An evaluation of seismically-cued antineutrino detection for nuclear weapon test monitoring

We estimate the sensitivity of large, gadolinium-doped water detectors to antineutrinos released by nuclear fission detonations, taking advantage of the capacity for seismic observations to provide an analysis trigger. If certain efficiency and background criteria are met, the antineutrino signature of a 250-kiloton pure fission weapon could be identified several hundred kilometers away in a detector about the size of the largest experiment currently proposed for basic physics. In principle, such an observation could provide rapid confirmation that the seismic signal coincided with a fission event. We discuss the limited potential for seismically-cued antineutrino observations to constrain fission yield, differentiate pure fission from fusion-enhanced weapons, and indicate that the seismic signature of a test had been intentionally masked. Overall, we find that antineutrinos from nuclear weapon tests may be observable in proposed physics experiments, but prospects for antineutrino-based test surveillance and test ban treaty verification remain severely constrained. This work is a collaboration with Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress (Middlebury Institute of International Studies) and Adam Bernstein (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). (author)