Scope of IAEA verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: The focused approach

Despite repeated international calls for the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), negotiations have not yet begun. Nonetheless, informal discussions have identified a number of key issues that will need to be resolved during negotiations. One of the key issues is the scope of verification under the Treaty. The United States has proposed a focused approach to FMCT verification, and this paper lays out the implications of that approach in defining the scope of IAEA verification. In general, this approach would apply routine monitoring to all production and downstream use of unirradiated fissile material (HEU, Pu-239 and U-233) after entry into force. Monitoring would begin at enrichment and reprocessing facilities and would end once a suitable level of irradiation is achieved. Other measures, including non-routine inspections at undeclared locations, would also be necessary in order to ensure the absence of undeclared production. This paper will explore the issues involved in effective verification at the starting and ending points of routine monitoring. At the starting point the verification objective is to ensure that all newly produced fissile material is declared and accounted for. As with safeguards under an INFCIRC/153-type agreement, material accountancy would be a fundamental verification measure. The verification approach will depend on the type of facility and on specific design features relevant to material accountancy. At the ending point the verification objective would be to ensure that the material subject to monitoring has been suitably transformed, for example that reactor fuel containing plutonium has been irradiated to a suitable level. The irradiation level necessary to fulfill the objectives of the FMCT would depend on the context established by other relevant agreements and the effectiveness of measures to detect undeclared production. (author)