Implementation trial of high performance trace analysis/environmental sampling (HPTA/ES) in uranium centrifuge enrichment plants

Field trials have demonstrated that the analysis of particles upon swipes obtained from inside nuclear installations provides clear signatures of past operations in that installation. This can offer a valuable tool for gaining assurance regarding the compliance with declared activities and the absence of undeclared activities (e.g. enrichment, reprocessing, and reactor operation) at such sites. This method, known as 'Environmental Sampling' (ES) or 'High Performance Trace Analysis' (HPTA) in EURATOM terminology, is at present being evaluated by the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate (ESD) in order to assess its possible use in nuclear installations within the European Union. It is expected that incorporation of HPTA/ES of sample collection and analysis into routine inspection activities will allow EURATOM to improve the effectiveness of safeguards in these installations and hopefully save inspection resources as well. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate has therefore performed implementation trials involving the collection of particles by the so-called swipe sampling method in uranium centrifuge enrichment plants and hot cells in the European Union. These samples were subsequently analysed by the Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe. Sampling points were chosen on the basis of the activities performed in the vicinity and by considering the possible ways through which particles are released, diffused and transported. The aim was to test the efficiency of the method as regards: the collection of enough representative material; the identification of a large enough number of uranium particles; the accurate measurement of the enrichment of the uranium particles found on the swipe; the representativity of the results in respect of past activities in the plant; the capability of detecting whether highly enriched uranium has been produced, used or occasionally transported in a location where low enriched uranium is routinely produced in very large quantities. The paper describes the analytical results obtained by ITU from swipes taken from enrichment plants using Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry (SIMS). The potential of particle analysis as a safeguards tool in centrifuge enrichment plants in the European Union is evaluated. Some of the open questions that still need to be resolved are also mentioned. (author)