Published 2001 | Version v1
Report

SNL material monitoring system, the T-1 RF seal, and the IAEA and KAMS

  • 1. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

Description

Throughout the world, advanced monitoring systems are needed to help monitor nuclear material. These monitoring systems should be capable of supporting a variety of sensors and video equipment and operating in a multitude of configurations and modes. The Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Material Monitoring System (MMS) fulfills these requirements and more. The SNL MMS can store and deliver sensor information from monitored sites to users anywhere in the world, enabling personnel to have a continuity-of-knowledge of the nuclear material. In addition, the SNL MMS supports various sensor types (e.g., RF and hardwired sensors) and video systems (e.g., still-frame video). The ultimate goal of the SNL MMS is to provide users with the capability of selecting from a variety of sensors and video, installing the MMS system, and running the system without needing to develop additional software to meet unique monitoring requirements. International Safeguards, as applied to storage and monitoring of nuclear materials, requires the application of seals to containment for verification that the material has not been diverted from its agreed upon configuration. At the heart of MMS is the T-1 Electronic Sensor Platform (ESP), which is a wireless containment sealing and monitoring device. The T-1 ESP is designed to satisfy the requirements of the International Safeguards regime as a radio frequency tamper indicating device (RFTID). However, the T-1 ESP concept presents far greater capabilities than a generic RFTID. The T-1 ESP can be configured to monitor a wide variety of digital and analog sensors that may be employed in containment monitoring. Its primary sensor is a fiber-optic loop that is applied to the material containment by passing the fiber through mechanical attachment points to prevent material removal without detection. This RFTID is to be used extensively for monitoring for the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) project at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The T-1 ESP system has recently undergone an IAEA-directed vulnerability assessment and passed this assessment with favorable results. The assessment evaluated the T-1 ESP vulnerabilities represented by its performance in three main areas: environmental, mechanical, and authentication. (author)

Part of:
Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Proceedings

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Proceedings
Imprint Pagination
1396 p.
Journal Page Range
[7 p.]
Report number
IAEA-SM--367/CD

Conference

Title
Verification and nuclear material security
Acronym
Symposium on international safeguards
Dates
29 Oct - 2 Nov 2001
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
33045250
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; INSPECTION; MONITORING; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; PHYSICAL PROTECTION; SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; SECURITY SEALS
Descriptors DEC
EQUIPMENT; MANAGEMENT; NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; PHYSICAL PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFEGUARDS; SEALS; US DOE; US ORGANIZATIONS

Optional Information

Contract/Grant/Project number
Contract DE-AC94AL85000
Notes
4 refs, 4 figs Imprint:Data in PDF format; Acrobat Reader for Windows 3.x, 95, 98, NT 3.5.1, NT 4.0, MacIntosh and UNIX (SUN, HP, IRIX (SGI), AIX and Digital UNIX) included
Secondary number(s)
IAEA-SM--367/7/02