Designing physical protection technology for insider protection

Since its inception, the nuclear industry has been engaged in providing protection against an insider threat. Although insider protection activities have been fairly successful in the past, present societal conditions require increased protection to further minimize the existence of an insider or the consequences of an insider-perpetrated incident. Integration of insider protection techniques into existing administrative and operational procedures has resulted in economic and operational impacts. Future increases in insider protection may result in even greater impacts, so we must proceed wisely as new approaches are developed. Increased emphasis on background investigations, security clearances, human reliability programs, security awareness activities, and the development of technology to address the insider threat are evidence of continuing concern in this area. Experience ranging from operational test and evaluation of developmental equipment to conceptual designs for new facilities has led to the development of general principles and conclusions for mitigating the insider threat while minimizing adverse impacts on site operations. Important principles include real-time monitoring of personnel and material and requiring that the physical protection and material control and accounting systems to be much more coordinated and integrated than in the past