Civil Applications of Safeguards Equipment

The events of September 11 have cast a new light on the perceived security of the world's nuclear facilities. Although concerns have persisted that governments might want to divert nuclear material from civil use to secret weapons programs - recent developments in North Korea validate such concerns - the terrorist attacks on US soil have inspired new fears for nuclear sites of insider threats that, if acted upon, could result in either outright sabotage of the facility or diversion of materials, potentially for future terrorist activities. Further, these concerns have increased the importance of preventing material stolen from nuclear facilities in countries with relatively weak security measures from being trafficked illicitly to and used against prime terrorist targets (industrialized countries of Europe and North America). Without international agreements and standards to guide their efforts, the international nonproliferation community now faces these newly emerged challenges of how to protect nuclear materials from insider threats and how to block diverted materials from reaching terrorist hands. The following paper will explore opportunities for agreed-upon and proven integrated safeguards equipment to be used both to counter the insider threat at nuclear facilities by automatically supervising oversight authorities, and to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials by observing personnel and procedures at civil installations. To conclude, the paper will look to future civil applications of safeguards equipment as support for international counter-terrorism and security efforts