Published October 2006 | Version v1
Journal article

Design of drilling contracts-Economic incentives and safety issues

  • 1. University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger (Norway)
  • 2. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Norway)

Description

Financial incentives in contracts can impact contractor's focus on safety. To elaborate on this issue the relationship between an oil company and a drilling contractor is used. We analyse how an operator influences the actions of a drilling contractor with the aid of financial and other incentives, both in connection with the tender process and contract design. The case material is rig contracts from the North Sea

Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1016/j.enpol.2005.04.011;
PII
S0301-4215(05)00120-5;

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Energy Policy
Journal Volume
34
Journal Issue
15
Journal Page Range
p. 2324-2329
ISSN
0301-4215
CODEN
ENPYAC

INIS

Country of Publication
United Kingdom
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
38031219
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Descriptors DEI
CONTRACTORS; CONTRACTS; DESIGN; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; NORTH SEA; OFFSHORE DRILLING; SAFETY
Descriptors DEC
ATLANTIC OCEAN; DRILLING; OFFSHORE OPERATIONS; SEAS; SURFACE WATERS

Optional Information

Copyright
Copyright (c) 2005 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, All rights reserved.