Regional, national and international security requirements for the transport of nuclear cargo by sea

Since the beginning of the nuclear age in the 1940's, the world has focused on the immense possibilities of nuclear power with both its destructive and productive capabilities. The civil nuclear industry in the UK, as in most nuclear weapons states, grew from the military facilities built in the post war years under the political climate of the Cold War. In the early years of the industry, civil and defence nuclear facilities were inextricably linked both in public perceptions and the regulatory infrastructure under which they operated. The nuclear arms race and the spread of communism overshadowed people's perceptions of there being two separate uses of nuclear material. This was a double edged sword which initially allowed the industry to develop largely unhindered by public concerns but latterly meant the industry could not break away from its roots and to many is still perceived as a dangerous and destructive force. Regulatory frameworks governing all aspects of the industry have developed both nationally and internationally driven by valid public concerns, political agendas and an international consensus that the unregulated use of nuclear material has catastrophic possibilities on an international scale. With the internationalisation of the civil nuclear industry and the costs associated with developing facilities to fully support each stage of the fuel cycle, from enrichment, fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and waste remediation, it became inevitable that a transport infrastructure would develop to make best use of the facilities. Regulations, both national and international are implicit in ensuring the security of nuclear material in transit. Due to the physical size of many of the irradiated fuel packages and implications of the changes to transport safety regulations, international transports of nuclear material, other than within mainland Europe, is predominantly carried out by sea