Published October 3, 2008
| Version v1
Journal article
Lower costs as a result of auctioning of emission rights
Description
According to economic theory auctioning of emission allowances is not more efficient than free allocation. Free allocation of emission allowances in Europe involves product subsidy, thus removing the incentive for emission reduction. [mk]
Abstract (Dutch)
Volgens de economische theorie is het veilen van emissierechten niet efficienter dan de gratis uitgifte ervan. Gratis uitgifte van emissierechten komt in de Europese praktijk neer op een productiesubsidie waardoor de prikkel tot emissiereductie vervaltAdditional details
Additional titles
- Original title (Dutch)
- Lagere kosten door veilen van rechten
Publishing Information
- Journal Title
- Economisch Statistische Berichten
- Journal Volume
- 93
- Journal Issue
- 4544
- Journal Page Range
- p. 603-605
- ISSN
- 0013-0583
- CODEN
- ECSBAH
INIS
- Country of Publication
- Netherlands
- Country of Input or Organization
- Netherlands
- INIS RN
- 40001931
- Subject category
- S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
- Descriptors DEI
- CARBON DIOXIDE; COST; EMISSION; EMISSIONS TRADING; EUROPEAN UNION; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; MARGINAL-COST PRICING; SECTORAL ANALYSIS
- Descriptors DEC
- CARBON COMPOUNDS; CARBON OXIDES; CHALCOGENIDES; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GOVERNMENT POLICIES; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; OXIDES; OXYGEN COMPOUNDS; PRICES