How should we handle Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident with engineer ethics? What is seen by encountering resilience engineering

Many of lectures on 'engineer ethics' being held at universities, etc. positively incorporate case study. This paper introduced the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident (1F accident) not as a mere failure case, but with broader view and broader manner based on practice. Resilience engineering cites anticipating, monitoring, responding, and learning as four core capabilities required to realize safety that people and organizations should aim at. The authors tried to analyze 1F accident using these four core capabilities and the elements required to demonstrating these core capabilities. In the responding of TEPCO to earthquake and tsunami cases before the accident, tsunami countermeasure responding required to prevent 1F accident was not demonstrated as a result. Good examples seen in other responding are the construction of the seismic isolation important building and the deployment of fire engines to the whole nuclear power plant. Accident reports so far took viewpoints of why the accident occurred, and why it led to hydrogen explosion. However, from resilience engineering, why catastrophic conditions could be avoided and how water injection in nuclear facilities could be assured become viewpoints. (A.O.)