Fissile material cutoff treaty: what added inspections would it require of civilian nuclear power facilities?

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of major American and Russian efforts to dismantle thousands of nuclear weapons, completion of the long-sought treaty to prohibit production of additional fissile material for weapons seems long over due. Renewed efforts to negotiate such a 'Cutoff' treaty could produce an agreement requiring inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of operating or closed plants for the production of fissile material. In addition, inspections of 'downstream' reactors or other facilities where newly-produced fissile material is used or stored would probably be necessary. This paper describes the purposes such a treaty might serve, the status of the negotiations, and what new inspections the treaty might require of civilian nuclear activities. It concludes that not only plants for producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, but civilian nuclear facilities that use newly-produced fissile material in China, Russia, and the United States as well as in India, Israel and Pakistan would likely be inspected under a Cutoff treaty. In France and the United Kingdom, civilian nuclear facilities are already subject to Euratom inspections implemented in cooperation with the IAEA