Corruption and reduced oil production: An additional resource curse factor?
- 1. Verksgaten 54, 4013 Stavanger (Norway)
- 2. University of Bergen, Faculty of Law, P.O. Box 6033, N-5892 Bergen (Norway)
- 3. Chr. Michelsen Institute, P.O. Box 6033, N-5892 Bergen (Norway)
Description
Prominent contributions to the resource curse literature suggest weak governance and corruption are important factors behind the wide welfare variations observed among oil producing countries. How weak governance and corruption influence revenue management and expenditure decisions, as well as the possible welfare benefits derived from oil, are broadly discussed. How they impact upon volumes of oil produced has, however, attracted little attention. This paper combines a review of the resource curse and oil production literatures with findings from qualitative interviews with oil sector experts to appreciate the feasibility of connections between corruption and oil production below its potential. We make particular reference to environments where regulatory institutions or political accountability are weak and focus primarily on producer government and oil firm relations. Drawing on insights from geology, political science and economics, we suggest suboptimal production solutions can impact volumes of oil actually produced and create constraints on long term revenues for oil producing countries. We argue greater disclosure of information on oil production efficiency on a field-by-field and country-by-country basis will assist further investigation of the relationships between corruption and volumes of oil produced. - Highlights: ► We combine a literature review with qualitative interviews with oil experts. ► We focus on feasible connections between corruption and oil production levels. ► We suggest suboptimal production solutions can impact volumes of oil produced. ► Corruption may reinforce suboptimal oil production. ► More data on oil production efficiency by field and country will assist research
Availability note (English)
Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.007Additional details
Identifiers
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.11.007;
- PII
- S0301-4215(12)00972-X;
Publishing Information
- Journal Title
- Energy Policy
- Journal Volume
- 54
- Journal Page Range
- p. 137-147
- ISSN
- 0301-4215
- CODEN
- ENPYAC
INIS
- Country of Publication
- United Kingdom
- Country of Input or Organization
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- INIS RN
- 46063447
- Subject category
- S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
- Descriptors DEI
- ECONOMICS; EFFICIENCY; ENVIRONMENT; EXPENDITURES; GEOLOGY; LIABILITIES; PETROLEUM INDUSTRY; POLITICAL ASPECTS
- Descriptors DEC
- INDUSTRY; INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Optional Information
- Copyright
- Copyright (c) 2012 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, All rights reserved.