Finland and Nuclear Non-Proliferation:
The Evolution and Cultivation of a Norm

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This report concerns a study which has been conducted for the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). The conclusions and viewpoints presented in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those of the SKI.
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Acknowledgments

The present study is related to two ongoing projects. An earlier version has recently been presented for an international comparative project that tries to compare the reasons and avenues for various non-nuclear-weapon states to develop and pursue pro-activist non-proliferation policies. Furthermore, the study of Finland is one of four case studies included in my Ph. D. thesis in progress on how non-proliferation assertiveness have become parts of the foreign policies of the four Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. I am indebted to a number of persons and institutions for their kindness and support.

In April 1994, I first interviewed officials from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and was met with an openness and kindness that greatly facilitated my research for an article of Swedish nuclear export controls and spurred my determination to continue working within the non-proliferation field - preferably on a topic related to the Nordic countries. When I was accepted as a Ph. D. candidate at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and moved to Sweden in April 1996, SKI had offered to finance my Ph. D. studies. It is necessary to add that the support of my research is by no means limited to finances as I have profited greatly from discussions at SKI - not least with staff members of the Office of Nuclear Materials Control. This SKI publication that addresses the making of Finland as a non-proliferation actor is a first effort to work with the four Nordic countries that will be included in the thesis. A study of Sweden and non-proliferation will also be published by SKI in February 1998 and at a later stage, studies of Denmark and Norway will follow as I start analysing these countries.

Since 1992, I have been a member of a European research group on nuclear non-proliferation established by Dr. Harald Müller from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. For six years I have had the pleasure to participate in various projects and conferences on non-proliferation, disarmament and export controls and have been able to contribute with studies of the Nordic countries for the monographs produced under the guidance of Harald Müller. In 1996, he initiated a new project with ambitions beyond the European context. The objective is to analyse why and how various non-nuclear-weapon states have chosen this option not to proliferate and why they even became pro-active in the formulation and support of non-proliferation efforts. This project by Harald
Müller is supported by the Ford Foundation and between 29 September and 3 October 1997, Harald Müller convened the researchers as well as an advisory panel at the Rockefeller Foundation Center in Bellagio, Italy. It is hoped that this publication will also allow readers to criticize and comment it before the material is incorporated with the other country studies and published with Harald Müller as editor. At this stage, where my Ph. D. thesis is still two years from completion, I remain grateful for any comments and suggestions readers might have.

Lars van Dassen
Uppsala, February 1998
Summary

It is very little that has been published on Finland’s nuclear non-proliferation policy and the background for it. There are at least two reasons for this. First of all, it is primarily former or present threshold states that are the subject of country studies and since Finland never counted among such states, there has not been a need to investigate Finland in this respect. Secondly, there is a general perception that small states matter little or nothing in nuclear non-proliferation. But this is wrong and what brings Finland into the picture. The world consists of a few states with many nuclear weapons and a vast majority of states that have foresworn nuclear armament. This is in itself a spectacular fact if one keeps in mind how scenarios made during the 1950s and 60s projected that the number of nuclear weapon holders would grow rapidly. Even small states have contributed enormously to achieve this by tabling proposals, cooperating on them and through the influence they have had on the nuclear-weapon-states. There are many ways this can be done - just like most countries have particular reasons and objectives for doing so.

Finland’s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security.

During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. Finland had become an active member of the international society and with this improved standing in international affairs, it was less likely that the USSR would challenge Finland’s neutrality.

In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West
developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly.

Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state.

For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in the long run. And this approach continues for Finland even after the end of the Cold War when many other states that used to be strong actors in non-proliferation are losing this interest.
Sammanfattning


Under förhandlingarna av icke-spridningsfördraget (NPT) 1965-1968, spelade Finland en mycket aktiv roll, då man först hjälpte till att bygga en bro mellan supermakterna och sedan mellan västliga och östliga staterna å ena sidan och utvecklingsländerna å den andra. Denna aktiva roll gav Finland ett namn i FN sammanhang och hjälpte till att fastlä neutraliteten och samtidigt etablera kontakter med västvärlden. Finland hade blivit en aktivt medlem av världsfatundet och med detta förbättrade läge i internationell politik var det mindre sannolikt att Sovjet skulle utmana finska neutraliteten.

Kekkonen tog upp frågan om Norden som en kärnvapenfri zon igen 1978; denna gången under inflytande av nya strategiska förhållanden för Finland så väl som den allmäna utvecklingen i öst-väst förhållandet. Kekkonen hade
starke stöd i den finska opinionen, medan andra stater var ytterst tveksamma till initiativet.

Politiken i Finland har till stor del präglats av relationen till Ryssland och senare Sovjetunionen. Emellertid var nukleär icke-spridning ett ämne som lämpade sig till att reducera tyngden i grannens påtryckningar och i denna målsättning hade Finland stor succé. Samtidigt var det också möjligt att öka kontakten med väst och förbli accepterat som en neutral stat.

Ursprungligen var icke-spridning ett instrument för Finland som syftade till att lösa andra problem än de som är relaterade till icke-spridning. Men det var också ett område där den finska politiken bedrevs och fortfarande bedrivs mycket ihållande och pragmatskt. Detta görs med en fokusering på konkreta frågor som kanske inte uppmärksammas mycket internationellt, men som i långa loppet ger resultat. Denna syn fortsätter att vara förhärskande även efter slutet på det kalla kriget, där annars många andra länder med ett förflutet inom icke-spridningens diplomati tappar intresset.
1.: Something old, something new: Helsinki between East and West

On 20 and 21 March 1997, the Russian and US heads of state, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, met at a summit in Helsinki.\(^1\) Several issues were on the agenda though there seemed to be a concentration on the planned NATO enlargement, the implementation of the existing START II Treaty and possibilities for how this disarmament process could be continued and expanded.\(^2\) Initially, Washington had been chosen as the location for the summit but Yeltsin’s unstable health at the time made it unwise for him to travel that far.

Helsinki is close to Moscow but this is hardly the only reason for the choice since Finland, on numerous occasions, provided good offices and

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\(^1\) The author is a Ph. D. candidate at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. The present study constitutes in part one of four case studies for a Ph. D. thesis in process on the evolution of non-proliferation cultures in the Nordic countries, 1945-1995; a project that is financed by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. For the present study the author is indebted to the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki which granted a guest fellowship in April 1997. Unless otherwise stated, the information is based on interviews with various officials and scholars. I am grateful for interviews with and information from: Jaako Kalela, Secretary General of the Office of the President of the Republic; Director Kari Kahiluoto and First Secretary Timo Kantola both from the Division for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Ilkka Pastinen, Ambassador and former Permanent Representative of the UN Secretary General to the CD; Professor Erik Allardt and Professor Risto Alapuro both from the Sociology Department, University of Helsinki; Professor Jan Sundberg and Assistant Professor Anne Eskelinen Political Science Department, University of Helsinki; Heleva Valta, Executive Director of the Karelian Association; Professor rt. and former chairman of the Peace Union of Finland Göran von Bonsdorff; Senior Researcher Unto Vesa, Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI); Professor and Chief Editor of Hufvudstadsbladet rt. Jan Magnus Jansson; Chairman of the Peace Union of Finland, Kalevi Suomela, Chairman of the Finnish Peace Committee, Pekka Koskinen; Senior Researcher Teija Tiilikainen and Major Mikä Kerttunen, National Defence College. It has been a tremendous help and support to discuss my topic and have suggestions from colleagues at FIIA. I am especially grateful to Director Tapani Vaahstoranta, Eeva Kairisalo, Riku Warjovaara, Jouko Rajakilii, Henrikki Heikka, Raimo Lintonen, Katarina Sehm, Christer Pursiainen and Tuomas Forsberg. I am also grateful for the kindness and hospitality offered by my friend Emma Fogelholm and her family.

Interlocutors have had the opportunity to make comments on an earlier draft, and the comments and suggestions made have to the extent possible been incorporated in this text, December 1997. Former UN Ambassador Max Jakobson made very helpful and constructive comments on an earlier draft though I did not get the occasion to interview him before the end of my stay in Helsinki. Charles Parker, a non-proliferation scholar at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs has given valuable comments and done considerable language editing. Last but not least, very helpful comments were made when this study was first presented at the conference in Bellagio by Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch, Mexico; Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, Sri Lanka; Associate Professor Etel Solingen, UCLA Irvine; Professor Thomas Risse, European University Institute; Director Dr. Harald Muller, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; Associate Professor Scott Sagan, Stanford University. At a non-proliferation seminar convened by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 15 December 1997, this study was presented and discussed. Most valuable comments were made by officials close to the non-proliferation diplomacy: Under Secretary of State, Jaako Blomberg; Ambassador Pasi Patoakallio; Director Kari Kahiluoto.

facilitated interaction between the power blocks. Because of good previous experiences, Helsinki was probably the capital that first came to the minds of the presidential staffs in Moscow and Washington. And so, when Finland's president Ahtisaari stated that it was a "lottery win" for Finland to host such an important meeting, this hardly implies that Helsinki was a random choice. For the Finnish hosts, the summit this time took place in an atmosphere very different from previous meetings as Finland no longer needs to carry out the balancing act between its Eastern neighbour's expectations and her own western-oriented political and economic preferences, as was the case during the Cold War.

A month after the summit, representatives from the states adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) assembled in New York to participate in the first of three scheduled Preparatory Committee meetings that will be convened before the upcoming Review Conference of the NPT in year 2000. The meeting took place under Finnish chairmanship as a tribute to the country's long-standing and strong support of the NPT and the capabilities of Finnish diplomacy in this field. At this meeting, Finland tabled a Preparatory Committee proposal that calls for the superpowers to provide reciprocal and international transparency in order to verify their unilateral promises to take out of service or decommission tactical nuclear weapons. According to the proposal this could be a first step towards starting negotiations on a disarmament treaty and process for the entire category of tactical nuclear weapons. The reasons behind the proposals are that Finland both wanted to spur general nuclear disarmament efforts but also holds a genuine concern over the large concentration of tactical nuclear weapons in the northwestern parts of Russia that cannot reach beyond targets in Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea region.

The proposal mentioned above is a good example of how Finland has perceived and worked to influence the international nuclear non-proliferation debate. One characteristic trait is that what establishes a consensus between the nuclear contenders is used as a point of departure and expanded upon. Secondly, the means to do so have traditionally been multilateral in the sense that the UN and other fora have been used to further the discussions and possibly expand the number of countries in favour of the concrete proposals. Finally, the non-

3 Stefan Lundberg, "Bastu, spionage och toppmöten" (Sauna, espionage and summits), Svenska Dagbladet, 22 mars 1997.
proliferation activism pursued by Finland has roots in a desire to improve both the security political situation of Finland itself but this is done with a view to how this influences the security of others and the international community at large.


Finland shares with many other states the conviction that the possible and actual proliferation of weapons of mass destruction influences the prospects of peace and security in a negative manner. With the increasingly wide and almost universal adherence to the NPT, it may seem trivial to investigate why states support the non-proliferation norm when the fact is that they simply do so. However, it should be pointed out that support for non-proliferation grew only gradually, and did not come simultaneously to all states. Most states had to be convinced about its virtues or be forced to see the light while others made their own deliberate choices in favour of nuclear non-proliferation at an early or late date. In this sense, all states have their own more or less individual roads, long or short, to supporting nuclear non-proliferation.

Finland is interesting in this respect. First, the potential nuclear option was in the sense of international law never there as the Paris Treaty that ended World War II forebade the defeated parties to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead of producing resignation, obstination or apathy with respect to the foregone nuclear option, Finland came to define a substantial part of its own international role and posture through the furtherance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues. So, while the nuclear option was at first seen as a sovereign indisputable right by most states, the nuclear non-option for Finland was turned into a virtue. Secondly, the Finnish efforts are also interesting because they reveal that small states can have considerable influence on multilateral processes and negotiations if they choose to do so. Third, there is a lesson to be taught on what neutrality can entail. It becomes obvious that neutrality is a very complex concept with a different content and meaning whether one considers Sweden, Switzerland or Finland. In contrast to the two others Finland was neither isolationistic nor activistic in terms of challenging both superpowers. The Finnish attitude has been to find elements of common ground between antagonistic powers and if possible expand hereon. However, there has often

been set question marks regarding Finland’s neutrality, some claimed it was, in reality, more pro-Soviet than need be and went beyond the middle ground expected of neutral states.

During the Cold War, Finland indeed had a very intimate but also intricate relationship with the Soviet Union. Finland was inside the Soviet sphere of interest but never became absorbed by the Soviet block. This delicate position was not equally well understood in the West. There certainly were strong Soviet attempts to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the Soviet Union but this did not work as intended and Finnish political and diplomatic skills found a way to navigate out of the pressure. The close relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union that, for good and for bad, existed was in the West perceived mainly for its negative aspects and portrayed as “Finlandization”. It was feared that other Western European states could gradually fall victims of the same Soviet pressures and that this influence could undermine the defence willingness of individual Western states.

However, a more detailed look reveals that Finland was not that typical an example of Finlandization after all. Much seems to indicate that the room for action and interaction with the outside world was actually growing and not crumbling during the Cold War decades. It was obvious that Finland had to observe the interests of the USSR and could not undertake activities or make statements that directly challenged the relationship. But this did not necessarily have to imply complacency and submission - it could also be used, if the issue and tides of security interests allowed - to seek and create dialogue and cooperation across the East-West divide. In a number of fields, Finland created a foreign political tradition between the two power blocks as a means of bringing them together. This intensified the dialogue and had some concrete results; it

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Finland’s former UN Ambassador, Max Jakobson summarizes the Western depiction of Finland in the following manner: “... visitors from the West almost invariably produce a one-dimensional view of the country, corresponding to the current state of Western relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1939-40, the Finns were idolized for their resistance against the Red Army; in 1941-44, ostracized for continuing to fight the Russians; at the end of the Second World War, castigated for their failure to heed western advice to trust Moscow; in 1948, written off as lost for signing a treaty with the Soviet Union; and finally, at the present time, subjected to a kind of character assassination through the use of the term “Finlandization” to denote supine submission to Soviet domination”. Max Jakobson, *Finland: Myth and Reality*, Otava Publishing Company Ltd., Helsinki, 1987, pp. 8-9
also put Finland on the map as an international actor in many multilateral contexts.

The international standing was well served by this and made the country less vulnerable to the Soviet attempts of undermining neutrality; though the Western interpretation of it being Finlandization did not cease to exist. One field where Finland from an early date developed a foreign political tradition was non-proliferation and disarmament - a policy emphasis that is still high today on the foreign policy agenda. To fully appreciate its background it is helpful with a short overview of Finland's external relations and domestic politics. The relationship with Russia and later the Soviet Union is of crucial importance to understand Finland's foreign policy - and foreign policy options. To a large extent the content and structures of domestic politics also reflect the various challenges an opportunities presented by the Russian neighbourhood since Finnish independence. Certain contours of political thinking and action were formulated at an early date - contours which become pronounced at later stages and came to bear on non-proliferation debates and policy-making.

2.1.: The road to independence: Finland and Russia till 1918.

Finland was a province of Sweden between the thirteenth century and 1809 when Sweden had to cede the territory to Russia. Under Swedish rule, Finland had enjoyed no rights of autonomy; the southern and western parts were integral parts of the core of the Swedish kingdom. Under Russian rule, Finland became a grand-duchy with a certain autonomy. The four-estate Diet that had been established by the Swedes continued to exist and it roughly represented the four classes, the nobility, clergy, peasantry and burghers. Though the rest of Russia was based on feudalism, Finland retained the free peasantry and Finns were exempt from conscription to the Russian military. In its early stages this arrangement enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy in spite of the fact that the Diet was not convened between 1809 and 1863.

The Russian Governor-General managed to govern the country together with the Diet and a Senate appointed by the Grand-duke with much

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7 This overview of developments till 1918 is mainly based on: Risto Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988; C. Jay Smith Jr., Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1922, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1958. The former is a sociological analysis of the demographic, economic and political developments that led to the Finnish Civil War. The latter is an historical account of how developments in the periphery of Russia - in this case Finland - influenced the Russian Revolution and the other way around.
independence and in such a manner that the traditional power structures established by the Swedish-speaking nobility were curbed. Finland became the most industrialized and economically prosperous part of the Russian Empire towards 1860 but a decade before the turn of the century the good Finnish-Russian relations changed when the Tsar annulled Finnish legislation and demanded that Russian be the official language. Gradually suppression increased and the Diet was turned into an advisory body, Finns were conscripts by the Russian Army and newspapers became subject to harsh censorship. With the advent of the war with Japan in 1905, Russia eased the pressure on Finland, however, by this time the Finnish and Swedish-speaking Finns had already realized that the main adversary was not each other but Russian imperial rule.

Three political traditions were established relating to the issues of independence and neighbourhood with Russia. The conservative-realists school of thought advocated appeasement with Russia as a means to preserve the Finnish nation and culture, whereas, the western-oriented and liberal Constitutionalists were in favour of independence achieved through protest mainly in the shape of civil disobedience. Finally, an activistic or radical tradition saw Russia as an enemy that had to be fought. After the turn of the century, and with the rapid industrialization, the political struggle also became divided along economic and class divisions but the prospects of a steady liberal-democratic evolution were destroyed by the advent of the Russian Revolution - followed by the Finnish Civil War in its wake. Russia's participation in World War I led to further oppression of Finland that, for a short period, united left and right against Russia. Lenin supported Finnish independence because he thought the revolutionary force of Finland could spearhead revolution in other places and that Finland thereafter would join the Soviet Union. As a result, the USSR was the first state to recognize Finland's independence on 31 December 1917. However, the Soviet Red Guard that was stationed in Finland as well, siding with the Finnish Bolcheviks clashed with the Finnish White Army. The White forces prevailed in the spring of 1918 after a very bloody civil war and eventually a peace treaty between Finland and the USSR was concluded in 1920. The activist/militant political orientation had prevailed in Finnish politics but it was its last victory.

2.2.: Towards and through World War II.

In the early 1920s, the Finnish government signed an agreement with the Baltic states and Poland to form a defence alliance. However, the Parliament rejected the agreement making it the first and only deeply dividing foreign political issue. Instead, it was attempted to enhance neutrality through active participation in the League of Nations and later in the late 1930s through an albeit futile attempt to establish a Nordic defence community. The 1930s was also a period of growing nationalism and political polarization whereby the wounds created by the Civil War remained open. When Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union in November 1939 it was the deepest moment of despair because Finland was left on its own. Germany and the Soviet Union had agreed to carve up the Baltic region among themselves and when the Finnish government turned to Sweden, Britain and France for support, it was rejected.

In March 1940 the Winter War ended on terms less favourable to Finland than the original claims that Stalin had made and ten percent of Finland’s territory was ceded to the Soviet Union. The only support Finland received was from Germany which provided weapons in return for the passage of German troops through Finland to Norway after Norway had been occupied by Germany. Gradually, Finland became closer and closer involved in the German war plans against the Soviet Union. Initial advances into Russia during this Continuation War and beyond the pre-1939 border were lost again. In September 1944, Finland and the USSR negotiated a separate armistice that re-established the borders of the 1940 peace settlement. The Wars devastated Finland’s economy. Some 400,000 refugees from mainly Eastern Karelia and other parts handed over to the USSR had to be repatriated and Finland had to pay considerable reparations to the Soviet Union. However, the Wars against Russia united the Finns and healed the wounds from the Civil War.

2.3.: After 1945: Peace and the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

Between the Russian and Finnish Civil Wars and September 1944, the relationship of the two neighbours had been antagonistic. The “White”

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9 Klaus Tornudd, op. cit. p. 39.
12 Max Jakobson, op. cit. pp. 29-47.
government in Finland was the object of Soviet domestic propaganda whereas Finnish movements propagated the establishment of a "Great Finland" at the expense of parts of the Soviet Union. Under President J. K. Paasikivi (1946-1956), it was at first a slow process for Finland to become a member of the international society after World War II. Finland was considered one of the defeated parties from the War and in the Paris Treaty from 1947 it had to accept various restrictions on rearmament such as foreswearing nuclear weapons. At an early stage both before and after the Paris Treaty negotiations, the USSR suggested a Finnish-Soviet defence treaty that the Finns however, managed to fight off in the light of how the tensions between the Soviet Union and the West were growing day by day. Instead, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) in 1948. This Treaty established provisions on Finland's military security. Finland was to defend itself with all possible means against an attack and "if necessary, with the assistance of or jointly with the Soviet Union" (Art. 1). To determine when such an attack was eminent the two parties would confer with each other (Art. 2). However, it remained open when such military consultations and military assistance should be made. To the Finns, both would have to agree on a necessity whereas the Soviet interpretation regarded one side's (meaning Soviet) desire to be sufficient.

The Finnish signature of the FCMA Treaty was based on a realization that new friendly relations with the USSR were the core of Finnish survival, but eventually this could allow for further openness towards the rest of the world. This strategy, also called the Paasikivi-line reached its objective. The relationship with the USSR became solid and trustful and as an expression hereof the Soviet Union returned the Porkkala naval base in southern Finland in 1955 that according to the peace treaty would be a Soviet lease for fifty years. Similarly, the Soviet Union had no objections when Finland a year later became a member of the UN and the Nordic Council.

The realistic-pragmatic line by Paasikivi was continued by Kekkonen in spite of problems at the initial stages of his presidency to gain the same degree of domestic respect as his predecessor had had. By the early 1960s, Finland became accepted as a neutral state in the West and by the Soviet Union and its

increasingly active neutrality policy was used for the promotion of dialogue between the power blocks. The SALT negotiations opened in Helsinki in 1969 and the same year Finland initiated the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) process by suggesting a conference on European security and from 1975, this conference convened. After 1982, when Mauno Koivisto was elected President, the foreign policy line at first continued in much the same manner as under his predecessors. Koivisto is said to have followed a foreign policy in close spirit with the FCMA Treaty even after changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe started to gain pace after 1985. With the end of the Cold War, Finland gradually increased the economic and political cooperation with the West, first by joining the EES, the Council of Europe and in 1995 the European Union. Finland has joined the Partnership for Peace and has become an observer of the WEU but still retains its neutrality though more and more voices are heard in favour of NATO membership. The FCMA Treaty was renegotiated twice after 1989 before the two states decided to abandon it in 1994.

2.4.: General aspects for the making of foreign and domestic policy.

To a certain extent the abovementioned comes across some interwoven characteristics of the political tradition in Finland and these are of relevance for the analysis of the non-proliferation debates that shall be presented in the following.

First of all, there is the experience that neutrality is no guarantee against aggression, on the other hand, it is not possible to rely on the support of others. Neutrality must therefore be pursued actively and based on friendly relations with neighbours. Secondly, foreign policy consensus increases the ability to act in a consistent manner as during the Paasikivi and Kekkonen eras.

15 Steen Berglund/Steve Lindberg, "Finland’s säkerhetspolitik” (Finland’s security policy), Ulf Lindström/Lauri Karvonen (eds.) Finland: en politisk loggbok (Finland: A political log-book), Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1987, p. 232.
In contrast, political radicalization is dangerous because it disrupted the country during the Civil War and it can create tensions with Russia/the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{19}

Third, a strong presidency can secure foreign political consequence and consensus. This is accompanied by a general positive view of the state by its citizens;\textsuperscript{20} the state was never seen as evil and is therefore given much freedom of action.\textsuperscript{21}

Fourth, national debates\textsuperscript{22} are in most cases initiated by various political elites. Fifth, Finnish politicians and media have imposed a kind of self-censorship more than being censored by Russia before 1917 and by the Soviet Union after 1944. Last but not least, two main political traditions (an idealistic-liberal tradition, and a conservative realistic tradition) in terms of how to deal with the relationship with other states and Russia/the Soviet Union remain after the activistic one has failed during the 1920 and 30s.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{3. Nuclear weapons and non-proliferation on the Finnish agenda.}

As stated earlier the potential of a Finnish nuclear option disappeared at an early date, with the signing of the Paris Treaty in 1947. The provisions on military restrictions for the defeated parties were possibly the least controversial for the Finnish government and delegation during the negotiations.\textsuperscript{24}

However, this could not by itself establish or guarantee that Finland stayed free of nuclear weapons. In the worst case the FCMA Treaty could be used by the Soviet Union to demand consultations leading to the stationing of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory. These specific nuclear concerns were not very high on the agenda when the FCMA Treaty was negotiated; it was the general aspects of how

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[20] Max Jakobson, \textit{op.cit.} pp. 53-54; Lars D. Eriksson, "Från konsensus till konsensus" (From consensus to consensus), Marianne Carlsson et. alt (eds.) \textit{op.cit.} p. 209.
\item[22] Risto Alapuro, "De intellektuella, staten och nationen" (Intellectuals, the state and the nation), \textit{Historish Tidskrift for Finland}, no. 3, 1987, pp. 457-479. Törnudd refers to how the Foreign Minister in 1994 in Parliament more or less gave a green light for discussions on whether Finland should join NATO; Klaus Törnudd, \textit{op.cit.} p. 57.
\item[23] According to Törnudd, these two remaining traditions existed as opposites to one another before Finland's independence. After World war II they have coincided more and more and complemented each other: Realistic approaches towards the Soviet Union, idealistic policies in multilateral fora; Klaus Törnudd, \textit{op.cit.} p. 41; Falk Bomsdorf, \textit{Sicherheit im Norden Europas}, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 124-126.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
soon the Soviets either unilaterally or in accordance with Finnish wishes could demand military consultations and when their conclusions would be implemented.25 The development of Soviet nuclear weapons in 1949 also implied that the nuclear option that had been closed off could come back through the Finnish backdoor, so to speak.26

With increasing intensity, reflecting the rapid horizontal and vertical proliferation of the day, Finland became more and more enmeshed in concerns and discussions over nuclear arms. Gradually, Finland also took up a role in this respect within the UN after it had become a member. Three situations merit special attention. The first relates to the Kekkonen-plan from 1963 when the Finnish President proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Nordic countries. This started a national and Nordic debate on the Nordic NWFZ. Secondly, Finnish activity during the NPT negotiations is interesting due to the considerable contributions delivered by Finland. However, this was to a much lesser extent followed by a national debate. And finally, the Nordic NWFZ was re-launched in 1978 in a different setting but again without concrete results. Taken together the three incidents of non-proliferation activism reveal something about the background for Finland’s motivations and debate culture in this particular field.


On May 28 1963, President Kekkonen addressed the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki and to the great surprise of the audience his speech was centered on a suggestion to establish a Nordic NWFZ. It is meaningful to refer to his speech as a set of ideas as the Kekkonen-plan was not very specific or elaborated. However, it is probable that Kekkonen wanted the proposal to be so general that it would also be open for interpretation and exchange.

Kekkonen stated that the fact that the Nordic countries were already de facto nuclear-weapon-free could be expanded so that the Nordic states taken together proclaimed themselves a NWFZ. In this sense they would contribute in the modest manner possible to reducing available nuclear escalation by curbing the nuclear deployment strategies of the power blocks on Nordic territory and the

risk that either of them would itself proliferate. The proposal was open to attack from various sides. First of all, there was no mentioning of any obligations on the part of the states with nuclear weapons, either in terms of strategic restraint towards the Nordic countries, or their guarantees to respect such a NWFZ. Further, Kekkonen said nothing about how a NWFZ could be verified as nuclear-weapons-free and what land and possibly sea territory should be covered by the zone. And not least, there was a problem of formality since Kekkonen had overlooked the unwritten rule by the Nordic countries to consult each other before making statements touching upon each others security situation.27

There were various causes and sources of inspiration behind Kekkonen’s move. NWFZs had for some time been on the international agenda.28 In the late 1950s, a NWFZ had been discussed for Central Europe and soon after the Soviet Foreign Prime Minister Bulgagin suggested a Nordic NWFZ to his Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Along with a proposal by Khrushchev in 1959 to make the Baltic Sea a “Sea of Peace” by denuclearization of the Nordic countries and the Baltic region - none of these proposals gained any ground. Too many signals from the East pointed in the wrong direction: Detente suggestions towards selected European NATO members accompanied by arms build-up and aggression elsewhere.

Kekkonen stated that he was inspired by the Swedish Foreign Minister Undén who in 1961 before the UN General Assembly had suggested the formation of a non-nuclear club if the states with nuclear weapons committed themselves to a comprehensive test ban. Undén also foresaw the establishment of NWFZs but he had thought of much more extensive regions than what could be contained by Kekkonen’s Nordic NWFZ. Denmark and Norway’s reaction was luke-warm due to the infringement participation would have on their NATO membership. Sweden also rejected the idea29, in spite of the aledged inspiration from Undén because there was no attention given to verification and obligations

29 According to diplomats involved at that time it is an understatement to characterize the reactions by the other Nordic countries as luke-warm. Behind the official statements as referred above there were furious attitudes due to the fact that no one had been informed about Kekkonen’s proposal and that this caught the other Nordic governments in a limbo where they had not prepared any responses. However, as Finnish sources point out; had there been a consultation before the address, then this would have defeated the purpose or watered-down what Kekkonen could say a manner acceptable to all.

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for the nuclear haves. However, it was not understood at all outside the Finnish government that Kekkonen could have reasons to launch his plan that stemmed from Finland's security relations with the Soviet Union.

In the fall of 1961, the Soviet Union called for consultations according to the FCMA Treaty. The Soviets argued that the West German membership and integration in NATO along with a more encompassing presence in the Baltic Sea constituted a threat to the Soviet Union. Kekkonen traveled to Novosibirsk and met the Soviet leadership and was able to convince them that the military consultations were unnecessary. In return, Finland was given the role of keeping an eye on security developments in the Nordic region. There is little reason to treat this incident in more detail as it now seems beyond much doubt that the so-called “Note-crisis” was produced by the Soviets in order to make Kekkonen stand out in the Finnish public as the guarantor of peace and friendly relations with the USSR before the presidential election campaign. The trick worked, Kekkonen returned in triumph from Novosibirsk and was reelected a year later. In other words, the Note-crisis was not the direct threat to Finnish neutrality it seemed to be at first glance as the Soviets probably had no intentions of exploiting the FCMA Treaty provisions. But it was an indirect threat as the Soviet move was a support of Kekkonen and this in turn could become an inroad to increasing dependence by Kekkonen on the Soviets.

A couple of years earlier in 1958, Kekkonen had found himself in genuinely frosty relations with the Soviet Union when he did not consult them on how a new Finnish government was formed. And taken together with the events from the Note-crisis, Kekkonen had become more and more dependent on Soviet support - even for domestic politics by 1963. The Nordic NWFZ can be fitted into this picture but also be seen as an attempt to gain freedom of action. The Kekkonen-plan had not been discussed with Soviet leaders but there was hardly any doubt that they would approve of it as it was a realization of the Finnish obligation to overlook security developments in the Nordic region. But to the extent that the Nordic NWFZ would be tabled in one way or another, this would also raise the threshold of when the USSR, at later stages, would be

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31 In spite of the fact that the Soviet leadership had earlier suggested a Nordic NWFZ in one shape or another there is little doubt that Kekkonen’s main source of inspiration was Undén’s plan and that he did not just present a Soviet proposal; Unto Vesa, Planen för ett kärnvapenfritt Norden (The plans for a Nordic NWFZ), Freds-och konfliktforskningsinstitutets forsknings-rapporter, nr. 18, 1979, pp. 8-9.
inclined to demand military consultations considering how this would ruin the willingness of the other Nordic countries to discuss the zone-plan. If discussions came about and this in the long run would lead to the proposed NWFZ then it would also lead the Nordic countries towards a situation where at least Denmark and Norway became more distanced from the Western defence integration and nearer a de facto neutrality. This would be closer to Kekkonen's preference of Nordic neutrality and enhance Finnish neutrality and security towards the Soviet Union. Thus, Kekkonen's preoccupation with Finland's security policy made it opportune to make disarmament and non-proliferation proposals beyond the bilateral Finnish-Soviet context.

Up until Kekkonen's speech, little attention had been given to the notions of a Nordic NWFZ in the Finnish public debate. Towards late 1963, the peace movements and the media were preoccupied with the promotion of peaceful coexistence and other more general issues, such as the establishment of peace research, as a means to analyse and prescribe ways to enhance stability. Peaceful coexistence was, however, the most important issue of the day. The Finnish Peace Committee had inaugurated a campaign to collect signatures demanding for all peoples and states to coexist peacefully, irrespective of their political systems; much in accordance with how the Finns had been able to develop their relations with the Soviet Union. The petition was signed and sponsored by President Kekkonen and other elites from all parts of society and Finland later presented the pledge for peaceful coexistence to the UN in order to have it disseminated to other states. The petition received wide support from all parts of society though it was not an undertaking that involved all peace movements.

The public reactions to the Kekkonen-plan were not very pronounced in terms of numbers and qualitative development on the proposal; it took a

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32 After Undén had proposed his plan to the UN in 1961, the UN Secretary General was asked to make an inquiry among the member states on how they viewed this non-proliferation scheme. Finland had answered in 1962 that it had already by the signing of the Paris Treaty foregone nuclear weapons and would not let other states use its territory to deploy such weapons. This statement went well beyond the spirit and content of the FCMA Treaty but it was an example of how eager (and clever) the Finnish leadership was to define Finland (and be understood) outside any alliances and nuclear umbrellas; Johan Tunberger, op. cit., p. 47.


34 Vasabladet, "Fred och neutralitet" (Peace and neutrality), 28 November 1962; Göran von Bonsdorff, "En central forskningsuppgift", Huvudstadsbladet, 30 December 1962.

35 Österbottniska Posten, "Tesen om samexistens" (The notion of coexistence) 15 February 1963; Ny Tid, "Fredsämparna: Kampen för fredlig samlevnad huvuduppgift" (The Peace Committee: The struggle for coexistence is our main task), 6 April 1963.
couple of years before the peace movements and various other interests groups got engaged in this subject and made it one of their most important issues.\textsuperscript{36} There were two reasons for this. First of all, the response from the other Nordic countries had not been enthusiastic and therefore it was not feasible to make rapid progress on the Nordic NWFZ idea. Secondly, there was hardly any disagreement between the foreign political leadership and the peace movements on the need to promote non-proliferation and disarmament ideas. At the time when the Kekkonen-plan was launched, the media supported it without reservation.\textsuperscript{37}

Some additional information on the relationship between the peace movements and the political leadership might be valuable at this stage.\textsuperscript{38} It was stated above how President Kekkonen had signed the petition for peaceful coexistence and this is indicative of the very close relationship between peace movements and political leadership. The size of the Finnish peace movements were always smaller than in most other European states. This has to do with the fact that the start was slower - important peace organizations did not form until after World War I - but also that the distance between opinions among various peace movements on the one hand and between the peace movements and the political leadership on the other was never that pronounced. What the peace movements lacked in formal size they in most cases made up for through their proximity to the government. Three peace movements are particularly important for the Cold War period. The Peace Union of Finland originated from the 1920s where it was also the country’s League of Nations association. Since then the Peace Union has held a liberal Western-oriented view of international affairs and Finland in the world, and had political ties with the Socialdemocratic Party, and the social-liberal Swedish People’s Party. The membership of the Peace Union has been relatively stable from before World War II and during the Cold War era at around 2000 individual members, though by 1978 it also became an

\textsuperscript{36} One exception was an article by von Bonsdorff who placed the Nordic NWFZ in the context of the need to establish peace research as a scientific discipline; Göran von Bonsdorff, “Fredsforsknings och politik” (Peace research and politics), \textit{Huvudstadsbladet}, 31 July 1963.


\textsuperscript{38} This information is based on interviews with leading representatives from the three mentioned peace movements and Ilkka Taipale/Erikki Tuomioja, “From the history of the peace movement to the future”, Pertti Joenniemi, “War and peace culture: The case of Finland”, Ilkka Taipale, “The peace movement in Finland”, all in Kimmo Kiljunen/Folke Sundman/Ilkka Taipale (eds.) \textit{Finnish Peace Making}, Finnish Peace Union, Helsinki, 1987, pp. 3-12, 13-24, 25-56 respect.
umbrella organization for other smaller peace movements. With roughly similar political affiliations, the Finnish Committee of One Hundred was founded in 1963 by intellectuals and journalists. The main emphasis was to base peace proposals on peace research and the thinking of philosophers like Bertrand Russell who suggested unilateral disarmament as a first step towards confidence-building and reciprocal disarmament. Approximately three thousand persons joined the Committee of One Hundred before its attraction started to wane in the 1970s. In 1978 it joined the Peace Union.39 The biggest peace movement, the Finnish Peace Committee was founded in 1949 as an offspring of the Moscow-inspired and supported World Peace Council and thus held similarly lop-sided views regarding the causes for the arms race and international conflict. In Finland it was a mass organization that managed to mobilize workers and unions for demonstrations far beyond the official number of individual membership of 8-20,000. It had close ties with the Communist Party40 that for long periods also participated in coalition governments.

The picture as painted so far has to be modified a little. The Finnish peace movements were not rigidly separated by focus and ideology. To a large extent they made common activities and were enmeshed with each other. There were religious pacifists that joined the Peace Committee and the Peace Union of Finland was also a member of the Peace Committee for some years. It is noteworthy that the representatives from the three mentioned movements all stated their respective organizations' prominent access to influence the political leadership and to receive information from it. It may in fact well be true that all three had influence or were at least heard by Kekkonen most prominently. The three peace movements state that they in general were very proud of the security and disarmament policies pursued by the government and president; this underlines that the opinions only differed when it came to detail and emphasis. Kekkonen, from time to time, showed up at meetings in the peace movements and even paid an annual contribution to the Committee of One Hundred in the size of one membership fee.

This probably gave the impression that Kekkonen listened to the peace movements. He may have done so on some occasions, considering that he also was a member of the Peace Union before World War II, however, as shall be seen

39 Huvudstadsbladet, "Fredsförbundet upptog De Hundras Kommitté" (The Peace Union included the Committee of One Hundred), 19 July 1978.
40 Both the Communist Party and the umbrella organization for various communist movements and parties, the Finnish Democratic People's League were members of the Finnish Peace Committee.
under the next heading his motives were not always driven by the need for inspiration but the desire to develop a policy that would enjoy wide acceptance and not run the risk of being stirred up by volatile peace movements.

3.2.: NPT negotiations, 1965-1968: "A game too important to be public".

The friendly relations that existed between the Soviet Union and Finland were never unproblematic. Behind the friendliness there was always the question on which terms the USSR regarded Finland. In foreign policy matters, the Finnish political leadership had towards the mid-1960s become more and more synonymous with President Kekkonen and his strong personal relations with the Soviet leaders was a strong pillar in the general political relations with the USSR. However, the tides of European security made it opportune and possible for the Soviet Union to - depending on the perspective - increase the pressure on or close its ties with Finland.

During the early 1960s, NATO had discussed the multilateral forces agreement (MLF) as a means to share the access to the use of US nuclear weapons. This was in itself a pressure on Finnish security that was increased by the Soviet attempts to find counter-measures. In this situation Kekkonen tried his best to convince Moscow that nothing eventually would come of the MLF due to French resistance. Further, he made the suggestion to establish an agreement between Finland and Norway whereby the two would secure that their Northern regions and common border would not be used by third parties for attacks against the other and their neighbours. These and other exercises by Kekkonen were necessary to keep up the friendly relations as they were; with due respect of Finland's neutrality. Still, nothing in this matter could be taken for granted. Whenever there were official visits to either Helsinki or Moscow it was hard to find common wording for the final communique: Finland insisted on a reference to Finnish neutrality being stated first; the Soviet insisted on primacy of the FCMA Treaty.

In this delicate situation, the Finnish foreign political leadership consisting of Kekkonen and a few members of the cabinet and the highest ranking diplomats decided in 1965 to launch a conscious effort for the NPT negotiations. Hitherto Finland had not been engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. This was now radically changed. If these efforts were

orchestrated skillfully a range of objectives could be achieved. First of all, Finland could make itself useful as a facilitator of cooperation between the superpowers. This could secondly create an international profile for the country that after all had so far only played a modest international role once becoming a member of the UN. With a strong profile, Soviet attempts to undermine Finnish neutrality would become harder and more expensive. Third, an agreement on non-proliferation would stabilize security developments in Europe and for Finland. In this equation the “German factor” also played a prominent role. If West Germany acquired nuclear weapons, this in itself would be a destabilizing development but via the Soviet connection the consequences would prove even more troublesome as Soviet anxiety would grow with all the implications this could have for Finland. On the contrary, if the Finnish plan for its involvement in NPT negotiations worked, Finland would, in the words of a diplomat closely involved with at this stage, “do well while doing good”.

Finland was not a member of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). Nevertheless, the observer rights to follow discussions and make proposals were used and being developed. Finnish diplomats gained expertise on the NPT matters and mingled with the main actors at the ENDC. A difference between the Finnish and Swedish ways of pursuing disarmament negotiations and issues started to stand out when Finland entered the disarmament scene. In Helsinki, it was thought that whatever constituted agreement or where there was a possibility of agreement between the superpowers it should be taken and furthered. In this light, the NPT was seen as a prerequisite for the superpowers to enter into nuclear disarmament negotiations. The Swedish approach was much more aggressive attacking the superpowers for their unwillingness to engage in serious arms reduction schemes. Behind the scenes, these differences led to considerable diplomatic cleavages between Sweden and Finland. Sweden was a formal member of the ENDC but was often seen as an unfriendly neutral by other members of the ENDC. Finland was “only” an observer but nevertheless used this as well as good personal contacts as a platform and became perceived as a “friendly neutral”.

It was the pragmatic Finnish line that was rewarded when the NPT had to be presented to and adopted by the UN General Assembly. So far, the superpowers had reached agreement on the careful wording of the NPT, yet what

42 According to Jakobson, op. cit. p. 39, the average annual activity of Finnish diplomats in terms of statements and initiatives had tripled by the mid-1960s compared to the preceding decade.
remained was a wider acceptance among the non-aligned and third world countries to whom the NPT was an attempt to consolidate the unequal power distribution held to the advantage of the superpowers. The Finnish UN Ambassador Max Jakobson was asked by the Soviets and the USA to be the chairman of a group of countries sponsoring the NPT and present it to the General Assembly.43 When introducing the draft treaty, Max Jakobson pointed to how the NPT in itself was a notable achievement of agreement between the US and the USSR and how this could serve as the necessary prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. The security advantages that were thought to be inherent to a possession of nuclear weapons were rejected by the Ambassador when he stated that nuclear weapons ownership would more likely turn the owner country into a target for nuclear weapons.44 Not least due to the lengthy and comprehensive statement delivered by Ambassador Jakobson did the General Assembly produce a vote in favour of adopting the NPT and lay it open for signature.45

At home in Finland, the agreement on the NPT was received with unanimous enthusiasm by all political parties and the peace movements. It was also with some pride that the prominent role fulfilled by Finland was noted. However, during the period 1965 till 1968, little attention had been paid to the NPT issue in Finland. There were a number of reasons for this. First of all, the NPT was and is a complicated issue, where the dealings with security guarantees, peaceful nuclear assistance, safeguards etc. made it much more complicated and unsuitable for campaigns than for instance the Vietnam War and the East-West arms race. Secondly, it was an issue on which there was no disagreement. Finland had already long foresworn nuclear weapons, would gladly do it once more by signing the NPT and could only see its own security enhanced if others did likewise. As such, there was not an internal debate among parties and interest groups for or against NPT adherence as was the case in many other European states. Every one favoured it.46 Third, there was a deliberate intention by the political leadership to keep the NPT negotiations and the policies as well as the role pursued by Finland at some distance from public attention. This

45 There were 95 votes for, 4 against and 21 abstained.
46 Huvudstadsbladet, "Kärnvapenavtalet och Finland" (The nuclear weapons agreement and Finland), 3 May 1968.
intention was based on the fact that the NPT negotiations were seen as being very important for the survival of Finnish neutrality being equally respected by both the East and West. To the extent that there were forces in Finland that suggested certain aspects be added to Finland's NPT position, this could be used by the USSR to point to weaknesses in the coherence of the Finnish position. In this regard, the Finnish diplomats were eager to exclude the issue of no-first use from the NPT negotiations as this easily would be perceived as directed against NATO. This was not desirable if Finland were to accomplish its role as fertilizer of the common ground between the superpowers.

It is fair to say that the attempt to use the NPT as a vehicle for Finland's continued sovereignty and neutrality worked. But this was not the only result. In 1969, Finland gained a seat in the UN Security Council and much of the confidence that other states showed when they voted for Finland stemmed from the NPT negotiation process. It is noteworthy that the first time the Finnish UN Ambassador Max Jakobson held the chair of the Security Council, he presented a declaration that stated that Finland as a neutral country did not rely on any foreign military assistance. Once again, Finland thus created distance to FCMA Treaty formalia - this time in the most prestigious international forum.

But the active policies also received recognition outside the UN. During Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign in 1976 he mentioned Finland as an example of how small states can play an important role in international affairs. This assessment was not least based on the NPT engagement both during and after the completion of the NPT negotiations.

3.3.: The Nordic NWFZ re-launched, 1978.

Finland was the only Nordic country that had a constant interest in the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. The other Nordic countries had their reservations and strategic concerns and only certain groups and political parties supported the proposal. The governments of Sweden, Denmark and Norway

47 It maybe seems odd that public involvement could have unwanted effects on Finland's negotiation position for the NPT considering how no one seemed to object to the NPT. But if one looks a little deeper than the substance issues of the negotiations themselves then at least one issue could become problematic. In Finland there were Social Democrats and Communists that wanted Finland to recognize the German Democratic Republic before it recognized West Germany. This was supported by the Peace Committee that had strong ties with counterparts in Eastern Europe. Such action would in the eyes of the West place Finland in the Eastern block for good and this would hardly be a helpful position considering what was at stake for Finland during the NPT negotiations. Appell. "Den svara tysklandsfrågan" (The hard German question) 28 June 1968.
were only occasionally inclined to proceed with the NWFZ. Though a common study group was formed to discuss and assess the prospects this never broke the impasse.

Under these circumstances Finland kept doing a lot of footwork hoping for prosperous solutions when the time was right. The security climate for the Nordic countries and Finland changed from the early 1960 till 1978 when Kekkonen re-launched the Nordic NWFZ. Due to the continuous elaborations on the zone proposal that had taken place both in Finland and that it had initiated at the international level, there was something new to be said when Kekkonen in May 1978 gave a speech at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. By that time, the introduction of cruise missiles in Western Europe as well as the debate over neutron bombs and mini-nukes were new challenges to Finnish security. Finland faced the same problem as Sweden that it would have to be able to intercept cruise missiles passing through its air space in order to have a credible policy of neutrality. For Finland there was the additional complication that such a situation also would trigger a Soviet request for military consultations according to the FCMA Treaty. In 1977, the Soviet Minister of Defence Ustinov visited Finland and suggested common exercises and military cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union. This suggestion is still surrounded with some uncertainty as some sources maintain that Ustinov made the suggestion as there were few other pressing items on the agenda. Others perceive the suggestion as yet another Soviet attempt to weaken the Finnish vigilance against anything threatening their neutrality.

This time, Kekkonen’s proposal on the Nordic NWFZ was to some extent tailored for this situation and other international developments. Some of these underscored the need for the confidence-building measure of the NWFZ and others seemed to make it more feasible. According to Kekkonen, the NWFZ had to be seen as an attempt to isolate the Nordic region from the effects of

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48 Raimo Väyrynen, “Kerneväben og Finlands udenrigspolitik” (Nuclear weapons and Finland’s foreign policy), Bertel Heurlin (ed.) Kernväbenpolitik i Norden (Nuclear weapons policy in the Nordic countries), Det sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiskes Udvalgs skriftserie, København, 1983. p. 44.

49 Recent disclosures made by former Soviet diplomats seem to indicate that it was during a meeting with the military leadership that a Soviet diplomat and expert on the Nordic countries was asked which topics meaningfully could be brought up with the Finns. The “common military exercises” came up spontaneously as no one really had prepared an agenda of hot topics and the expert felt he had to suggest something. Ustinov’s suggestions was widely referred to in the Finnish and Scandinavian press. In spite of the fact that it today is clear that there was no substance in the Soviet proposal, this was not known at that time. With good reasons, the Finnish government and public could thus perceive the proposal in line with the many other attacks on Finland’s neutrality.
nuclear strategy where every target on earth could be hit.\(^{50}\) This meant that there had to be a verification of the Nordic NWFZ and guarantees by the superpowers that they would respect it by not deploying or using nuclear weapons in the region. In order to achieve such guarantees, the superpowers would have to be invited to present their views on how the NWFZ would influence their interests and strategies. Within this scheme it was also understood that the Nordic countries would enter the zone arrangement with due respect to the other security arrangements they had, like Denmark and Norway’s NATO membership. Kekkonen had in this sense come to perceive that Nordic security could be enhanced if both neutrals and NATO members were in the same arrangement as a means to build a bridge across existing gaps.

The new proposal reflected both how the NPT had referred to NWFZ as a valuable means to achieve non-proliferation and the way the NPT debate continued to circle round the issue of negative security assurances. Last but not least, the proposal had received inspiration from a study completed in 1975 by a group of experts from the UN Disarmament Committee on the the problems and potentials of NWFZs. The completion of this study had been proposed by Finland and approved by the General Assembly a year earlier.

Kekkonen’s Nordic NWFZ proposal in 1978 received massive attention in the media and among the public in Finland. However, there were differences as to the peace movements’ reactions. There was a general pride of Finland and Kekkonen’s ability to steal international attention with proposals like the NWFZ, yet it still needed to be specified what the zone would have to encompass. The general step taken by Kekkonen was maybe the easiest one; in terms of details there would be disagreement among various national actors. To the Communist Party and the Peace Committee, there had long been an emphasis on the Nordic NWFZ, though only Western nuclear weapons were seen as a menace. The Committee of One Hundred and the Peace Union had nothing against the zone proposal though they were also considering obligations (withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Baltic Sea and/or the Kola Peninsula) on the part of the USSR as a relevant.\(^{51}\) These two movements also thought that

\(^{50}\) The presentation of the content of Kekkonen’s 1978 NWFZ proposal is based on the analysis by Unto Vesa, The Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone: Purposes, Problems and Prospects, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Occasional Papers no. 21, 1982, pp. 6-13; John Tunberger, op. cit., pp. 66-73; Borgåbladet, “Kekkonens kärnfråga” (Kekkonen’s nuclear issue) 10 May 1978.

\(^{51}\) Göran von Bonsdorff, “Småstater och nedrustning” (Small states and disarmament), Huvud- stadsbladet, 2 November 1978.
a solution would have to be framed by general arms reductions in Europe and they soon came to campaign for END, European Nuclear Disarmament.\textsuperscript{52}

The initial reactions in the other Nordic capitals were cool which prompted Finland to start diplomatic exchanges with a number of important states on the Kekkonen-plan II. Denmark stated that such a plan would have to originate from direct negotiations that included NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Norway wanted to see the Kola Peninsula as a part of the NWFZ, and Sweden wanted the Baltic Sea in a possible zone. The Soviets, however, flatly rejected the Swedish and Norwegian thoughts. From Washington, Bonn and London there were no official responses.

Little by little this caused the death of the Nordic NWFZ in statements made by Kekkonen though in many other fashions it survived and came to fulfil other purposes. Among the Nordic countries a still-existing official study group was formed to study the options and the peace movements in Finland and the Nordic countries continued to give it a good deal of attention. To this very day it is an issue on which the Peace Committee is active and tries to convince Nordic politicians on the virtues.\textsuperscript{53}

The Nordic NWFZ proposal at least achieved two results that should not be overlooked. It created a security political dialogue among the Nordic countries that otherwise would have been much weaker and unable to create the same appreciation of the specific concerns in and choices available for each of the countries. Secondly, the debate in Finland, raised the general awareness of the exposure to nuclear threats and thus made the threshold higher for when, for instance, foreign nuclear weapons could be deployed.\textsuperscript{54}

4.: Traits of Finland's nuclear non-proliferation policy in recent years.

Between 1977 and 1982 four reactors at two sites went into commercial operation. The decision to introduce nuclear energy was taken in the late 1960s\textsuperscript{55} but it was

\textsuperscript{52} Kettil Bruun, "Den nya folkrörelsen" (The new public movement), \textit{Sosiologia}, vol. 19, no. 4, 1982, p. 299.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Samarbejdskomitéen for Fred og Sikkerhed, Den norske Fredskomité, Fredskämparna i Finland och Svenska Fredskommittén, Andamålet med ett zonarrangemang} (The purpose of a zone arrangement), 6 January 1997.


\textsuperscript{55} Statement by Ambassador Max Jakobson on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 84.
also understood that the nuclear facilities would not be built till the NPT and accompanying safeguards instruments were in place. Finland was among the first countries to sign the NPT and the first to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.56

Technical expertise has all along been coupled with the pragmatic attitude towards disarmament and security policies. Finland has always supported the role of the IAEA and seen it as unproblematic to transfer additional competences to the Agency. In the early 1990s, there has been support for the establishment of the New Partnership Agreement that shares safeguards obligations between the IAEA and Euratom. Furthermore, it was with Finnish backing that the Agency was granted the right to conduct special inspections and that the recent decision to improve the general safeguards system in the shape of the New Model Protocol was made.57 At the practical levels, Finland operates a programme for the improvement of safeguards in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Russia. The efforts attached to this programme are coordinated with the IAEA just as there is a support fund for IAEA safeguards research and development.58

With respect to export controls on nuclear technology and materials Finland holds a similarly comprehensive record. From October 1995 till April 1996, Finland held the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines (NSG). During this period, a number of new important nuclear exporters became members of the NSG and the NSG started to adopt measures for increased transparency as adopted by the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT in 1995. Finland's engagement with respect to nuclear trade also covers the other side of the coin. At the first Review Conference of the NPT in 1975, much attention was paid to strengthening non-proliferation by adopting common export requirements of nuclear technology and materials. Finland proposed that export controls be complemented with import restraints in the sense that NPT adherents would commit themselves to only purchase nuclear materials and technologies from other faithful NPT states. In order to be a nuclear supplier to NPT states, a given state would thus have to join the NPT and this would create incentives to join the NPT both for states that would demand and/or supply


nuclear technology and materials. In 1976, the Finnish government had extended on the issue and submitted a memorandum to the IAEA.59

If one were to state something general about the pursuance of non-proliferation objectives in the Finnish fashion, it is that there is a focus on working with practical problems. There is much willingness to formulate plans, join projects and conduct research on issues that constitute obstacles. Since 1995, Finland has been a member of the EU and integrated in the non-proliferation work under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within this framework its pragmatic emphasis has continued. It is probably no understatement when observers of EU non-proliferation policy-making and the review process of the NPT state that Finland is one of the most influential Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

5.: Accounting for the Finnish non-proliferation activism.

Finland and nuclear weapons issues are not so interesting if the objective is to find something incriminating in the shape of a secret nuclear weapons programme. This could well be one reason why there has been little focus on Finland and much on Sweden. Yet, the Finnish experience is interesting because it reveals something about what can be accomplished if one is devoted enough. Above, attention was given to the specific historical roots of the country and the security political situation that prevailed at various times when nuclear weapons were on the top of the agenda. In the following, it shall however, be attempted to find out which factors contributed to how Finland’s non-proliferation assertiveness developed as it did.60

5.1.: Finland’s security political situation.

As a neutral state, Finland has not been encompassed by a regional security framework. It is possible to maintain that security guarantees of some kind existed in the shape of the FCMA Treaty, but Finland did whatever it could to

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60 The words in italics denote the factors that tentatively are thought related to the non-proliferation outcome. This scheme has been developed by Dr. Harald Müller in order to synthesize what was important and what was not important for the establishment of a country’s non-proliferation conviction.
step out of this relationship or at least make it count as little as possible. In fact, one can perceive the situation as inverted in the sense that Finland did not so much want security guarantees - and least of all nuclear based security guarantees - from the Soviet Union as the USSR wanted to make sure that Finland would not be used for an attack against the Soviet Union.

Historically, Finland certainly has had a conflict-ridden relationship with Russia and later the Soviet Union and from the end of World War II there were irredentist threats and ethnic tensions arising from the Finnish loss of Eastern Karelia and the large number of refugees that had to be repatriated. This constituted the base for what could have been continuous regional enmities. But it never did, because under Pasikivi and later Kekkonen the popular sentiments of revanchism that would have been futile under any circumstances were suppressed and replaced with an accommodating and pragmatic attitude towards the Soviet Union. Relations had to be friendly in spite of the injustice that the Soviets had committed.

After 1944 and till the post-Cold war era, Finland has opposed a strongly armed neighbour. In many other cases such situations lead to considering the counter-measures at hand. This was not so for Finland; the peace agreements in the wake of the Wars created the first non-proliferation obligation and this was accepted and at no stage was there an attempt to circumvent this. All the other factors: The ethnic tensions, irredentist conflicts, the absence of real security guarantees might have spurred nuclear ambitions for many states. For Finland it did not due to the capacity to live with the Paris Treaty and come to terms with the fact that a new approach towards the USSR was necessary.

5.2: Finland’s foreign policy culture.

Finland entered the post-war era with the traumas of the Winter and Continuation Wars. Yet, the war experience united the Finns and healed the wounds from the Civil War. Moreover, it had been a defeat with limits. Finland had not been occupied and had fought bravely. One Finnish politician has once stated that the Soviets won, but the Finns came in as an honourable number two. The trauma could have led to ambitions of enlargement, at least as far Eastern Karelia and the Petsamo Corridor (which had earlier connected Finland with the Barents Sea and provided an access to the sea in the north) is concerned, yet in the foreign policy matters it is self-containment that has reigned.
The FCMA Treaty and geography placed Finland closer to the USSR than the USA but this did not keep Finland from seeking close relations with both parties. And in contrast to other neutral states, Finland in a certain sense met the superpowers with more sympathy than hostility. Finns of course felt that they and the world at large was held hostage by the antagonistic superpowers but there was also a perception that this situation could be mended by small steps. In this respect, the usefulness of military instruments were never given a positive evaluation except in the ultimate event for the defence of the country.

In terms of the hierarchy of foreign policy values, the debates in Finland over the international politics bears the marking of a desire to alter things with a focus on peace and development. The Finnish attitude was positive towards the proposal discussed in the UN in the 1970s to transfer funds from first and second world military budgets to the third world if they could gain wide support. In the same sense, the national aspiration/self-image can be seen as the good international citizen that has no ambitions of regional power status.

If one weighs the domestic vs. foreign political objectives in national decision-making there is no doubt that the national interest in terms of survival comes first. However, the way this is thought of as achievable differs from the general perceptions of national interests as a means to achieve this is by recognition of neighbours' and other states' interests.

5.3. Finland's foreign policy style.

The way Finland engaged in the formulation of a Nordic NWFZ and the NPT indicate that security is seen as something that has to be cooperative and not based on national and isolated perceptions of security. National security can hardly stand alone if one is in a delicate position between two antagonistic blocks. The Nordic NWFZ would have created a regional cooperative security structure that, depending on the circumstances, could have been cooperative beyond the Nordic countries if others were willing to accept and guarantee it. The NPT fits into the same picture as a cooperative security measure of global coverage. With this being said, it is also obvious that cooperative security can only be achieved if there is responsiveness more than assertiveness with respect to the limits of tolerance and interests of other states. The forum to act so has, to a large extent, been multilateral fora like the UN. Kekkonen did, however, launch the zone proposal in smaller fora but this does not destroy the impression that
multilateral fora are seen as the main avenue to achieving security policy objectives. The Nordic NWFZ would have had to be negotiated among many parties.\textsuperscript{61}

5.4.: Structure and values in domestic politics.

Finland is a \textit{democratic} state with all the civic and political rights that entails. Yet, it is also a state where there is a high degree of \textit{centralization} or exclusivity regarding foreign and security policy issues. This does not mean that there is a layer of secrecy as such around the foreign policy process - only that the political history of this century taught the lesson that dissent on foreign policy line was dangerous. A president with strong powers would be the best guarantor for stability. In consequence, certain foreign political issues are only discussed after the political elite has indicated that an \textit{open debate} can take place. The president is also the supreme commander of the military forces and though the decision-making process also includes various other parliamentary committees and the cabinet, the executive power runs from the president/supreme commander to the commander-in-chief and the rest of the military chain of command. The \textit{military is not known to play a role in politics} in spite of the \textit{good reputation} that it enjoys.\textsuperscript{62}

Before the end of the Cold War there were some manifest and latent limitations to the \textit{openness of public and political debates} and the \textit{freedom of speech}. This rests on certain obligations arising from the Paris Treaty according to which no fascist movements or groups with stated anti-Soviet objectives were allowed. The media, interest groups and political parties imposed self-censorship on themselves in order to stay within these limits. There was never an official authority of either Finnish or Soviet origin that exercised censorship.

It is hard to paint with a single brush how various values prevail in Finnish society. The \textit{nationalist sentiments} culminated with the end of World War II when the focus was shifted to welfare and economic growth after the war

\textsuperscript{61} It has been mentioned already that though the Nordic NWFZ did not materialize it created a debate forum for the Nordic countries by which they came to understand each other's security political situation better. The thinking on the Nordic NWFZ continues to have other effects as well. It is a valuable experience for options and limits when other regional NWFZ are considered. And not least has the study on NWFZs that was proposed by Finland and finalized by the UN in 1975 turned out to be a valuable source of inspiration for the negotiators of the Pelindaba Treaty by which the African continent is now a NWFZ.

reparations to the USSR had been paid. Environmentalism and post-materialistic attitudes are of a rather recent nature compared to many other European countries. In accordance herewith, the general public attitude towards nuclear energy has long been positive and only changed in recent years. Proposals to expand the nuclear energy sector have been rejected by the Parliament though there at present seems to be a majority of the population in favour of building another reactor.

6. Conclusion: Non-proliferation in the Finnish political tradition.
The study of nuclear non-proliferation highlights a number of special features of Finnish politics like: Neutrality, the friendly relations with Russia/USSR, the powers of the president, the domestic debate culture, idealistic and realistic orientations etc. that with respect to this issue are placed in a certain relationship.

Based on personal diplomatic experiences, Max Jakobson states that a small state’s realistic attitude to its survival and world politics must be based on a certain portion of idealism. This is also the impression that stands out above though the logic could also have been inverted: The idealistic goals of a small state must be based on a certain degree of realistic attitude. Both would seem to count for Finland depending on which period one would investigate.

This makes the Finnish non-proliferation case all the more interesting since there are some features that normally might trigger nuclear weapons ambitions that do no such thing in the this case. The absence of security guarantees, the proximity to a state with overwhelming military capacities, defeat in two wars with a loss of territory would have been enough to lead other states on the nuclear path. For Finland this was not the case. Of course, the Paris Treaty and other arrangements stood in the way of nuclear weapons but they would not have impede thinking about nuclear options and considerations of whether there was a way out of Paris Treaty obligations.

Finland’s non-proliferation assertiveness has a lot to do with the Soviet Union. The relationship with the Soviets was marked by realistic assessments of what domestic actors could say on the issues that had implications for the peaceful neighbourhood. Instead of stopping the story there, the use of multilateral fora and the formulation of idealistic proposals and policies gave access to a wider contact with the West and the international community. This was an instrument for upholding neutrality and building bridges where they did

63 Max Jakobson, op. cit., p. 29.
not exist - just as it was and continues to be of tremendous importance to international non-proliferation efforts.

In spite of the fact that the non-proliferation emphasis was developed with a view to seeking a number of other goals than the ones that are in the non-proliferation subject as such; it is important to note that the Finnish non-proliferation continues to live and thrive. Other states that used to have a high profile in the non-proliferation diplomacy are down-sizing their role in the misbelief that things are safe with the end of the Cold War. This is not the case for Finland. There is an unbroken devotion to the non-proliferation objectives; not because other things still have to be achieved - but simply because non-proliferation in itself is important.