Published June 2005 | Version v1
Journal article

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

Creators

  • 1. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, 207 Giannini Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 (United States)

Description

If a regulator is unable to measure firms individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions

Additional details

Identifiers

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Environmental and Resource Economics
Journal Volume
31
Journal Issue
2
Journal Page Range
p. 229-251
ISSN
0924-6460
CODEN
ERECEP

Conference

Title
Workshop on Instrument Design and Choice in Environmental Regulation
Dates
19 Oct 2002
Place
Helsinki (Finland)

INIS

Country of Publication
Netherlands
Country of Input or Organization
Netherlands
INIS RN
36112407
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
EMISSION; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; MARKET; POLLUTION REGULATIONS; POLLUTION SOURCES; PRICES; TAXES
Descriptors DEC
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GOVERNMENT POLICIES; LAWS; REGULATIONS

Optional Information

Notes
Available from doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-1772-8