Published September 2018 | Version v1
Book

Authenticated Sensor Interface Device for Securing Sensors and Data Transmission

  • 1. Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken, SC (United States)

Description

The paper will discuss the features of Savannah River National Laboratory's (SRNL) Authenticated Sensor Interface Device (ASID) which provides the ability to authenticate data from critical sensors and other data streams, share that data among a number of parties, and protect the sensor and each party's network from outside cyber-attack or cyber-attack from other parties receiving the data. In addition, the paper will discuss the development of the prototype to date as well as the future plans for the ASID. As industrial sensor data is increasingly transmitted over networks which are ultimately connected to the internet the likelihood that this data, critical to the protection and operation of nuclear and other facilities, will suffer a successful cyber-attack has greatly increased. The risk of unreliable data, either through manipulation or denial of service, being relied upon for physical security systems poses a tremendous security risk. Additionally, unreliable data due to a cyber-attack on industrial control systems poses unacceptable safety and operational risks. The risk of unreliable sensor data must be mitigated to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear and other critical infrastructure facilities throughout the world. The ASID, fully implemented, can be a key component in the protection of critical infrastructure from malicious cyber-attacks. The ASID's modular concept allows for interfacing to numerous sensor types including digital protocols as well as analog sensors with voltage, milliamp, and temperature outputs. The sensor signal is authenticated and encrypted by the primary embedded controller, then communicated to each party's transmission module where additional private encryption may be applied to the data stream. An integral and key feature of the ASID is the data diode functions that ensure no communication flows backward to the sensor interface module which ensures that both the sensor and every network is protected from cyber-attack. (author)

Part of:
International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. Summary of an International Conference. Supplementary Files

Additional details

Publishing Information

Publisher
IAEA
Imprint Place
Vienna (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))
ISBN
978-92-0-106918-4
Imprint Title
International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. Summary of an International Conference. Supplementary Files
Imprint Pagination
4647 p.
Series
Proceedings Series
Journal Page Range
p. 2641-2645
ISSN
0074-1884

Conference

Title
International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
Dates
13-17 Nov 2017
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
52123878
Subject category
S46: INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
CONTROL SYSTEMS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; CYBER ATTACKS; DATA TRANSMISSION; HAZARDS; NUCLEAR SECURITY; RELIABILITY; SAFETY; SENSORS; SIGNALS
Descriptors DEC
COMMUNICATIONS; CRIME; SABOTAGE; SECURITY

Optional Information

Notes
2 figs.
Secondary number(s)
IAEA-CN--254-233