Multi-Unit Initiating Event Analysis for a Single-Unit Internal Events Level 1 PSA

The Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 highlighted the importance of considering the risks from multi-unit accidents at a site. The ASME/ANS probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard also includes some requirements related to multi-unit aspects, one of which (IE-B5) is as follows: 'For multi-unit sites with shared systems, DO NOT SUBSUME multi-unit initiating events if they impact mitigation capability [1].' However, the existing single-unit PSA models do not explicitly consider multi-unit initiating events and hence systems shared by multiple units (e.g., alternate AC diesel generator) are fully credited for the single unit and ignores the need for the shared systems by other units at the same site [2]. This paper describes the results of the multi-unit initiating event (IE) analysis performed as a part of the at-power internal events Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for an OPR1000 single unit ('reference unit'). In this study, a multi-unit initiating event analysis for a single-unit PSA was performed, and using the results, dual-unit LOOP initiating event was added to the existing PSA model for the reference unit (OPR1000 type). Event trees were developed for dual-unit LOOP and dual-unit SBO which can be transferred from dual- unit LOOP. Moreover, CCF basic events for 5 diesel generators were modelled. In case of simultaneous SBO occurrences in both units, this study compared two different assumptions on the availability of the AAC D/G. As a result, when dual-unit LOOP initiating event was added to the existing single-unit PSA model, the total CDF increased by 1∼ 2% depending on the probability that the AAC D/G is available to a specific unit in case of simultaneous SBO in both units.