Proliferation prevention in the commercial fuel cycle

This website contains the papers presented on November 17, 1998 during the session, ''Proliferation Prevention in the Commercial Fuel Cycle,'' at the American Nuclear Society meeting in Washington, DC. The abstracts are in a separate section; individual papers also contain the author's bio and e-mail address. In the session planning phase, it was suggested that the following questions and other relevant issues be addressed: * What are the difficulties and issues with defining and enforcing international standards for the physical protection of Pu and HEU (beyond the Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear Material, which primarily addresses transportation)? * How do we (or can we) keep nuclear technology in general, and reprocessing and enrichment technologies in particular, from spreading to undesirable organizations (including governments), in light of Article IV of the NPT? Specifically, can we (should we) prevent the construction of light-water reactors in Iran; and should we support the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea? * Are there more proliferation-resistant fuel cycles that would be appropriate in developing countries? * Can the concept of ''nonproliferation credentials'' be defined in a useful way? * Is there historical evidence to indicate that reprocessing (or enrichment of HEU) in the US, Japan, or the EURATOM countries has impacted the acquisition (or attempted acquisition) of nuclear weapons by other nations or groups? * What is the impact of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) be on commercial nuclear fuel cycles? * Does MOX spent fuel present a greater proliferation risk than LEU spent fuel? Although the authors did not explicitly attempt to answer all these questions, they did enlighten us about a number of these and related issues