Authenticated Sensor Interface Device for Securing Sensors and Data Transmission
Creators
- 1. Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken, SC (United States)
Description
The paper will discuss the features of Savannah River National Laboratory's (SRNL) Authenticated Sensor Interface Device (ASID) which provides the ability to authenticate data from critical sensors and other data streams, share that data among a number of parties, and protect the sensor and each party's network from outside cyber-attack or cyber-attack from other parties receiving the data. In addition, the paper will discuss the development of the prototype to date as well as the future plans for the ASID. As industrial sensor data is increasingly transmitted over networks which are ultimately connected to the internet the likelihood that this data, critical to the protection and operation of nuclear and other facilities, will suffer a successful cyber-attack has greatly increased. The risk of unreliable data, either through manipulation or denial of service, being relied upon for physical security systems poses a tremendous security risk. Additionally, unreliable data due to a cyber-attack on industrial control systems poses unacceptable safety and operational risks. The risk of unreliable sensor data must be mitigated to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear and other critical infrastructure facilities throughout the world. The ASID, fully implemented, can be a key component in the protection of critical infrastructure from malicious cyber-attacks. The ASID's modular concept allows for interfacing to numerous sensor types including digital protocols as well as analog sensors with voltage, milliamp, and temperature outputs. The sensor signal is authenticated and encrypted by the primary embedded controller, then communicated to each party's transmission module where additional private encryption may be applied to the data stream. An integral and key feature of the ASID is the data diode functions that ensure no communication flows backward to the sensor interface module which ensures that both the sensor and every network is protected from cyber-attack. (author)
Additional details
Identifiers
Publishing Information
- Publisher
- IAEA
- Imprint Place
- Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))
- ISBN
- 978-92-0-106918-4
- Imprint Title
- International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. Summary of an International Conference. Supplementary Files
- Imprint Pagination
- 4647 p.
- Series
- Proceedings Series
- Journal Page Range
- p. 2641-2645
- ISSN
- 0074-1884
Conference
- Title
- International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
- Dates
- 13-17 Nov 2017
- Place
- Vienna (Austria)
INIS
- Country of Publication
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Country of Input or Organization
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- INIS RN
- 52123878
- Subject category
- S46: INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
- Resource subtype / Literary indicator
- Conference
- Descriptors DEI
- CONTROL SYSTEMS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; CYBER ATTACKS; DATA TRANSMISSION; HAZARDS; NUCLEAR SECURITY; RELIABILITY; SAFETY; SENSORS; SIGNALS
- Descriptors DEC
- COMMUNICATIONS; CRIME; SABOTAGE; SECURITY
Optional Information
- Notes
- 2 figs.
- Secondary number(s)
- IAEA-CN--254-233