Published November 2010 | Version v1
Journal article

Vertical integration, credit ratings and retail price settings in energy-only markets: Navigating the Resource Adequacy problem

  • 1. Level 22, 101 Miller Street, North Sydney, NSW 2060 (Australia)

Description

Energy-only markets are prone to the Resource Adequacy problem, i.e. the timely entry of new plant. The reason for this is that competitive energy-only markets struggle to be remunerative given reliability constraints and market price caps. Historically, Australia's 45,000 MW National Electricity Market has managed to navigate this well understood problem, albeit with government entities directly or indirectly responsible for a surprisingly large 73% of all new plant investments to 2007. But government involvement in direct investment has now ceased. So what will enable the industry to navigate the Resource Adequacy problem into the future? Quite simply, industrial organisation, the presence of merchant utilities with investment-grade credit ratings and setting any regulated retail prices or 'price to beat' with an LRMC floor.

Availability note (English)

Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.08.023

Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1016/j.enpol.2010.08.023;
PII
S0301-4215(10)00638-5;

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Energy Policy
Journal Volume
38
Journal Issue
11
Journal Page Range
p. 7427-7441
ISSN
0301-4215
CODEN
ENPYAC

INIS

Country of Publication
United Kingdom
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
42010573
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Descriptors DEI
AUSTRALIA; INDUSTRY; INVESTMENT; MARKET; POWER PLANTS; RELIABILITY; RETAIL PRICES; VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Descriptors DEC
AUSTRALASIA; DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; PRICES

Optional Information

Copyright
Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, All rights reserved.