Best-estimate coupled RELAP/CONTAIN analysis of inadvertent BWR ADS valve opening transient

Noncondensible gases may become dissolved in boiling water reactor (BWR) water-level instrumentation during normal operations. Any dissolved noncondensible gases inside these water columns may come out of solution during rapid depressurization events and displace water from the reference leg piping, resulting in a false high level. Significant errors in water-level indication are not expected to occur until the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pressure has dropped below ∼450 psig. These water level errors may cause a delay or failure in emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation. The RPV water level is monitored using the pressure of a water column having a varying height (reactor water level) that is compared to the pressure of a water column maintained at a constant height (reference level). The reference legs have small-diameter pipes with varying lengths that provide a constant head of water and are located outside the drywell. The amount of noncondensible gases dissolved in each reference leg is very dependent on the amount of leakage from the reference leg and its geometry and interaction of the reactor coolant system with the containment, i.e., torus or suppression pool, and reactor building. If a rapid depressurization causes an erroneously high water level, preventing automatic ECCS actuation, it becomes important to determine if there would be other adequate indications for operator response. In the postulated inadvertent opening of all seven automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves, the ECCS signal on high drywell pressure would be circumvented because the ADS valves discharge directly into the suppression pool. A best-estimate analysis of such an inadvertent opening of all ADS valves would have to consider the thermal-hydraulic coupling between the pool, drywell, reactor building, and RPV