First is the different perception on the biologial and chemical threats. For example, some chemical or biological agents which are considered dangerous material for some countries, they are not considered danger for some peoples either due to the lack of awareness or their daily lifestyles which put security on a very low priority.
The second reason is that demographical and geographical condition of Indonesia which is very diverse and with more than 230 milion populations which are scattered throughout more than seventeen thousands islands makes it difficult to be controled. The other major challenge is that the danger of chemical and biological agents is not only a function of the pathogenity, tranmissibility and infectivity or toxicity of the agent, but also heavily depends on the person who is handling the agent.
So, the key to counter the threat coming from chemical and biological agent rests on our ability to detect the intention behind the possible threats whether they are deliberetely used for peaceful or hostile purposes. For those reasons, the presentation will discuss five steps that have to be considered in order to counter the threats from the use of biological and chemical agents either in laboratories or the possible misuse by a potential terrorist. These are intention, trends, pre-actions, action, and post-action.

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58. TRANSBORDER COOPERATION ON THE PROTECTION, SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF ENDEMIC DISEASES

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This paper discuss some concern and challenges regards the Bulgarian-Greec transborder cooperation with respect the protection, surveillance and control of some endemic for this transborder region diseases like: Q-fever, Brucellosis, Lyme disease, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever and Marseilles fever. The study examines transborder activities, including a background for the infection diseases state for the period 2004-2007, the problems of training and equipment of the specialists for sampling and identification of these diseases, development of strategy and conception for control of spreading of the infectious agents in 4 bulgarian regions / Blagoevgrad, Haskovo, Smoljan and Kardjeli/ and in the corresponding regions in Greece – Seres, Drama, Ksanti and Evro. Additionally, there is presented the role of local governmental representatives to manage these transnational border issues.

Key Words/ Phrases: transborder cooperation, endemic infectious diseases, infectious control and surveillance

Will not be presented

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Publications: About 180 scientific papers.

59. TOXIC INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS (TICs) AS ASYMMETRIC WEAPONS: THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT

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Asymmetric warfare concepts relate well to the use of improvised chemical weapons against urban targets. Sources of information on toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and lists of high threat chemicals are available that point to likely choices for an attack. Accident investigations can be used as a template for attacks, and to judge the possible effectiveness of an attack using TICs. The results of a chlorine rail car accident in South Carolina, USA and the Russian military assault on a Moscow theater provide many illustrative points for similar incidents that mighty be carried out deliberately. Computer modeling of outdoor releases shows how an attack might take into consideration issues of stand-off distance and dilution. Finally, the preceding may be used to estimate with some accuracy the design basis threat posed by the used of TICs as weapons.

MAJ Skinner has worked on hazardous materials, WMD, and security issues for 20 years. He has been a member of civilian HazMat, urban search & rescue, and WMD response teams.

He's served in the military as an aviator and in special operations units; his current assignment is with the Consequence Management Unit (Abingdon, MD, USA). His areas of expertise include incident response/command, toxic industrial chemicals, toxicology, and threat/vulnerability assessment.
He's participated in numerous exercises and operations world-wide, and has published a number of papers on WMD and security-related topics. His educational background is in molecular biology, toxicology, and security engineering.

60. EDUCATION IN PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY AS PREVENTION FROM CHEMICAL TERRORISM

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Technical and technological accidents in petrochemical industry, with possible catastrophic consequences, caused by anthropogenic activity (technical or technological malfunction, terror, or war destruction), usually accompanied by great human losses and material damage and high intensity of events in a relatively short period of time, which requires a quick action of emergency responders, process personnel and the high degree of self-organized endangered population for treatment in these kind of accidents. This implies a high qualification and skills for the treatment of accidents of all factors of rescue and protection such as: process personnel, emergency responders (firefighters, technical services), other workers as well as the endangered population. Managing the system of protection and rescue in communities with such risks requires maximum responsibility of local authorities and management of petrochemical plants. Petrokemija Kutina, with its many years of experience as a target for military and terrorist attacks, actively participated in the creation of laws and systems of protection and rescue in the Republic of Croatia, and also in creating standard operating procedures on local and regional level, and is also ready to share its own experiences with other similar factories using toxic substances in the production processes.

Key Words/ Phrases: chemical terrorism, destruction of war, hazardous substances, education, rescue and protection

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61. INCIDENT COMMAND LINKUP: THE VITAL KEY FOR CBRN RESPONSE

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The most vital element for responding emergency personnel to a CBRN attack is the incident command linkup and dissemination of information. Incident Command, the basic foundation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), is the first thing that must be effectively established when a response is required in any emergency. When initial evaluation of the scene determines that the incident involves CBRN, specialized resources from a wide array of assets must be activated quickly to mitigate the hazards.
In this paper, we examine the information that the Incident Commander must be prepared to convey to those specialized assets responding.
We will also look at what questions those specialized resources may ask while en route and upon arrival. Another key element that will be discussed is the placement of those resources in the hierarchy of the National Incident Management System.
The information that the Incident Commander (IC) must be prepared to convey to those specialized assets responding is crucial for an efficient response and effective deployment. What questions might those specialized CBRN resources ask while en route and upon arrival? At a bare minimum, the four basic questions of who is in charge of the incident, where is the incident located, what transpired to trigger a response, and when did the incident occur must be answered. These questions should be answered while en route to the scene so that the Commander of the responding CBRN unit can formulate a plan on the move and prepare his response accordingly.
While in transit, the CBRN responders should maintain contact with a representative of the Incident Command at the scene so that the latest information is available. Discussions should include anticipated logistical requirements such as personal protective equipment (PPE), decon requirements, communications protocols, and medical care issues. The CBRN