Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden
Creators
- 1. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, 207 Giannini Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 (United States)
Description
If a regulator is unable to measure firms individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions
Additional details
Identifiers
Publishing Information
- Journal Title
- Environmental and Resource Economics
- Journal Volume
- 31
- Journal Issue
- 2
- Journal Page Range
- p. 229-251
- ISSN
- 0924-6460
- CODEN
- ERECEP
Conference
- Title
- Workshop on Instrument Design and Choice in Environmental Regulation
- Dates
- 19 Oct 2002
- Place
- Helsinki (Finland)
INIS
- Country of Publication
- Netherlands
- Country of Input or Organization
- Netherlands
- INIS RN
- 36112407
- Subject category
- S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
- Resource subtype / Literary indicator
- Conference
- Descriptors DEI
- EMISSION; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; MARKET; POLLUTION REGULATIONS; POLLUTION SOURCES; PRICES; TAXES
- Descriptors DEC
- ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GOVERNMENT POLICIES; LAWS; REGULATIONS
Optional Information
- Notes
- Available from doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-005-1772-8