Published December 1996 | Version v1
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CANDU passive shutdown systems

  • 1. AECL CANDU, Sheridan Park Research Community, Mississauga, ON (Canada)

Description

CANDU incorporates two diverse, passive shutdown systems (Shutdown System No. 1 and Shutdown System No. 2) which are independent of each other and from the reactor regulating system. Both shutdown systems function in the low pressure, low temperature, moderator which surrounds the fuel channels; the shutdown systems do not penetrate the heat transport system pressure boundary. The shutdown systems are functionally different, physically separate, and passive since the driving force for SDS1 is gravity and the driving force for SDS2 is stored energy. The physics of the reactor core itself ensures a degree of passive safety in that the relatively long prompt neutron generation time inherent in the design of CANDU reactors tend to retard power excursions and reduces the speed required for shutdown action, even for large postulated reactivity increases. All passive systems include a number of active components or initiators. Hence, an important aspect of passive systems is the inclusion of fail safe (activated by active component failure) operation. The mechanisms that achieve the fail safe action should be passive. Consequently the passive performance of the CANDU shutdown systems extends beyond their basic modes of operation to include fail safe operation based on natural phenomenon or stored energy. For example, loss of power to the SDS1 clutches results in the drop of the shutdown rods by gravity, loss of power or instrument air to the injection valves of SDS2 results in valve opening via spring action, and rigorous self checking of logic, data and timing by the shutdown systems computers assures a fail safe reactor trip through the collapse of a fluctuating magnetic field or the discharge of a capacitor. Event statistics from operating CANDU stations indicate a significant decrease in protection system faults that could lead to loss of production and elimination of protection system faults that could lead to loss of protection. This paper provides a comprehensive description of the passive shutdown systems employed by CANDU. (author). 4 figs, 3 tabs

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Part of:
Technical feasibility and reliability of passive safety systems for nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an advisory group meeting

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Technical feasibility and reliability of passive safety systems for nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an advisory group meeting
Imprint Pagination
357 p.
Journal Page Range
p. 99-111.
ISSN
1011-4289
Report number
IAEA-TECDOC--920

Conference

Title
Advisory group meeting on technical feasibility and reliability of passive safety systems for nuclear power plants.
Dates
21-24 Nov 1994.
Place
Juelich (Germany).

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
28021869
Subject category
S21: SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
CANDU TYPE REACTORS; PRESSURE DEPENDENCE; REACTOR SAFETY; REACTOR SHUTDOWN; SAFETY ENGINEERING; TEMPERATURE DEPENDENCE
Descriptors DEC
HEAVY WATER MODERATED REACTORS; POWER REACTORS; PRESSURE TUBE REACTORS; REACTORS; SAFETY; SHUTDOWN; THERMAL REACTORS

Optional Information