



THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

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The following main points will be dealt with and underlined by illustrative examples:

0. A preliminary clarification: Contrary to the title's short-hand language, it is of course, not the Additional Protocols entered into by the Agency and States and other Parties to Safeguards Agreements since 1997 nor the Model Additional Protocol adopted by the Board of Governors and endorsed by the General Conference in 1997 that are, by themselves, an important tool for the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system. They are, however, the necessary legal prerequisite as well as a strong political and moral boost for enabling the Agency to develop and apply additional tools in order to make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime more effective and, therefore, more reassuring and at the same time, more efficient and therefore, more widely accepted.
1. The importance of the new tools cannot be assessed yet. Hopefully, it will grow quickly and consistently. This will depend primarily on two factors:
 - The extent to which Additional Protocols are entered into force and at what speed this is achieved, and the extent to which these Protocols cover all important peaceful nuclear activities and resources, whether these exist in states with comprehensive safeguards agreements or not;
 - The extent to which the Agency succeeds in merging the new measures with those applicable before into an optimized, integrated toolbox.
2. The first factor tends to increase effectiveness by permitting the collection of safeguards-relevant data provided not only in reports from countries in which such activities are conducted or such resources exist but also in information coming from other sources such as publications in or intelligence made available by, other countries. Cross-checking all those data against each other may, in the best case, reinforce their credibility or, in the worst case, reveal gaps and inconsistencies, but will at any rate, in one way or other, help to attain primary safeguards objectives.
3. The second factor may enhance effectiveness by allowing the Agency to choose, in any given case, the best and fastest-working combination of tools from the wide array created by the various safeguards instruments (agreements, protocols, Board decisions, and the like). By the same token, such choice offers great potential for achieving better efficiency (e.g. correlating information available from several sources independent of each other before proceeding to further time-consuming, costly and more intrusive inspections).
4. The most important positive impact of these two factors is, however, to be expected from their interrelatedness, from their promise of mutually reinforcing their positive effects: If, for instance, the integration of the new tools into the Agency's safeguards arsenal will lead to higher efficiency, this will promote wider acceptance of Additional Protocols which in turn will increase effectiveness (as described under 2 above) and, by ever more approaching "universality" of the Agency's safeguards system, its attraction for countries that have not, or not fully, adhered to it before.

Whether all the potential that is added by Additional Protocols will be exhausted to the optimum will, of course, be decisively influenced by the way in which the now larger toolbox will be put to use. If the measures made possible by the Protocols are seen in isolation and only as a purely additive means for complementing an otherwise unchanged implementation of safeguards as administered before, added value in terms of safeguards effectiveness and safeguards efficiency will be low. If, however, the implements are chosen wisely and flexibly as appropriate in any given situation, then the title of my present contribution might become a statement of fact rather than a mere question or expression of hope.