Published January 2008 | Version v1
Journal article

Russian and European gas interdependence: Could contractual trade channel geopolitics?

  • 1. Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Developpement (CIRED), CNRS and EHESS-Paris, 45 bis avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent sur Marne Cedex (France)
  • 2. Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Integration Internationale, Universite de Grenoble, BP 47X, 38040 Grenoble Cedex (France)

Description

In a framework of international political economics, this article analyses the increasing distance between Russia and the European Union (EU) in their interdependent relationship with regard to gas. The representations of economic risks associated with the dominant position of the Russian seller in the European gas market are analysed in terms of industrial economics. Then the relevance of possible responses by the EU is analysed in relation to the reality of alleged risks of gas dependence: the tentative EU-Russia regulatory unification, the creation of a single gas negotiator, and the support to a denser pan-European network, with additional entry points and sources of supply and increased market integration in order to increase the contestability of the markets

Availability note (English)

Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.08.038

Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1016/j.enpol.2007.08.038;
PII
S0301-4215(07)00379-5;

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Energy Policy
Journal Volume
36
Journal Issue
1
Journal Page Range
p. 423-442
ISSN
0301-4215
CODEN
ENPYAC

INIS

Country of Publication
United Kingdom
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
39091746
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Descriptors DEI
ECONOMICS; ENERGY POLICY; EUROPEAN UNION; HAZARDS; MARKET; MARKETERS; NATURAL GAS; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; SECURITY; TRADE
Descriptors DEC
EASTERN EUROPE; ENERGY SOURCES; EUROPE; FLUIDS; FOSSIL FUELS; FUEL GAS; FUELS; GAS FUELS; GASES; GOVERNMENT POLICIES; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Optional Information

Copyright
Copyright (c) 2007 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, All rights reserved.