

Information Circular

INFCIRC/539/Rev.4

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General Distribution

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Communication of 1 October 2009 received from the Resident Representative of Hungary to the Agency on behalf of the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

1. The Director General has received a letter dated 1 October 2009 from the Resident Representative of Hungary to the Agency on behalf of the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.¹ Attached to this letter is an updated version of a paper entitled "The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities." The original version of this paper was issued as INFCIRC/539 on 15 September 1997; revisions were issued on 17 April 2000, 16 September 2003 and 30 May 2005.
2. As requested in the letter, the revised version of the paper, attached hereto, is being circulated to Member States of the IAEA.

¹ A list of NSG participating Governments is contained in the Annex to this INFCIRC.



Vienna, 1 October 2009

Your Excellency,

Pursuant to the letter dated August 13, 1997, by the Permanent Mission of Australia, and on behalf of the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), I have the honour to send you a revised text of the document entitled : „The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities.”

The Purpose of this document is to provide detailed background regarding the NSG Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2, as amended), which govern the exports of items and technologies exclusively for nuclear use, as well as the export of nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies. The original version of this document was published by the Agency as INFCIRC/539 dated September 15, 1997. The International Atomic Energy Agency also published subsequent revisions. In light of many developments in the activities of the NSG since the last revision, the Participating Governments of the NSG deemed it necessary to update the document.

I would be grateful if you could circulate the attached document to the Member States of the IAEA as a revised version of INFCIRC/539.

Please accept, Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Károly Banai
Ambassador

H.E. Mr. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna

The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities

Overview

1. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. NSG Participating Governments (hereinafter referred to as “NSG participants or PGs”) are listed in the Annex. NSG participants pursue the aims of the NSG through adherence to the NSG Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through an exchange of information, notably on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.
2. The first set of NSG Guidelines¹ governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These include: (i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear reactors and equipment therefor; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plants and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production; and (v) technology associated with each of the above items.
3. The second set of NSG Guidelines² governs the export of nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies, that is, items that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but that have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry.
4. The NSG Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally binding instruments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).
5. The aim of the NSG Guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms. The NSG urges all States to adhere to the Guidelines.
6. The commitment of NSG participants to rigorous conditions of supply, in the context of the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, makes the NSG one of the elements of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

¹ These guidelines are contained in INFCIRC/254, Part 1 (as amended).

² These guidelines are contained in INFCIRC/254, Part 2 (as amended).

Background to Present Paper

7. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a broader understanding of the NSG and its activities as part of an overall effort to promote dialogue and cooperation between NSG participants and non-NSG participants. This document provides information on actions taken by NSG participants to give effect to their commitment to improve transparency in nuclear-related export controls and to cooperate more closely with non-NSG participants to achieve this objective. In so doing, it aims to encourage wider adherence to the NSG Guidelines.

8. The paper's purpose is therefore consistent with Decision 2 on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPTREC) where Paragraph 17 of that document states that "transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty." In this connection, NSG participants also take into account Paragraph 16 of that document, which calls for preferential treatment to be accorded to non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account. This paper is likewise consistent with Paragraph 9 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which "calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation" so as to address the threats posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Section I traces the origins and development of the NSG.

Section II describes the structure and current activities of the NSG.

Section III describes the developments of the NSG to date.

Section IV reports on the NSG action to promote openness and transparency.

I. Origins and Development of the NSG

Export Controls

9. From the beginning of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, supplier countries have recognised the responsibility to ensure that such cooperation does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Shortly after entry into force of the NPT in 1970, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment of two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger Committee in 1971 and what has become known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975. Between 1978 and 1991, the NSG was not active, even though its Guidelines were in place. The Zangger Committee continued to meet on a regular basis during this period to review and amend the list of items subject to export controls, the so-called "Trigger List."

The Zangger Committee

10. The Zangger Committee had its origins in 1971 when major nuclear suppliers regularly involved in nuclear trade came together to reach common understandings on how to implement Article III.2³ of the NPT with a view to facilitating consistent interpretation of the obligations arising from that Article. In 1974 the Zangger Committee published a “Trigger List,” that is, items which would “trigger” a requirement for safeguards and the Zangger guidelines (“common understandings”) governing the export, direct or indirect, of those items to non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) that are not party to the NPT. The Zangger Understandings establish three conditions for the supply: a non-explosive-use assurance, an IAEA safeguards requirement, and a re-transfer provision that requires the receiving State to apply the same conditions when re-exporting these items. The Zangger Trigger List and the Understandings are published as IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as amended.

The NSG

11. The NSG was created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State, an event which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. It was thus felt that conditions of nuclear supply might need to be adapted so as to better ensure that nuclear cooperation could be pursued without contributing to the risk of nuclear proliferation. This event brought together the major suppliers of nuclear material, non-nuclear material for reactors, equipment and technology who were members of the Zangger Committee, as well as States who were not parties to the NPT.

12. The NSG, taking into account the work already done by the Zangger Committee, agreed on a set of guidelines incorporating a Trigger List. The NSG Guidelines were published in 1978 as IAEA Document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended), to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. There is a requirement for formal government assurances from recipients to this effect. The NSG Guidelines also strengthened re-transfer provisions and adopted a requirement for physical protection measures and an agreement to exercise particular caution in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In doing so, the NSG Guidelines recognised the fact that there is a class of technologies and materials that are particularly sensitive—namely, enrichment and reprocessing technologies—because they can lead directly to the creation of material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The implementation of effective physical protection measures is also critical. This can help prevent the theft and illicit transfer of nuclear material.

³

Article III.2 of the NPT states that:

“Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:

(a) source or special fissionable material, or

(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.”

13. At the 1990 NPT Review Conference (NPTRC), a number of recommendations made by the committee reviewing the implementation of Article III had a significant impact on the NSG's activities in the 1990s. These included the following:

- That NPT parties consider further improvements in measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons;
- That States engage in consultations to ensure appropriate coordination of their controls on the exports of items, such as tritium, not identified in Article III.2 but still relevant to nuclear weapons proliferation and therefore to the NPT as a whole;
- That nuclear supplier States require, as a necessary condition for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear weapon States, the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all their current and future nuclear activities (i.e. full-scope safeguards or comprehensive safeguards).

14. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that export control provisions then in force had not prevented Iraq, a party to the NPT, from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, which later prompted UN Security Council action. A large part of Iraq's effort had been to acquire dual-use items not covered by the NSG Guidelines and then to build its own Trigger List items. This gave major impetus to the NSG's development of its Dual-Use Guidelines. In doing so, the NSG demonstrated its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by ensuring that items like those used by Iraq would from now on be controlled to ensure their non-explosive use. These items would, however, continue to be available for peaceful nuclear activities subject to IAEA safeguards, as well as for other industrial activities where they would not contribute to nuclear proliferation.

15. Following these developments, the NSG decided in 1992:

- To establish guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications) that could make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity. These Dual-Use Guidelines were published as Part 2 of INFCIRC/254, and the original Guidelines published in 1978 became Part 1 of INFCIRC/254;
- To establish a framework for consultation on the Dual-Use Guidelines, for the exchange of information on their implementation and on procurement activities of potential proliferation concern;
- To establish procedures for exchanging notifications that have been issued as a result of national decisions not to authorise transfers of dual-use equipment or technology and to ensure that NSG participants do not approve transfers of such items without first consulting with the State that issued the notification;

- To make a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA a condition for the future supply of Trigger List items to any non-nuclear-weapon State. This decision ensured that only NPT parties and other States with full-scope safeguards agreements could benefit from nuclear transfers.

16. The endorsement at the 1995 NPTREC of the full-scope safeguards policy already adopted by the NSG in 1992 clearly reflects the conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply policy is a vital element to promote shared nuclear non-proliferation commitments and obligations. Specifically, Paragraph 12 of Decision 2 on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" states that full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be a condition for granting licences for Trigger List items under new supply arrangements with non-nuclear-weapon States.

17. The 2000 NPTRC reconfirmed also that any transfer of nuclear-related dual-use items should be in full conformity with the NPT.

The NSG, the Zangger Committee and the NPT

18. The NSG and the Zangger Committee differ slightly in the scope of their Trigger Lists of *especially designed or prepared* (EDP) items and in the export conditions for items on those lists. Concerning the scope of those lists, the Zangger list is restricted to items falling under Article III.2 of the NPT. The NSG Guidelines, in addition to covering equipment and material, also cover the technology for the development, production and use of the items on the list. On export conditions for the items on the Trigger Lists, the NSG has a formal full-scope safeguards requirement as a condition of supply. The NSG Guidelines apply to transfers for peaceful purposes to any NNWS and, in the case of controls on retransfer, to transfers to any State.

19. The NSG Guidelines also contain the so-called "Non-Proliferation Principle," adopted in 1994, whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the NSG Guidelines, authorises a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Principle seeks to cover the rare but important cases where adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not by itself be a guarantee that a State will consistently share the objectives of the Treaty or that it will remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations.

20. The NSG arrangement covering exports of dual-use items is a major difference between the NSG and the Zangger Committee. As dual-use items cannot be defined as EDP equipment, they fall outside the Zangger Committee's mandate. As noted above, the control of dual-use items has been recognised as making an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation.

21. Despite these differences between the two regimes, it is important to keep in mind that they serve the same objective and are equally valid instruments of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. There is close cooperation between the NSG and the Zangger Committee on the review and amendment of the Trigger Lists.

II. Structure and Current Activities of the NSG

Participation

22. From the initial publication of INFCIRC/254 in 1978 to now, participation has increased steadily. (See full list of NSG participants in the Annex.)
23. Factors taken into account for participation include the following:
- The ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the Annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines;
 - Adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them;
 - Enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system that gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;
 - Adherence to one or more treaties, such as the NPT, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Bangkok or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s);
 - Support of international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.

Organisation of Work

24. The NSG works on the basis of consensus. Overall responsibility for activities lies with the NSG participants who meet once a year in a Plenary meeting.
25. A rotating Chair has overall responsibility for coordination of work and outreach activities. (See full list of NSG Chairs in the Annex.)
26. The NSG Plenary can decide to set up technical working groups on matters such as the review of the NSG Guidelines, the Annexes, the procedural arrangements, information sharing and transparency activities. The NSG Plenary can also mandate the Chair to conduct outreach activities with specific countries. The aim of the outreach activities is to promote adherence to the NSG Guidelines.
27. Typically, the agenda of the Plenary meeting focuses on reports from working groups that may be operating or may have concluded their work since previous Plenaries as well as on reports from the previous NSG Chair on outreach activities. Time is also allotted to review items of interests such as trends in nuclear proliferation and developments since the previous Plenary meeting.
28. In addition to the Plenary meeting, the NSG has two other standing bodies that report to the Plenary. These are the Consultative Group (CG) and the Information Exchange Meeting (IEM) with Chairs that also rotate annually. The CG meets at least twice a year and is tasked to

hold consultations on issues associated with the Guidelines on nuclear supply and the technical annexes. The IEM precedes the NSG Plenary and provides another opportunity for NSG participants to share information and developments of relevance to the objectives and content of the NSG Guidelines. Under the mandate of information exchange, the Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting, or LEEM, discusses issues relating to effective licensing and enforcement practices.

29. NSG participants review the Guidelines in INFCIRC/254 from time to time to ensure that they are up to date to meet evolving nuclear proliferation challenges. The IAEA is notified of agreed amendments to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines and their associated lists and reissues INFCIRC/254 accordingly. Such amendments can be additions, deletions or corrections.

30. The Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna, acting as a Point of Contact, carries out a practical support function. It receives and distributes NSG documents, notifies meeting schedules and provides practical assistance to the NSG Plenary, the CG and IEM Chairs and Chairs of the various working groups established by the Plenary.

How the Guidelines Work

31. The NSG Guidelines introduce a degree of order and predictability among the suppliers and harmonise standards and interpretations of suppliers' undertakings with the aim of ensuring that the normal process of commercial competition does not lead to outcomes that further the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Consultations among NSG participants are also designed to ensure that any possible impediments to international nuclear trade and cooperation are kept to a minimum.

32. The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each NSG participant in accordance with its national laws and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements. This is the prerogative and right of all States for all export decisions in any field of commercial activity and is also in line with the text of Article III.2 of the NPT, which refers to "each State Party," and thus emphasises the sovereign obligation of any party to the Treaty to exercise proper export controls. NSG participants meet regularly to exchange information on issues of nuclear proliferation concern and how these impact on national export control policy and practice. However, it is important to remember that the NSG does not have a mechanism for limiting supply or the coordination of marketing arrangements and does not take decisions on licence applications as a group.

33. The requirement that no transfer of Trigger List items to NNWS takes place unless the recipient State has full-scope safeguards on all its nuclear activities is particularly pertinent because it establishes a uniform standard of supply that is based on the IAEA's international verification system. The strengthened safeguards system of the IAEA, as adopted in 1997, should improve considerably the Agency's ability to exercise its verification role.

34. Contacts and briefings take place with non-participating countries: in addition to the outreach activities conducted with potential NSG participants, the NSG conducts briefings of non-NSG participants with a view to increasing the understanding of and adherence to the NSG

Guidelines. States can choose to adhere to the Guidelines without being obliged to participate in the NSG.

III. Developments of the NSG to Date

35. The NSG Guidelines have significantly strengthened international solidarity in the field of transfers of nuclear material. NSG undertakings reflect the non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation objectives that NSG participants share with all NPT parties and parties to other international legally binding non-proliferation commitments. Controls on the transfer of listed items and technologies provide essential support for the implementation of these treaties and for the continuation and development of peaceful nuclear cooperation, thus also facilitating the utilisation of nuclear energy in developing countries.

36. Contrary to fears that the NSG Guidelines act as an impediment to the transfer of nuclear materials and equipment, they have in fact facilitated the development of such trade. For some time now, supply arrangements have incorporated NSG commitments. Such arrangements are designed to expedite transfers and trade. The NSG commitments, when woven into the supply arrangements with a basis in respective national laws, provide governments with legitimate and defensible arguments that such arrangements diminish proliferation risk. In this manner, non-proliferation and trade purposes are mutually reinforcing.

37. The NSG Guidelines are applied both to NSG participants and non-NSG participants. Most NSG participants do not possess a self-sufficient fuel cycle and are major importers of nuclear items. Accordingly, they are required to provide the same assurances for nuclear transfers as non-NSG participants in accordance with the Guidelines.

38. As practised by NSG participants, export controls operate on the basis that cooperation is the principle and restrictions are the exception. Few NPT parties have been refused controlled items: this has occurred when a supplier had good reason to believe that the item in question could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Almost all rejections by NSG participants of applications for export licences have concerned States with unsafeguarded nuclear programmes.

39. There is close interdependence between the controls in Part 1 of the Guidelines and the effective implementation of comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The NSG supports fully international efforts to strengthen safeguards to detect undeclared activities as well as to monitor declared nuclear activities to ensure that they continue to meet vital nuclear non-proliferation requirements and to provide the assurances needed for the continuation of international nuclear trade.

40. The NSG held an Intersessional Meeting in Vienna in October 1998, following the concern expressed by NSG participants at the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. NSG participants discussed their impact and they reaffirmed their commitment to the NSG Guidelines.

41. The NSG held an Extraordinary Plenary Meeting in Vienna in December 2002 and agreed to several comprehensive amendments to strengthen its Guidelines, intended to

prevent and counter the threat of diversion of nuclear exports to nuclear terrorism. The Plenary emphasised that effective export controls are an important tool to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. While discussing the DPRK nuclear programme, the Participating Governments of the NSG called on all States to exercise extreme vigilance that their exports and any goods or nuclear technologies that transit their territorial jurisdiction do not contribute to any aspect of a North Korean nuclear weapons effort.

42. At the 2004 NSG Plenary in Göteborg, Sweden, the NSG welcomed Libya's voluntary decision to eliminate materials, equipment and programmes leading to the production of nuclear weapons, while noting with deep concern the discovery of elements of a covert international proliferation trafficking network through which sensitive nuclear-related equipment had found its way to Libya. The Göteborg Plenary also noted the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and called on Iran to implement proactively all of the provisions of the resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and to restore broad international confidence.

43. NSG Participants continue discussions on illicit procurement and trafficking, while calling on all States to exercise extreme vigilance to make best efforts that none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to nuclear weapons programmes. In this regard, NSG participants welcome UNSCR 1540's affirmation that the prevention of nuclear weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology used for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilisation should not be used as a cover for proliferation.

44. NSG participants also welcome UNSCR 1540's recognition of the importance of export controls to non-proliferation efforts, as well as its decision that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including establishing end-user controls.

45. To further strengthen Participating Government's national export controls, the 2004 Göteborg Plenary decided to adopt a "catch-all" mechanism in the NSG Guidelines, to provide a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with a nuclear weapons programme. Participating Governments also agreed on the importance of effective and consistent Guideline implementation, including requiring the existence of national export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations.

46. In recognition of the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the unrestricted spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, NSG participants continue to discuss ways to further strengthen the NSG Guidelines in order to address these challenges.

47. At the 2005 NSG Plenary in Oslo, PGs adopted additional strengthening measures: to establish a procedure towards suspending, through national decisions, nuclear transfers to countries that are non-compliant with their safeguards agreements; that supplier and recipient states should elaborate appropriate measures to invoke fall-back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer undertake its Safeguards mandate in a recipient state, and to introduce the existence of effective export controls in the recipient state as a criteria of supply for nuclear material, equipment and technology and a factor for consideration for dual use items and technologies.

48. At the 2006 NSG Plenary in Brasilia, the NSG adopted revised guidelines for information sharing, adopted an approach to continue to examine ways of strengthening conditions of supply, amended the Guidelines to include especially designed or prepared valves for use in enrichment plants, and a means to incorporate the outcomes of an NSG Workshop on sensitive technologies into outreach activities.

49. Beginning in 2005, the NSG examined issues raised by the US-India Joint Statement of July 2005, and possible NSG-India civilian nuclear cooperation. In September 2008, taking note of steps India voluntarily undertook to separate its civilian nuclear facilities, the conclusion and approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of a safeguards agreement for India's civilian nuclear facilities and India's commitment to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol to that agreement, and to support international efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and India's other steps to strengthen its domestic export control system, adhere to the NSG Guidelines and continue a moratorium on nuclear testing and work toward an FMCT, NSG PGs adopted a policy statement on civil nuclear cooperation with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civil nuclear program. Based on these commitments and actions of India, the policy permits transfers of trigger list and dual use items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguarded civil nuclear facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of the NSG guidelines, as revised. The policy is elaborated in IAEA document INFCIRC/734. The statement notes that PGs will report approved transfers to India of INFCIRC/254 Part 1, Annex A and B items, requests the Chair to confer and consult with India and report to the Plenary, and states that PGs will consult regularly on matters connected to the implementation of all aspects of the policy statement. The statement also includes a provision for PGs to meet, if deemed necessary, in accordance with paragraph 16 of the Guidelines.

50. The NSG continues to exchange information and analyze current proliferation challenges as they arise, and also to call on all states to exercise extreme vigilance and make best efforts to ensure none of their exports of goods and technologies contribute to nuclear weapons programs.

IV. NSG Action to Promote Openness and Transparency

51. The NSG is aware that non-NSG participants have in the past expressed concern about the lack of transparency in the NSG's proceedings. Non-NSG participants have not been part of the decision-making process in the establishment of the Guidelines. Concerns have therefore been expressed that the NSG has sought to deprive States of the benefits of nuclear technology or impose requirements on non-NSG participants, which have been made without their participation.

52. NSG participants understand the reasons for these concerns but state emphatically that the objectives of the NSG have consistently been to fulfil their obligations as suppliers to support nuclear non-proliferation and, in doing so, to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation. The growing and diverse participation of the NSG demonstrates that it is not a closed shop.

53. The NSG has consistently promoted openness and greater understanding of its aims, as well as adherence to its Guidelines and is prepared to support efforts by States to adhere to and

implement the Guidelines. In response to the interest shown by individual States and groups of States, a series of contacts have taken place to inform them about the NSG's activities and to encourage them to adhere to the Guidelines. These contacts have been organised through special missions to these countries by successive NSG Plenary Chairs and representatives of NSG participants as well as during NSG seminars specially convened for this purpose (in 1994 and 1995).

54. The NSG welcomes the call in Paragraph 17 of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the 1995 NPTREC for more openness and transparency, and responded substantively to the call at its Buenos Aires Plenary meeting on 25-26 April 1996 by establishing a working group to consider how to promote openness and transparency through further dialogue and cooperation with non-NSG participants

55. As a first step, NSG participants have strengthened their dialogue with non-NSG participants through contacts that took place in the margins of the 1996 IAEA General Conference. This dialogue continues in capitals and on other occasions such as regular nuclear and security policy dialogues, as well as during multilateral meetings that deal with these issues. This paper is a further practical contribution to this process.

56. On 7-8 October 1997, immediately following the forty-first session of the IAEA General Conference, the NSG held the "International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation" in Vienna. Given the importance of including all actual and potential supplier countries and the wish for a genuine, open and all-inclusive dialogue, it was decided to invite all States to the Seminar, both parties and non-parties to the NPT.

57. On the basis of the dialogue started in Vienna, a second international seminar on the same subject was held in New York on 8-9 April 1999, ahead of the 1999 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting. As in 1997, speakers were drawn from both NSG participants and non-NSG participants and from a variety of backgrounds so that the debate could cover a broad spectrum of views. Both seminars were attended by representatives from Governments, international organisations, and leading experts from the media, the academic world and industry.

58. The two international seminars were designed to be a further but not final step in promoting the goals of transparency within a framework of dialogue and cooperation on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation and in the promotion of nuclear trade for peaceful purposes. These events proved to be very beneficial in terms of furthering transparency about nuclear export controls.

59. At the 2001 Aspen Plenary the NSG agreed upon the creation of a web site in order to better inform the public of the role and activities of the NSG. The web site, with the following URLs, was opened to the public at the 2002 Prague Plenary.

<http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org>

<http://www.nsg-online.org>

60. Recognising the increased need for transparency, openness and dialogue in order to address export control challenges posed by illicit procurement of nuclear and nuclear-related

materials and the globalisation of the nuclear industry, NSG participants agreed at the 2004 Göteborg Plenary to strengthen contacts with non-partners through seminars and other joint activities with States outside of the NSG.

61. NSG participants are also exploring other means of cooperating more closely with non-NSG participants, to promote understanding of the Guidelines as well as adherence and implementation. The Troika composed of the past, present and incoming NSG Chairs continues contacts with non-participating governments and international organizations in the framework of existing NSG outreach programme and regular contacts with specific countries to inform them about NSG practices and to promote adherence to the Guidelines.

62. In order to give a practical dimension to, and a reliable framework for ongoing transparency efforts, at the Budapest Plenary NSG participants adopted best-practice guides to be used internally and for outreach activities to address the challenges posed by intangible transfer of technology (ITT) and end-use control.

Conclusions

63. In its future activities, the NSG will continue to be guided by the objectives of supporting nuclear non-proliferation and facilitating the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

64. With regard to the future development of the Guidelines, NSG participants will continue to harmonise their national export control policies in a transparent manner. In this way they will continue to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation and at the same time support the development of nuclear trade and cooperation and help sustain genuine commercial competition between suppliers.

65. Universal transparency of the NSG Guidelines and the Annexes will continue through their publication as IAEA Information Circulars.

66. The NSG remains open to admitting further supplier countries in order to strengthen international non-proliferation efforts, as already illustrated by its broadening participation in all regions of the world.

67. The NSG is committed to the further promotion of openness and transparency in its practices and policy.

NSG Participating Governments and those who have held the Chair

ARGENTINA	(1996 / 97 – BUENOS AIRES)
AUSTRALIA	
AUSTRIA	
BELARUS	
BELGIUM	
BRAZIL	(2006 / 07 – BRASILIA)
BULGARIA	
CANADA	(1997 / 98 – OTTAWA)
CHINA	
CROATIA	
CYPRUS	
CZECH REPUBLIC	(2002 / 03 – PRAGUE)
DENMARK	
ESTONIA	
FINLAND	(1995 / 96 – HELSINKI)
FRANCE	(2000 / 01 – PARIS)
GERMANY	(2008 / 09 – BERLIN)
GREECE	
HUNGARY	(2009 / 10 – BUDAPEST)
ICELAND	
IRELAND	
ITALY	(1999 / 00 – FLORENCE)
JAPAN	
KAZAKHSTAN	
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	(2003 / 04 – BUSAN)
LATVIA	
LITHUANIA	
LUXEMBOURG	
MALTA	
NETHERLANDS	(1991 / 92 – THE HAGUE)
NEW ZEALAND	
NORWAY	(2005 / 06 – OSLO)
POLAND	(1992 / 93 – WARSAW)
PORTUGAL	
ROMANIA	
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	
SLOVAKIA	
SLOVENIA	
SOUTH AFRICA	(2007 / 08 – CAPE TOWN)
SPAIN	(1994 / 95 – MADRID)
SWEDEN	(2004 / 05 – GÖTEBORG)
SWITZERLAND	(1993 / 94 – LUCERNE)
TURKEY	
UKRAINE	
UNITED KINGDOM	(1998 / 99 – EDINBURGH)
UNITED STATES	(2001 / 02 – ASPEN)

Permanent Observer: EUROPEAN COMMISSION