Nuclear power

The committee concludes that the nature of the proliferation problem is such that even stopping nuclear power completely could not stop proliferation completely. Countries can acquire nuclear weapons by means independent of commercial nuclear power. It is reasonable to suppose if a country is strongly motivated to acquire nuclear weapons, it will have them by 2010, or soon thereafter, no matter how nuclear power is managed in the meantime. Unilateral and international diplomatic measures to reduce the motivations that lead to proliferation should be high on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. A mimimum antiproliferation prescription for the management of nuclear power is to try to raise the political barriers against proliferation through misuse of nuclear power by strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to seek to raise the technological barriers by placing fuel-cycle operations involving weapons-usable material under international control. Any such measures should be considered tactics to slow the spread of nuclear weapons and thus earn time for the exercise of statesmanship. The committee concludes the following about technical factors that should be considered in formulating nuclear policy: (1) rate of growth of electricity use is a primary factor; (2) growth of conventional nuclear power will be limited by producibility of domestic uranium sources; (3) greater contribution of nuclear power beyond 400 GWe past the year 2000 can only be supported by advanced reactor systems; and (4) several different breeder reactors could serve in principle as candidates for an indefinitely sustainable source of energy