Published November 2014 | Version v1
Journal article

Failure mode and effect analysis oriented to risk-reduction interventions in intraoperative electron radiation therapy: The specific impact of patient transportation, automation, and treatment planning availability

  • 1. Servicio de Radiofísica y Protección Radiológica, Consorcio Hospitalario Provincial de Castellón, Castellón de la Plana (Spain)
  • 2. Servicio de Oncología Radioterápica, Consorcio Hospitalario Provincial de Castellón, Castellón de la Plana (Spain)
  • 3. Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain)
  • 4. Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria Gregorio Marañón, Madrid (Spain)
  • 5. Departamento de Oncología, Hospital General Universitario Gregorio Marañón Madrid (Spain)
  • 6. Instituto de Técnicas Energéticas, Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña, Barcelona (Spain)

Description

Background and purpose: Industrial companies use failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) to improve quality. Our objective was to describe an FMEA and subsequent interventions for an automated intraoperative electron radiotherapy (IOERT) procedure with computed tomography simulation, pre-planning, and a fixed conventional linear accelerator. Material and methods: A process map, an FMEA, and a fault tree analysis are reported. The equipment considered was the radiance treatment planning system (TPS), the Elekta Precise linac, and TN-502RDM-H metal–oxide-semiconductor-field-effect transistor in vivo dosimeters. Computerized order-entry and treatment-automation were also analyzed. Results: Fifty-seven potential modes and effects were identified and classified into 'treatment cancellation' and 'delivering an unintended dose'. They were graded from 'inconvenience' or 'suboptimal treatment' to 'total cancellation' or 'potentially wrong' or 'very wrong administered dose', although these latter effects were never experienced. Risk priority numbers (RPNs) ranged from 3 to 324 and totaled 4804. After interventions such as double checking, interlocking, automation, and structural changes the final total RPN was reduced to 1320. Conclusions: FMEA is crucial for prioritizing risk-reduction interventions. In a semi-surgical procedure like IOERT double checking has the potential to reduce risk and improve quality. Interlocks and automation should also be implemented to increase the safety of the procedure

Availability note (English)

Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.radonc.2014.11.012

Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1016/j.radonc.2014.11.012;
PII
S0167-8140(14)00491-5;

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Radiotherapy and Oncology
Journal Volume
113
Journal Issue
2
Journal Page Range
p. 283-289
ISSN
0167-8140
CODEN
RAONDT

Optional Information

Copyright
Copyright (c) 2014 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, All rights reserved.