Published 2010 | Version v1
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Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

Creators

  • 1. ASNO (Australia)

Description

In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The traditional focus of safeguards is detection capability. Here, the greatest single priority is improving the capability to detect undeclared nuclear programs. Another key priority is greater efficiency in safeguards implementation, to meet an expanding workload. Other priorities include addressing innovative fuel cycle developments, and maintaining safeguards skills and knowledge. As important as these priorities are, it is essential to also address issues of confidence and deterrence. Failures in these areas will undermine the value of the safeguards system and constrain the development of future nuclear verification missions. This paper takes a broader view in discussing the key nuclear verification priorities. (author)

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Part of:
Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges
Imprint Pagination
vp.
Journal Page Range
1 p.
Report number
IAEA-CN--184

Conference

Title
Preparing for Future Verification Challenges
Acronym
Symposium on International Safeguards
Dates
1-5 Nov 2010
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
42081446
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES; CRIME DETECTION; EFFICIENCY; FUEL CYCLE; HAZARDS; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; IMPLEMENTATION; LEGAL ASPECTS; NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; PROLIFERATION; VERIFICATION
Descriptors DEC
DETECTION; SAFEGUARDS

Optional Information

Notes
Abstract only; PowerPoint presentation also available (17 p.)
Secondary number(s)
IAEA-CN--184/002