Limitations of Managing Safety by Numbers

Work, especially in a complex, dynamic workplaces, often requires subtle, local judgment with regard to timing of subtasks, relevance, importance, prioritization, etc. Still, people in the nuclear industry seem to think safety results from error counts and people just following procedures. In the wake of failure it can be tempting to introduce new procedures and an even stricter "rule following culture". None, or at least very little, attention is given to tacit knowledge and individual skills. I am aiming to highlight the inadequacy of putting too much trust in formalization and that reporting and trending of events will contribute to increased learning, an increased nuclear safety and an efficient operational experience. The ability to interpret a situation concrete depends on proven experience in similar situations, analogical thinking and tacit knowledge. I intend to problematize the introduction and use of so-called Corrective Action Program (CAP) and computerised reporting systems linked to CAP in the nuclear industry. Categorization and trending in computerised reporting systems is only based on the direct or triggering cause and not based on any analyzes, so the question we have to ask is what the trends are really telling us, if anything at all.