Review of Australia's Nuclear Security Regime

The paper outlines the outcomes of some of the reviews related to elements of Australia's nuclear security regime. In 2012, Australia revised its Design Basis Threat. The outcome of this process was reported at the first International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2013. Also in 2012, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) began the first Periodic Security Review for the OPAL research reactor, noting that unlike for nuclear safety, there is currently no published guidance on how such a review should be carried out. The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) and the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA), both having regulatory responsibilities for nuclear security, subsequently examined this review and produced findings in 2015. In November 2013, Australia hosted its first IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission. The mission report produced 9 recommendations and 24 suggestions, covering the regulatory activities of ASNO, ARPANSA and the nuclear security system present at ANSTO. This paper will outline some of the lessons learned from these reviews and point out common themes. In 2015, ASNO conducted a major review of security and safeguards regulatory requirements for Australia's OPAL research reactor. This review took into account the outcomes of the above mentioned reviews, entailed an alignment of requirements with that contained IAEA NSS No. 13 and included benchmarking against other State regimes. For the first time ASNO produced a compliance code containing the bulk of the regulatory requirements. Finally, the paper will also describe plans for Australia to conduct a concurrent periodic safety and security review that will allow the licensee to consider safety and security requirements together. Modelled on IAEA SSG-25, the guide identifies 14 safety factors and 19 security factors to be reviewed by the licensee both individually and in a global assessment. Here the licensee is encouraged to consider commonalities between safety and security factors when conducting the review. Experience gained from this process will help inform the consideration of an integrated safety-security series. (author)