Office of Nuclear Security
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency

Regional Workshop on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Information Management and Coordination

Mombasa, Kenya, 7-10 July 2008

Information support for major public events

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Objective

- To provide information on and assessment of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials to national authorities in charge of nuclear security of major public events using the unique capabilities of the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB)

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Terms of Reference

- **Information on incidents confirmed to the IAEA, and incidents reported in open sources, which have not yet been confirmed.**
- **Two types of reports:**
  - **Baseline assessment report providing statistics and analysis of incidents, risks, trends, and patters for a certain period of time prior to the beginning of the information support project;**
  - **Periodic reports providing summary of and commentary to new incidents recorded in the ITDB after the time period covered by the Baseline report**
- **Timeline, frequency and scope of reporting is established in consultations between IAEA and the cooperating State**
- **Reports are communicated to the States via an encrypted electronic link**

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Baseline report

- Covers a certain period of time agreed upon between the IAEA and the cooperating State
- Methodology is case-specific but includes common elements:
  - Assessment of the materials involved, incl. the materials which have not been recovered;
  - Assessment of regional spread of the incident, trafficking routes and directions;
  - Assessment of black market activities;
  - Assessment of motives and intentions;
  - Assessment of connection to terrorism.

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Periodic reports



IAEA-Germany ILLICIT TRAFFICKING INFORMATION SUPPORT PROJECT, January – June 2006

Report 2. ITDB Incidents: March 2006

Date	Location	Source of information, date	Status	Material	Material seized?	Individuals/ organizations involved	Summary	ITDB comments
2006-03-09	Kiev region, Ukraine	State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine, 2006-03-20	Confirmed	Sr-90	Yes	Unknown	Ukraine reported that a container with a Sr-90 source was found in the possession of individuals in the Kiev region. The Security Services of Ukraine conducted the apprehension and the ongoing investigation.	Available information is limited at this stage and it is not possible to assess either the material involved or the circumstances of the incident. The criminal's intent and motives are not known at this stage.
2006-02-24	Bogota, Colombia	Argentinian, 2006-03-03	Confirmed	Depleted uranium, 16 kg	Yes	Two unidentified individuals	Colombia confirmed that two individuals had been apprehended for attempting to sell depleted uranium.	The nuclear material involved in this case cannot be used in a nuclear explosive device and is of very low terrorism-related concern. From the reported circumstances it is not clear whether any real buyer has been identified and whether or not the event has been rapidly driven.
2006-02-13	Perth, Texas, USA	Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006-02-16	Confirmed	Am-241/Be, 1.48 GBq and Cs-137, 0.296 GBq	Yes	Unknown	A moisture-density gauge was stolen from an unlocked pickup truck. Theft of a pickup truck. The gauge was found in a parking lot the next morning.	The sources contained in a moisture-density gauge are categorized as Category 4, according to the IAEA Categorization of radioactive sources. These sources could be harmful if unshielded and misused or damaged. The gauge was stolen and the theft are not known at this stage. The circumstances of the recovery suggest that the thieves were not interested in radioactive materials and the gauge was abandoned when the thieves realized that it contained radioactive materials.

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Secure Communication

Why is it important?

- To ensure **authenticity and integrity** of the received information.
- Use of **encryption** and **digital signature** confirms to the reader of a document the authorship of the document, verifies that the document is intact and not changed (maliciously or by a computer or network glitch).
- The signature attached to a document is unique to the sender and to the contents.
- **Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)** encryption is used by the IAEA
- Each PGP user has a pair of keys:
  - Public key - used by others to encrypt documents sent to the user and verify his signature
  - Private key - used by the user to read encrypted documents sent to him, and to sign his documents
- PGP link is established between an ITDB officer and an officer in the cooperating country

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Exchanging encrypted data



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