Published August 13, 2009 | Version v1
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Proliferation Risks of Fusion Energy: Clandestine Production, Covert Production, and Breakout

Description

Nuclear proliferation risks from fusion associated with access to weapon-usable material can be divided into three main categories: (1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, (2) covert production of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and (3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state begins production of fissile material without concealing the effort. In this paper we address each of these categories of risk from fusion. For each case, we find that the proliferation risk from fusion systems can be much lower than the equivalent risk from fission systems, if commercial fusion systems are designed to accommodate appropriate safeguards

Availability note (English)

Available from INIS in electronic form; Also available from OSTI as DE00962921; PURL: https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/962921-w4qgvc/

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Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Pagination
14 p.
Report number
PPPL--4431

Conference

Title
9. IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Power Plant Safety
Dates
15-17 Jul 2009
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
United States
Country of Input or Organization
United States
INIS RN
40092447
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; S11: NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; S70: PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
FISSILE MATERIALS; FISSION; IAEA; POWER PLANTS; PRODUCTION; PROLIFERATION; SAFEGUARDS; SAFETY; THERMONUCLEAR REACTORS
Descriptors DEC
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; MATERIALS; NUCLEAR REACTIONS

Optional Information