The context between a fissile materials cutoff and NPT-safeguards

The activities in the frame of the 93+2 Programme resulted in the 'IAEA Strengthened Safeguards System' Model Protocol agreed to by the IAEA member states. Together with the the provisions of the INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement the Model Protocol represents a powerful tool to verify all declared nuclear activities and to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On the other side the vast quantities of military as well as civilian nuclear material in the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and in states not adhering to the NPT remain outside of any international control. Therefore the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) banning the production of fissile material for weapons use would be of highest priority on the agenda of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). Compliance with a FMCT should be verified internationally. Due to the large variety of potential sources of weapons material international safeguards should be applied to all nuclear material in NWS with the exception of a limited amount of material contained in nuclear weapons and military stocks. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be charged with the application of safeguards in the NWS and in states with unsafeguarded nuclear programmes. This would be an decisive step towards an universal safeguards system. The additional effort of applying safeguards also in these states would appreciably increase the expenditures of the IAEA. Taking profit from the potential synergies resulting from the universality of safeguards and the application of advanced technology could possibly mitigate the increase in costs. The agreement to a FMCT of the NWS and of the states not parties to the NPT would be in support of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. Advances in both areas would be important steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. (author)