Nuclear husbandry functions

Despite the differences, traditionally domestic safeguards approaches have often been used for international safeguards, sometimes with a few modest changes. Given the extreme discrepancies between the goals, operational context and potential adversaries of the two, such easy solutions may be detrimental to long-term nuclear security. Domestic MPC and A personnel and hardware are not automatically appropriate for international treaty monitoring or for international auditing. International inspectors, such as used by the IAEA, need tools and training specific for their treaty monitoring mission, not just duplicated from (U.S.) domestic MPC and A approaches. Domestic 'cost-effective' solutions may turn out to be highly ineffective and thus expensive and detrimental to long-term nuclear security when applied in new contextual settings. Emphasis should be given to optimize approaches and hardware specifically designed for international safeguards and for future treaty monitoring (e.g. under a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty). To the extent international applications are to be borrowed from domestic approaches, much caution should be given to assess all aspects of the unique nuclear husbandry function in question (objective, obstacles to implementation, potential adversaries etc.), before any fielding of devices or systems