International safeguards for spent fuel storage
Description
This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems
Availability note (English)
MF available from INIS under the Report Number; Available from NTIS., PC A04/MF A01.Files
12642724.pdf
Files
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Additional details
Publishing Information
- Imprint Pagination
- 73 p.
- Report number
- ORNL/SUB--7605/12-2
INIS
- Country of Publication
- United States
- Country of Input or Organization
- United States
- INIS RN
- 12642724
- Subject category
- S98: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION;
- Descriptors DEI
- ACCOUNTING; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; MONITORING; NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY; NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; SEALS; SPENT FUEL STORAGE
- Descriptors DEC
- MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS TESTING; SAFEGUARDS; STORAGE; TESTING; TREATIES