Humble Expectations (on Non-proliferation and Disarmament)

The last few years have been, to paraphrase Charles Dickens, an epoch of belief and an epoch of incredulity. The optimistic tide triggered in the spring of 2009 by President Obama's Prague speech appears to be receding. Recent developments in Ukraine provide ammunition for those who doubted the value and wisdom of nuclear arms reductions. It is easy, indeed comfortable, to point to the value of deterrence in times of political fears and tension between those who are nuclear armed. However, Ukraine is not a validation of nuclear weapons possession, nor is it proof that deterrence works. If it were, it carries with it the uncomfortable thought that nuclear weapons deter countries from stepping up in the defence of smaller nations. The consequences of such a chain of thought are unsettling: by extension, it may well be that nuclear force - while securing the borders of those states that can wield it - ultimately undermines the principle of collective security embodied in Article I of the UN Charter. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently stated, 'disarmament in its classic 'meaning' is more and more of the past'. But what has really changed? The prospects for multilateral disarmament efforts have been slim throughout the nuclear age. Disarmament, even a simple reduction of nuclear arms not required for defence needs, has always been a long-term effort, requiring patience and careful planning, and is not suitable for people more who prefer high rhetoric, lofty ambition, and quixotic goals. Things are progressing, albeit slowly. The P-5 process is making small but important advances in formulating joint terminology. While the outcome (expected in 2015) is likely to be under-whelming for many, the effort should not be dismissed, but encouraged. Further work is required to lay the substratum on which disarmament can occur, especially so in regards to the mechanics of multilateral verification, and the future role of international institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Disarmament cannot be verified without a strong safeguards system. The principal function of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Over its lifetime, the treaty has been fairly successful in dissuading further nations from acquiring arms. One can be cautiously optimistic about the future. While the situation in North Korea continues to be a headache, discussions with Iran look promising. It would be unrealistic to think that Iran will give up all its fuel cycle ambitions, but the present talks contains the embryo of a deal that may help make those ambitions less threatening to Iran's neighbours and strategic rivals, hence promoting regional stability. If nothing else, a carefully monitored nuclear programme in Iran - limited in its scope - will make it more costly and more time consuming for the country to develop weapons. The centre is holding. There are few indications at present that we will see many more new entrants in the nuclear weapons club. With continual improvements to safeguards - the continued uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol in particular - we are likely to enter an era where cheating becomes more difficult, and more costly. (author)