Economic and institutional dynamics of electricity markets deregulation: the interaction between sectoral regulation and antitrust policy

The purpose of this study is to define regulatory intervention as a part of a global monitoring procedure allowing the definition and adaptation of market structures and rules, given the observed behavior of market participants. Nevertheless, the possible inefficiency in its (decisional) coordination with competition authorities implies further analysis. We thus adopt a comparative methodology based on the studying PJM and NETA wholesale markets. This analysis enables us to stress two possible 'models' in the distribution and coordination of monitoring powers. The first one privileges a strong 'informational coordination' between the sectoral regulator and the Transmission System Operator. By contrast, the second model is characterized by a constrained informational coordination, leading to a greater 'decisional convergence' between regulatory intervention and antitrust policy. Lastly, we put these conclusions into perspective with the specific issue of the achievement of an efficient and integrated European market for electricity. In particular, we stress the need for a single regulatory agency, which should be given autonomous decisional powers in the adoption of regional markets reform initiatives (author)