Integrated IAEA safeguards concepts for nuclear critical facilities

Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. Goal of the study was to develop an independent capability for detecting the protracted or abrupt diversion of fuel containing 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately 1 week of the diversion. It is concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system for critical facilities can be achieved. Such a system would involve methods of monitoring movement of materials and people and would maintain a running inventory that is tested periodically by independent inventory sampling. This monitoring would detect inventory and procedural discrepancies as well as unauthorized removal of nuclear materials. A special inventory may be taken following a monitoring alarm to confirm a suspected diversion. Comparison of various safeguards options led to the selection, for further development, of a system which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and periodic routine inventory verification. The safeguards system concepts were developed for a reference critical facility having a split-table horizontal matrix; however, a system designed for an actual facility would necessarily incorporate facility-specific features. Development of special equipment for such systems must include preliminary operational tests and evaluations of these concepts in an operating facility to determine their effectiveness and acceptability. 4 figures, 5 tables