)
- Entry into force. (art. XXI)
- Reservations. (art. XXII)
- Depositary. (art. XXIII)
- Authentic texts. (art. XXIV)
- Annex on chemicals. (Annex 1)
- Annex on implementation and verification. (Annex 2)
- Annex on the protection of confidential information. (Annex 3)
Member States support Agenda for Peace

The need for anticipation of potential threats and timely action by the United Nations was imperative and would have to be accorded utmost priority, stated Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt, expressing a view voiced by many delegations during the Assembly debate on the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace".

Speaking in a series of debates in the General Assembly during October 1992, he said the maintenance of international peace and security could not be achieved if the UN role was confined to tackling a crisis after its eruption.

The objective of the report, An Agenda for Peace, which had been submitted to the Security Council on 17 June in response to a request of the Security Council summit of 31 January, was to provide an analysis and recommendations on ways to strengthen and make more efficient the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peace making and for peace-keeping.

The debate in the Assembly indicated a number of points in the report which delegations felt could lead to action.

India supported the proposal for a peace-keeping reserve fund for peace-keeping start-up costs, and the idea that States might make their contributions from defence budgets. It also said Member States should promptly inform the Secretariat of the personnel and equipment they could provide at short notice.

India also held that mechanisms should be set up to go into operation immediately and automatically as soon as sanctions were imposed which caused special economic problems to States imposing sanctions. This would encourage States to cooperate with Council decisions.

Addressing the question of special economic problems of States resulting from sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, on 30 December 1992, the Security Council noted the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the Council devise measures involving UN financial institutions that could insulate States from such difficulties.

On 29 January 1993, the Council commented on the views of the Agenda for Peace report concerning cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations. It invited these bodies to study, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter:

- ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within their areas of competence, paying regard to the characteristics of their respective regions.
- ways to further improve coordination with the UN for information, and consultations to enhance UN capabilities, including monitoring and early-warning, by making timely and specific requests for UN involvement, and by a readiness to provide resources.

The Council also asked the Secretary-General to transmit their statement to those regional arrangements and organizations which have standing invitations to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly as observers, and to other regional arrangements and organizations.

On 26 February 1993, the Security Council stated that it was important to include humanitarian considerations and indicators as early-warning information and that the capacity of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs should systematically facilitate planning at a pre-emergency phase to assist governments in averting crises.
New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era

On 27 October 1992, in observance of Disarmament Week, the Secretary-General introduced a report on new dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament. Stating that he sought to build on the foundations laid in "An Agenda for Peace", he said the disarmament work of the United Nations should be integrated, globalized and revitalized.

Disarmament was becoming more closely linked to issues of peace and security and also to socio-economic progress. Concern over levels of armaments was now routine in UN peace-keeping operations; and was an inherent part of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building.

On globalization, he said, "Our vision must extend beyond regional balances of power. All States must be involved". The time had come to accept the globalization of accountability for the consequences of unrestrained military spending. Pointing to the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and its conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention, he urged universal adherence to the CWC.

"We must also move away from the idea that disarmament is a subject for negotiations alone," he continued. "It is also an area for action through self-restraint, mutual example and public awareness of the costs and benefits of weapons acquisition".

On revitalization, the Secretary-General said the important legacy of past achievements in arms control and reduction should be strengthened and extended. All States should adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which should be indefinitely and unconditionally extended in 1995.

The report itself addresses the same three themes, with additional specific points:

Integration. Disarmament in the New International Environment
- Although we have taken some strides in dealing with excesses in armaments and military expenditures, the world remains a dangerous place: the shadows of the weaponry of mass destruction still loom large; the threat of weapons proliferation—be it nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional—still exists; the trade in weapons is again gaining momentum; and military expenditures in many parts of the world are still far too excessive in relation to unmet human needs. 
- United Nations peace-keepers have become well versed in the mechanics of conducting weapons inspections and monitoring troop withdrawals or disengagement zones.
- The integration of weapons-control features into United Nations-brokered settlements can contribute enormously to peace-building activities in countries long plagued by civil strife.

Globalization. Enhancing the Multilateral Approach
- Regarding the new relationship between the two major military Powers, Russia and the United States, what has happened is remarkable. A period of confrontation, hostility and mistrust has been replaced by a spirit of cooperation that has enabled them to attain far-reaching disarmament agreements and increased mutual trust. Such steps should not be confined to the exclusive domain of these two nations.
- We must strive to create conditions in other regions of the world which would enable more States to undertake similar commitment.
- That is what some call disarmament by mutual example or reciprocated unilateral measures... The goal is to extend disarmament efforts to include not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral arrangements in a world-wide process involving all States.
- One can imagine numerous ways in which regional approaches could enhance the process of global arms reduction... there is an evident need to devote major attention to the question of conventional arms races.
- The relentless accumulation of armaments by States is not only a symptom of political tension; it can also cause and heighten such tensions and increase the risk of conflict. The detrimental effect of these weapons transfers on regional security and stability continues to be felt today, particularly in connection with the continuing transfer of weapons to volatile areas such as the Middle East, which has been the recipient of over 30 per cent of world weapons imports.
- I am confident that international organizations can do a better job in serving as a focus for serious discussions of an interregional nature. International organizations in general and those of the United Nations system in particular can play a much more significant role in the globalization of disarmament.

Revitalization. Building on Past Achievements
- To achieve genuine disarmament we have to complete the building of a new system of international security... To be viable, it has to instil sufficient confidence in States to assure them that they no longer need abundant weaponry.
"The cold war did not carry the cause of disarmament and arms limitation far enough, but it left an important legacy in the form of a system of agreements and treaties."

**Weapons of mass destruction**

- "Over the years, the thrust of diplomacy has been to reduce and, wherever possible, to eliminate these weapons, to curb their proliferation among States; and to preclude their deployment in certain international domains, such as outer space, the sea-bed and Antarctica".
- "By the end of this decade, the multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) may be a thing of the past, and the category of tactical nuclear weapons will be sharply reduced, if not totally eliminated".
- "The international community can aim for no less a goal than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Achieving this goal may take some time. Nuclear technology cannot be disinvented; and there are a host of difficult questions—including issues of stability and verification—which must be weighed carefully".
- "The seriousness of purpose demonstrated by the two major Powers as they continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals drastically, and the ongoing efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, can best be matched by embracing the associated measure of halting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through a cessation of nuclear testing".
- "The annual number of tests carried out in the last several years indicates a most welcome downward trend".

**Proliferation control**

- "Current international trends should help immeasurably in achieving a priority which is of growing importance to the global community—the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".
- "In the nuclear realm, the Non-Proliferation Treaty continues to provide an indispensable framework for our global non-proliferation efforts".
- "Over the longer term, it is my hope that we may achieve more equitable and comprehensive approaches to responsible proliferation control, not only of weapons, but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies".

**Arms transfers**

- "The problems related to excessive arms transfers are daunting. Paradoxically, this is attributable, in part, to the success achieved in disarmament negotiations. Production overcapacities and surplus equipment in industrialized States are now increasingly feeding arms markets in parts of the developing world".
- "One obstacle that stands in the way of effective global controls is the difficulty of objectively distinguishing between defensive and provocative arms transfers. One potentially valuable alternative would be regional agreements on what constitutes clearly excessive or threatening conventional military capabilities".

**Transparency in arms and other confidence-building measures**

- "The newly created United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was the subject of much debate last year, assumes even greater importance now".
- "For my part I wish to assure you that this Organization will do all that it can to make the Register an efficient and successful service for Member States. For your part, it is vitally important that sufficient resources be made available for this task".

**Conclusion. New Challenges**

- "With the development of the process of disarmament we are encountering an entirely new set of problems, which may be labelled "post-disarmament issues". The correlation between disarmament measures and economic conditions has drawn more attention over recent years as democratic trends influence development".
- "As we have recently learned, disarmament measures may entail significant transaction expense".
- "The financial and ecological burdens of effective weapons disposal are the immediate, and unavoidable, consequences of implementing reductions. Much more far-reaching is the problem of redirecting manufacturing and research-and-development capacities, as well as soldiers and technical personnel, from military to civilian endeavours".
New machinery
- "The United Nations framework in which disarmament has been pursued was created in the course of the cold war. This machinery should be reassessed in order to meet the new realities and priorities of our time".
- "I support greater Security Council involvement in disarmament matters, and in particular, the enforcement of non-proliferation".
- "In international politics, one of the most important means of reducing violence in inter-State relations is disarmament. What is required of States is concerted efforts and broad participation".

Consideration of the report of the Secretary-General
Commenting on the report, delegations stressed the increased need for disarmament after the cold war and the need to engage as many States as possible in the disarmament process.

The UK, speaking for the European Community, agreed with the Secretary-General that there is a new scope for integrating arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. It was also the EC view that globalization implied giving appropriate weight to unilateral actions, to bilateral agreements and to multilateral arrangements at both regional and global levels.

On machinery, the UK remarked on the streamlined work of the Disarmament Commission, the growing consensus in the First Committee and the success of the Conference on Disarmament with the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. It supported an early enlargement of the membership of the CD to "more adequately reflect the level of interest in its work".

Canada said arms control and disarmament was the business of every State and continued to be centrally relevant to international peace and security. Encouraged to see a growing interest in developing regional approaches, Canada said the United Nations had an important role to play in promoting informal mechanisms for dialogue, especially in regions or subregions where institutional frameworks for such discussions were not yet fully developed.

Canada intended to work actively to ensure that as many States as possible comply fully with the Arms Register and particularly welcomed the Secretary-General's assurance that the UN would do all it could to make it a success, including, Canada assumed, ensuring that sufficient resources would be devoted to it.

Mexico said that Member States should participate in defining any changes that would be made in the disarmament work of the United Nations; while East-West confrontation had gone, the weapons were still there.

Finland agreed with the Secretary-General that from demobilization to de-mining, disarmament was an inherent part of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building and that the end of bipolarity had not diminished the need for disarmament, but had, if anything, increased it. In the view of Finland, what really was new in the post-cold-war era was the integration of disarmament with UN peace enforcement. Also, the United Nations could play a useful role in assisting conversion of military assets into more productive uses.

Reinforcing the role of the Security Council in implementing disarmament measures was referred to by Egypt as one of the constructive proposals in the report of the Secretary-General. It also mentioned a larger role for regional organizations, and cited the post-disarmament tasks discussed in the report as being important. These included transforming military-oriented industries for peaceful production, and the safe destruction of arms stockpiles.

Sweden noted with particular interest that the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of enhancing the multilateral approach, his strong support for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, his statement that all States should adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty, and his positive appraisal of the recently concluded Convention on chemical weapons.

Japan welcomed the assurance of the Secretary-General that the Organization would do all it can to make the Register of Convention Arms an efficient and successful service for Member States and restated its intention to make a substantial financial contribution for the establishment of the database system for the Register.

Russia said delegations should not forget the new role already played by the Security Council, including the Military Staff Committee, since the dissemination of various types of weapons could threaten international peace and security.

Brazil highlighted the statement of the Secretary-General that today there is a real opportunity to initiate a process of global disarmament. It also stated that the machinery to address major disarmament problems promptly, flexibly and efficiently was in place within the UN system and would be able to address any major
disarmament problem as soon as the necessary political will existed. Venezuela said efforts should not be aimed at establishing a new disarmament programme, but at exploring ways to achieve agreements expeditiously. The extension of the NPT should aim at achieving a commitment to make it possible to strengthen the NPT and to induce other States to become parties to it.

Cuba noted that, while important disarmament agreements had been secured in recent years, the nuclear-weapon States and States with large military arsenals were not yet on an equal footing with the other members of the international community. Pakistan endorsed the idea of a special examination of the traditional concepts of disarmament and security to see which parts have continuing validity and which might have been overtaken by new developments; to identify what is achievable in the disarmament agenda in a specific time frame over the next few years; to clear possible confusion about the roles and responsibilities of various overlapping organs; and to encourage all Member States to participate actively in making known their views on this subject.

Bulgaria stressed the Secretary-General’s point that the end of bipolarity had not diminished the need for disarmament, but had, if anything, increased it. The view that disarmament was a subject for action through self-restraint, mutual example and public awareness was also important. Such a course of action by Member States opened an extremely important avenue for building confidence to contribute to common security in the world.

Iran stated that, as the Secretary-General had emphasized, the UN system could play a much more significant role in the globalization of disarmament. The responsibility resting with nuclear-weapon States to make the world safer by accelerating their efforts towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals needed to be kept in view.

With regard to the role of the UN, Iran agreed with the observation in “An Agenda for Peace” that democracy within the family of nations required the fullest consultation, participation and engagement of all States in the work of the Organization. Iran thus supported the greater involvement of the General Assembly and the First Committee in disarmament and international security issues; the Assembly was entitled to consider all problems of common concern and should not be even nominally sidelined in cases of international peace and security, including disarmament matters.

China said that all the States Members of the United Nations should participate on an equal footing in deliberations concerning disarmament and the resolution of problems in this area: a small number of strong and large countries should not be allowed to monopolize all such activities. This approach to globalization meant that the role played by the UN and its organs should not be denigrated, but their efficiency and effectiveness should be enhanced. The Republic of Korea praised the Secretary-General for the new focus on the relationship between the underlying causes of instability and the arms build-up, and for the importance placed on regional arrangements for implementing arms control and confidence-building measures.

India said the approach to controlling proliferation should be fine-tuned to reflect post-cold-war developments, care should be taken not to unravel it. While the cost of peace was enormous, it was insignificant compared to the cost of war—thus India called for adequate funding of disarmament-related matters such as regional confidence-building efforts.

France said the objective was to ensure that the reflection and reform necessitated by the new elements in the international security situation should proceed in an orderly and realistic fashion. Belgium said States should not remain prisoners to past patterns but should also maintain the instruments that have proved their effectiveness.

Algeria shared the Secretary-General’s concern about the risk of proliferation, but thought it would be an illusion to try to base a just and lasting peace on as shaky a notion as the imposition of peace which, like disarmament, should be the result of a freely negotiated process. It also stressed the problem of nuclear weapons and the importance of addressing it in a way that would not sanction de facto imbalances.
Resumed session of First Committee examines disarmament machinery

From 8 to 12 March 1993, the First Committee of the General Assembly met in resumed session to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery including the roles of the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament and their interrelationship, and the role of the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The 1992 General Assembly resolution mandating this session had called for enhancing the functioning and efficiency of the disarmament machinery, bearing in mind the competence of the Security Council.

The Secretary-General made a statement early in the session, and delegations made 59 statements during formal meetings. On the 12th, a resolution was adopted without a vote by which the General Assembly would:

1. **Decide** that the First Committee of the General Assembly, in pursuit of its efforts to respond to the new realities of international security, should continue to deal with the questions of disarmament and related international security issues;

2. **Request** the Chairman of the First Committee to continue his consultations on the further rationalization of the work and the effective functioning of the Committee, taking into account all the views and proposals presented to the First Committee, including those related to the thematic clustering of agenda items;

3. **Reaffirm** the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as a specialized deliberative body within the United Nations disarmament machinery, and take note of the progress achieved in its ongoing process of reform;

4. **Recommend** that every effort be made to continue to enhance the working methods of the United Nations Disarmament Commission so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament. To that end, welcome the decision of the Commission to move its agenda towards a three-item phased approach;

5. **Take note** of the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single global disarmament negotiating forum, is a body of limited composition taking its decisions on the basis of consensus and maintains its special status in relationship with the United Nations disarmament machinery;

6. **Welcome** the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, in addition to the review of its composition, has also intensified the review of its agenda and methods of work, with a view to reaching prompt decisions on these questions;

7. **Encourage** the Conference on Disarmament to reach early agreement on the expansion of its membership;

8. **Stress** the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the UNDC and the Conference on Disarmament;

9. **Urge** the Secretary-General to take concrete steps to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to ensure that it has the necessary means and resources to carry out its mandated tasks;

10. **Request** the Secretary-General to report on those steps to the General Assembly at its 48th session;

11. **Decide** to review these questions at its 48th session.

North Korea renounces NPT

On Friday, 12 March 1993, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Under the terms of the NPT, each party has the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It is to give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the UN Security Council three months in advance. Such notice is to include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

The renunciation of NPT membership by the DPRK took place two weeks after IAEA had asked for fuller cooperation regarding its inspection of various North Korean sites.

At the conclusion of a four-day meeting in Vienna on 25 February, the Board of Governors of IAEA had called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond urgently to its request earlier in the month for access to additional information and to two additional sites in the country. The DPRK was asked to clarify the reasons for inconsistencies that had emerged from IAEA analysis of samples and measurements.

At the closing meeting of the resumed session of the First Committee of the General Assembly on 12 March, statements were made by a number of delegations urging reconsideration by the DPRK of its decision to withdraw from the NPT.
NPT has 157 parties

Following the accession of France to the NPT on 3 August 1992, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had 152 States parties. The number increased in 1991 from 141 to 146 with the accession of Lithuania, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. During the first half of 1992, five more parties acceded: Estonia and Latvia in January, China in March, Slovenia in April, Uzbekistan in May, bringing the total to 151 by 31 July.

After the accession of France, four additional States became parties during 1992: Azerbaijan, in September, Namibia and Niger in October, and Myanmar in December. With the division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic into two States on 1 January 1993, the number of parties became 157.

Both Belarus and Kazakhstan have ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol thus reconfirming their decisions to become non-nuclear parties to the NPT.

Radioactive wastes in the Arctic Seas

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Norway and Russia organized an international meeting at Oslo on radioactive wastes in the Arctic Seas from 1 to 5 February 1993.

A total of 50 scientists from 13 countries reviewed the available information on the nature of dumped radioactive wastes, dumping sites and on relevant oceanographic and human effects. The objective of the meeting was to develop a scheme for assessing the health and environmental impact of the dumping and to launch an international project for carrying out this assessment.

MTCR expands role and membership

As the Missile Technology Control Regime meets in Canberra, from 8–11 March 1993, there are 22 member States: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Four States (those with stars) were admitted in 1992, and five have subsequently applied for membership: Argentina, Hungary, Iceland, Israel and Romania.

At the plenary meeting held at Oslo from 29 June to 2 July, the members agreed that the MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-relevant Transfers of 18 April 1987 remained an essential mechanism for preventing proliferation of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

In view of the members’ concern about the possible use of missiles to deliver all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the member States agreed to amend the Guidelines to extend the scope of the regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons.

The MTCR members also took note of the decision of a growing number of countries to observe the MTCR Guidelines and issued a joint appeal to all States urging that observance by as many States as possible to export control measures in accordance with MTCR Guidelines would contribute to limiting the risks of proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and to fostering international security.

Underground tests decrease

The trend towards fewer nuclear-weapon tests continued in 1992. No atmospheric tests took place after 1980. The total number of underground tests was:

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The USSR announced a moratorium in October 1991 which Russia extended for one year in January 1992.

France stopped testing in April 1992 and later announced it would not test again unless another State did so.

The United States decided in September 1992 to have no tests before July 1993 and to then limit the number per year, and to have no tests after 30 September 1996 with the express aim of having a comprehensive test ban in place by that date. If another State conducts a test, the legislation would not hold after 30 September 1996.

The Conference on Disarmament, in the first part of its 1993 session in Geneva, appointed Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan to be Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban.

During the annual session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1992, Ambassador Prakash Shah of India served as Special Coordinator for the agenda item on a nuclear-test ban. A series of proposals on a draft mandate was put forward and considered, and the growing importance of the agenda item was recognized by all delegations.
Security in Central Africa

The Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa met at Bujumbura, Burundi from 8 to 12 March 1993.

The meeting opened with an expert group which:

• reviewed the status of international legal instruments regarding arms limitation and disarmament in the subregion;
• reviewed the geopolitical and security situation in the region;
• examined the proposal for a Non-Aggression and Security Pact for the member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

The meeting also elaborated measures in support of an accord on the progressive reduction of armed forces, military equipment and military budgets in ECCAS States.

ECCAS member States are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire.

Expert participants in Bujumbura also considered the specification of measures to support the establishment of a permanent inter-State crisis management centre for the maintenance of peace in the sub-region.

The meeting of experts was followed by a Ministerial Meeting on 11 March, followed by informal consultations and a final report on the 12th.

The organizational meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Yaounde, Cameroon in 1992, was attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defence from ten of the eleven ECCAS States.

Seminar on CSBMs held at Windhoek


The keynote address, on “Development and Economic Integration as Factors for Confidence- and Security-Building in Southern Africa”, was be given by Lt. Gen. Mompati Meraathe, representing the Head of State of Botswana which currently holds the chairmanship of SADC (the Southern African Development Community).


Also addressing the theme on new thinking, another session considered “The Current Security Situation in Southern Africa” with Prof. Peter Vale from the University of the Western Cape, and “The Stockholm Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe: Lessons for Southern Africa”, with speakers from four Nordic Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

A Working Group on confidence and security-building in the non-military field examined civil-military relations, refugees, demobilization and human rights. A subsequent Working Group considered disarmament, demobilization and joint military training, and possible collective security and collective defence arrangements in Southern Africa.

Asian Centre meeting

“National Security and Building of Confidence among Nations in the Asia-Pacific Region” was the title of a meeting held at Kathmandu, Nepal from 1–3 February 1993.

Discussing the results of the meeting in a closing statement, Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, said the participants had indicated that the basic security trends influencing the Asia-Pacific context were not much in dispute. Generally, political relationships among former adversaries were improving. Also, power relationships were tending toward greater stability, despite some concerns expressed regarding new weapons acquisitions.

While bilateral links remained important to many States, most participants appeared to accept the desirability of greater multilateral coordination. The question, as a number of speakers had put it, was not whether to pursue such efforts, but how.

With respect to military security, several participants had stressed the inherent right of all States to provide for their own defensive needs. Others had stated that self-defence is not an open-ended right: it comes with the obligation to pursue peaceable relations and thus not to provoke fears or reactions in other States. Defence procurement policies are thus a legitimate topic for international discourse, whether at the regional level or globally.

The meeting was sponsored by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia. The Asian Centre is directed by Mr. Tsutomu Ishiguri, who was appointed on 1 September 1992.
Disarmament information work gains new support

Pledges totalling $1.5 million were announced at the 1992 Pledging Conference for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme. The comparable figure from the previous year was $701,000.

A total of 72 States attended the Pledging Conference and 24 made pledges. $965,000 was for the disarmament regional centres and other programmes of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and 573,000 was for UNIDIR.

Many delegations expressed satisfaction over the agreement reached by the co-sponsors of the resolution on the World Disarmament Campaign that its name would be changed to the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme to better reflect its work providing balanced information to broad constituencies of MPs, educators, scholars, public interest groups, libraries and others throughout the world.

The two largest contributions offered to the WDC/UNDI Trust Fund were earmarked for specific projects. Italy pledged $175,573 to support a symposium to be held in Florence on transparency in conventional arms transfers. Sweden pledged $37,383 for a seminar on confidence- and security-building measures to be held in Windhoek.

Japan offered major support for the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, which is in Kathmandu, Nepal; and Canada offered a significant contribution to the work being undertaken by the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Other UNDI contributions were either not earmarked or were identified as being for the disarmament publications programme.

Speaking as President of the Pledging Conference, Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada said it is essential that the United Nations continue to be in the forefront of efforts to establish conditions under which respect for international law can be maintained and a reasonable standard of life assured for all people on the planet.

She said efforts to make the UN stronger and more effective must continue so that it can capably address current challenges, effectively promote peace, democratization, human rights, trade liberalization, a healthy environment—in short—promote security in the fullest, truest sense of that word.

Genuine security would be impossible without lasting arms reductions, she continued, and this would be impossible without collective political will which would have to spring from people—attentive publics able to act as catalysts on their governments. As the United Nations role in promoting arms control and disarmament and building cooperative security grew in importance, so did the task of developing public understanding of, and support for, UN objectives in the disarmament field.

Public awareness of what Member States were trying to achieve through UN processes, at both the global and regional levels, would be critical to success in reaching disarmament goals, particularly in an increasingly democratized world, she said.

The materials distributed and conferences held under the auspices of the World Disarmament Campaign had contributed to a much greater awareness and appreciation of the complex issues involved. Researchers, educators and member of the general public had not been the only direct beneficiaries. "I would venture to guess," she continued, "that a well-thumbed copy of The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook can be found on the shelf of every government official dealing with First Committee or UNDC issues."

Saying that she wished to draw delegates' attention to the publications issued in 1992, she provided a list of them to date:

- 1991 Disarmament Yearbook;
- periodic review Disarmament (3)
- Topical Papers (4)
- Disarmament Facts (3)
- Disarmament Newsletter (4)

"But it is not only the furtherance of public understanding that is the focus of WDC activities," she said, "I would draw attention to the continuing emphasis—since 1989—on promoting pragmatic work among governmental representatives on emerging issues, particularly in the area of regional confidence-building and in the promotion of global norms of non-proliferation via the three UN regional centres and their increasingly ambitious program of regional conferences co-hosted by Member States, city governments and even private institutions."

"The success of global disarmament efforts depends to a large extent on the development of effective regional arrangements to address underlying causes of insecurity and instability. The end of the cold war has increased opportunities for regions to focus on their problems. She strongly encouraged the United Nations to continue to pursue this direction, and expressed the hope that Member States would continue to make this possible.

"The United Nations has a vital role to play, not only in furthering the disarmament process, but in contributing to publicizing the progress that has been made."
NGO news items

The brief report below on activities of non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes which have come to the attention of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The choice of events does not imply any judgement of them by the United Nations.

Cartago City in Costa Rica celebrated its Second Disarmament Week from 23-27 November 1992 by adopting a resolution to become a member of the International Programme to Promote the Solidarity of Cities Toward the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. The City Council and its Commission on Education, Culture and Sports endorsed the resolution with a view to establishing and maintaining friendly ties and an exchange of cultural and commercial activities with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan and has initiated the required diplomatic process and sent a message to the UN Secretary-General and to the Costa Rican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Mission to the UN. Cartago City's First Disarmament Week in 1989 celebrated the Regional Disarmament Peace Process in Central America. Contact: Permanent Mission of Costa Rica, 211 East 43rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (Tel: 1 212 966 6374; 986 6842).

The Soka Gakkai Youth Division presented more than 50,000 used portable radios to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The radios were collected between 7 June and 31 December 1992 to provide more people in Cambodia with access to broadcasts concerning the elections planned there for May 1993. Contact: Soka Gakkai International, 32 Shiman-no-machi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160, Japan. (Tel: 81 3 3353 0616; Fax: 3353 5129).

Juniata College, the International Association of University Presidents (IAUP) and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs have launched a series of yearly seminars on arms control and disarmament for scholars and government officials from developing nations. The International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament will be held at Juniata College in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania and will be administered by Juniata's Baker Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Faculty will include experienced negotiators, arms control scholars, researchers and people with experience in conflict management and dispute resolution. Contact: David Gildea, Juniata College, Huntingdon, PA 16652 (Tel: 1 814 643 4310). The Juniata seminar series is one of several projects of the IAUP Commission on Arms Control Education. Others will be presented at Kobe, Japan from 11-14 July 1993 to the IAUP's tenth Triennial Conference. Contact: Leland Miles, IAUP President Emeritus, Tide Mill Landing, 102, 2425 Post Road, Southport, Connecticut 06490, USA. (Tel: 1 203 255 4269, Fax: 203 259 8859).

The University of Alberta, Edmonton, on 6 April, will sponsor a public lecture on "The United Nations in the 21st Century" and a reception to launch the book, A Bargain for Humanity: Global Security by 2000, by Douglas Roche. The book deals with the movement away from militarism, the importance of the 1992 Earth summit, the resurgence of the United Nations, and standards for an equitable new world order. Contact: University of Alberta Press, 141 Athabasca Hall, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E8. (Tel: 1 403 492 3662; Fax: 403 492 0719).

The International Peace to the Oceans Committee in Russia is organizing a Baltic Sea cruise on the Ivan Kruzenstern, a ship rented from the Russian navy. It will leave St. Petersburg on 15 June, be in Helsinki until the 18th, Baltiysk from 20-22, Kiel 23-27, Copenhagen 28-30, Gdynia 1-3 July and St. Petersburg on 5 July. Up to 3 representatives from national peace, veterans or religious organizations may join the cruise commemorating sailors lost at war in the Baltic Sea. The cruise cost with expenses and meals from St. Petersburg is $1,200 per person for a single room or $1,000 double occupancy. Contact: IPOC, 36 Pr. Mira, Moscow, Russia (Tel: 095 280 71 73, Fax: 095 288 95 87).

The NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. (New York) and the Special NGO Committee for Disarmament, (Geneva) are sponsoring a major conference to take place at UN Headquarters from 20-23 April 1993. Opening with presentations by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the conference on "New Realities: Disarmament, Peacebuilding and Global Security" will address a number of topics, including: What transformations in the international system are prerequisites for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons? What is the best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Can abolition of nuclear weapons be adequately verified? Cooperative security and controlling conventional armed forces. How can UN capabilities be increased? How can non-military sources of insecurity be more effectively addressed? Contact: NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. 777 United Nations Plaza, Suite 3-B (Tel: 1 212 687 5340).