Information barriers

An information barrier (IB) consists of procedures and technology that prevent the release of sensitive information during a joint inspection of a sensitive nuclear item, and provides confidence that the measurement system into which it has been integrated functions exactly as designed and constructed. Work in the U.S. on radiation detection system information barriers dates back at least to 1990, even though the term is more recent. In January 1999, an Information Barrier Working Group (IBWG) was formed in the United States to help coordinate technical efforts related to information barrier research and development (R and D). This paper presents an overview of the efforts of this group, by its present and former Chairs, as well as recommendations for further information barrier R and D. Progress on the demonstration of monitoring systems containing IBs is also provided. From the U.S. IBWG perspective, the top-level functional requirements for the information barrier portion of an integrated radiation signature-information barrier inspection system are twofold: The host must be assured that its classified information is protected from disclosure to the inspecting party; and The inspecting party must be confident that the integrated inspection system measures, processes, and presents the radiation-signature-based measurement conclusion in an accurate and reproducible manner. It is the position in the United States that in the absence of any agreement to share classified nuclear weapons design information while implementing an inspection regime, the need to protect host country classified warhead design information is paramount and overrules the need to provide confidence to the inspecting party regarding the accuracy and reproducibility of the measurements. The U.S. IBWG has reached a consensus on several critical design elements that define a general standard for radiation signature information barrier design. Technical specialists from cooperating parties must be able to prove to their respective policymakers that it is not overly difficult to make measurements of sensitive objects without revealing classified information. Without technical measures to inspect classified nuclear items and materials, it will be extremely difficult to reduce stockpiles in a manner that does not weaken the security of Russia and the United States. The importance of successfully developing and implementing effective information barrier methods and procedures cannot be overstated. (author)