Published 2001 | Version v1
Report Open

The T-1 Two-way Radio-Frequency Seal (TRFS) and acceptance testing for IAEA routine use

  • 1. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)
  • 2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

Description

Full text: The Two-way Radio Frequency Seal (TRFS) or T-1 Electronic Sensor Platform (T-1 ESP), which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) designators, respectively, is an electronic sensor platform with two-way radio-frequency (rf) communications. The primary sensor is an active fiber optic loop seal; the ESP accommodates other internal and external, analog and digital output sensors. An embedded data authentication algorithm and a tamper resistant housing including active tamper sensors provide sensor-to- review end-to-end data security. A stainless steel housing provides limited radiation protection. A Data Review Station (DRS) provides an inspector's interface that is part of an integrated Material Monitoring System (MMS). Either the MMS/DRS or a separate portable computer is used to configure the TRFS, including authentication key installation. The T-1 TRFS is currently in the final stages of IAEA evaluation and approval for routine use. Environmental testing has been performed by Euratom's Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy (JRC Ispra). Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the UK's Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG) have completed independent third-party vulnerability assessments. The remaining steps include modification of the MMS/DRS inspector's review software interface to satisfy IAEA requirements and IAEA testing and acceptance of the DRS. The planned first major operational installation of T-1 TRFS is for joint domestic and IAEA use at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) in Aiken, South Carolina, USA. The T-1 domestic material surveillance system is already installed and approved for operational use by the Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) and DOE. The IAEA T-1 TRFS KAMS implementation awaits a joint agreement regarding KAMS by the U.S. Government (USG) and the IAEA, and IAEA approval and acceptance for use of T-1. This IAEA 2001 Safeguards Symposium paper describes the SNL T-1 TRFS and the IAEA status of approval for routine use. (author)

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Part of:
Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

Additional details

Publishing Information

Imprint Title
Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses
Imprint Pagination
377 p.
Journal Page Range
p. 116
Report number
IAEA-SM--367

Conference

Title
Verification and nuclear material security
Acronym
Symposium on international safeguards
Dates
29 Oct - 2 Nov 2001
Place
Vienna (Austria)

INIS

Country of Publication
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
33006948
Subject category
S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Conference
Descriptors DEI
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; MONITORING; PERFORMANCE TESTING; REMOTE CONTROL; RF SYSTEMS; SECURITY SEALS; VERIFICATION
Descriptors DEC
CONTROL; EQUIPMENT; PHYSICAL PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFEGUARDS; SEALS; TESTING

Optional Information

Secondary number(s)
IAEA-SM--367/A/7/01/P