Published August 13, 2009
| Version v1
Report
Restricted
Proliferation Risks of Fusion Energy: Clandestine Production, Covert Production, and Breakout
Description
Nuclear proliferation risks from fusion associated with access to weapon-usable material can be divided into three main categories: (1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, (2) covert production of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and (3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state begins production of fissile material without concealing the effort. In this paper we address each of these categories of risk from fusion. For each case, we find that the proliferation risk from fusion systems can be much lower than the equivalent risk from fission systems, if commercial fusion systems are designed to accommodate appropriate safeguards
Availability note (English)
Available from INIS in electronic form; Also available from OSTI as DE00962921; PURL: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/962921-w4qgvc/
Files
Additional details
Identifiers
Publishing Information
- Imprint Pagination
- 14 p.
- Report number
- PPPL--4431
Conference
- Title
- 9. IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Power Plant Safety
- Dates
- 15-17 Jul 2009
- Place
- Vienna (Austria)
INIS
- Country of Publication
- United States
- Country of Input or Organization
- United States
- INIS RN
- 40092447
- Subject category
- S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; S11: NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; S70: PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY;
- Resource subtype / Literary indicator
- Conference
- Descriptors DEI
- FISSILE MATERIALS; FISSION; IAEA; POWER PLANTS; PRODUCTION; PROLIFERATION; SAFEGUARDS; SAFETY; THERMONUCLEAR REACTORS
- Descriptors DEC
- FISSIONABLE MATERIALS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; MATERIALS; NUCLEAR REACTIONS
Optional Information
- Funding organization
- USDOE Office of Science (Seychelles) (US)