Game-theoretic approach for safeguards program of a geological repository for spent nuclear fuels during post-closure period

Since significant amount of plutonium will remain over 10,000 years in one disposal canister, long-term safeguards on DGR should be required to prevent an unauthorized access unless rigid physical protection by a repository itself is provided. Recently, this issue led to international consensus that long-term safeguards of a repository is unavoidable. In this case, continuous safeguards cost can be imposed. Considering that the principle objective of a DGR is the minimization of burden to future generation, a possibility of long-term economic cost by safeguards program of DGR should be discussed in decision making process for SNF management policy. This paper suggests a gametheoretic approach for an assessment of economic cost by safeguards on a DGR during post-closure period. The game theory model, named plutonium mine game model, is suggested based on the assumption that the decision of malicious actors would be determined by cost benefit of their strategies. Considering that such approach has used to be applied not only to conventional nuclear facilities but also other conflict situation, the suggested approach would be appropriate for decision making on safeguards program during post-closure period.