Illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials: Modeling and analysis of trafficking trends and risks

Concerns over the illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials were focused originally on the lack of security and accountability of such material throughout the former Soviet states. This is primarily attributed to the frequency of events that have occurred involving theft and trafficking of critical material components that could be used to construct a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or a rudimentary, improvised nuclear device (IND). However, with the continued expansion of nuclear technology and the deployment of a global nuclear fuel cycle these materials will continue to become increasingly prevalent, affording a more diverse inventory of dangerous materials and dual-use items. To further complicate the matter, the list of nuclear consumers has grown to include: 1) Nation-states that have gone beyond the IAEA agreed framework and additional protocols concerning multiple nuclear fuel cycles and processes that reuse the fuel through reprocessing to exploit technologies previously confined to the more industrialized world. 2) Terrorist organizations seeking to acquire nuclear and radiological material due to the potential devastation and psychological effect of their use. 3) Organized crime, which has discovered a lucrative market in trafficking of illicit material to international actors and/or countries. 4) Amateur smugglers trying to feed their families in a post-Soviet era. An initial look at trafficking trends of this type seems scattered and erratic, localized primarily to a select group of countries. This is not necessarily the case. The success with which other contraband has been smuggled throughout the world suggests that nuclear trafficking may be carried out with relative ease along the same routes by the same criminals or criminal organizations. (author)