Promoting wider adherence to additional protocols

IAEA safeguards traditionally have focussed on nuclear material as declared by the State, and the possible diversion of such material from peaceful nuclear material. The discovery of a clandestine nuclear programme in Iraq brought the need to focus more on the possibility of undeclared nuclear material to the top of the political agenda. The difficulties the IAEA experienced shortly after the Gulf War in verifying the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the DPRK pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) pointed in the same direction. Also important in this context was the Agency's experience in the early nineties in verifying - as instructed by the 1991 General Conference resolution GC(XXXV)/RES/567 - the completeness of South Africa's nuclear inventory after the country had concluded its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In light of these experiences the IAEA Secretariat, strongly supported by its membership and by SAGSI (the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation), started Programme 93+2. This programme was aimed at increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. As is well known the Programme resulted in proposals that came in two parts. Part I could be implemented under the existing authority of the Model NPT Safeguards Agreement. For the second part, additional authority was required. This was given by the Board by the adoption, in May 1997, of the Model Additional Protocol