Historical overview of international safeguards

The belief that the avoidance of proliferation is too vital to depend exclusively on unverified national undertakings has led to the development of IAEA safeguards, a unique system for the verification of peaceful use commitments through on-site inspections by international civil servants. The safeguards system has its origin in the Atoms for Peace proposal of 1953, which abandoned the earlier concept of international ownership of sensitive nuclear installations in favour of international inspection of national activities. The first step was adoption of the IAEA Statute, which authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards to its own projects and to other activities at the request of the parties involved. The adoption of the Statute was followed by the development, on an evolutionary basis, of more detailed procedures applicable to a variety of different types of nuclear activities. This system, INFCIRC/66, was completed by 1966. The basic approach adopted was a graduated system of reporting and inspection, emphasizing materials accountancy, designed to detect diversion of nuclear materials to unauthorized use. The Non-Proliferation Treaty placed on the IAEA the important new responsibility of applying safeguards to the entire peaceful nuclear programmes of treaty parties. This necessitated the development of a modified safeguards system, INFCIRC/153, introducing several new concepts, including at ''strategic points'' and greater emphasis on instruments, and containment and surveillance. Implementation of the system has proceeded rapidly with a total of about 500 installations in 47 countries now subject to the Agency's safeguards. The development of improved safeguards techniques, especially for the difficult case and bulk-handling facilities, such as reprocessing plants, is proceeding. In addition, implementation of the IAEA's statutory authority to store surplus plutonium is under consideration