Evaluation of Fall-back Safeguards Mechanism on the State Party Withdrawing from the NPT

Under Article X of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT), an NPT party has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country such as national security. Nonetheless, the application of safeguards on all materials and equipment supplied to the State Party should be continued for nuclear non-proliferation. This study would identify the fall-back safeguards mechanism in the current safeguards system and evaluate whether the mechanism provides the legal instruments to prevent the diversion of nuclear material and equipment supplied to the State Party withdrawing from the NPT. To prevent diversion of nuclear material and equipment supplied to the State withdrawing from the NPT, legal instruments for continuous application of safeguards are needed. As discussed above, the fallback safeguards mechanism set forth in each safeguards agreement can play a crucial role in preventing nuclear proliferation. In this context, two recommendations are suggested: (1) Supplier states have to specify their safeguards right explicitly in NCA and exercise effectively, if necessary. To have universality, the requirement to be included in every NCA could be discussed in international non-proliferation community. (2) To close the existing loophole in the termination of INFCIRC/153 agreement from the NPT withdrawal, additional instruments such as signing on additional INFCIRC/66 agreement, as an international norm, can be considered in advance.