Published 2008 | Version v1
Miscellaneous

Electronuclear Park, Privatization and Civil Strict Liability

  • 1. Univ. de Nice, CNRS, 250, avenue Albert Einstein, 06560, Valbonne, Sophia Antipolis (France)

Description

The civil strict liability regime of the electronuclear industry is a fundamental variable for preventing risk. Because prices of other energies as oil or gas are becoming higher and unpredictable, nuclear power becomes cost-effective and may favour the partial privatization of nuclear parks. By considering theoretical traditional liability models, we study the conditions that ensure the most efficient safety level when comparing natural monopoly situation and Bertrand duopoly. Our results are that natural monopoly is safer than duopoly only when strict liability is fully applied. We define conditions that neutralize risk for applying some privatization plan to nuclear park.

Additional details

Identifiers

Publishing Information

Imprint Pagination
20 p.
Report number
NEI-SE--748

Conference

Title
EAERE 2008. 16. annual conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Dates
25-28 Jun 2008
Place
Goeteborg (Sweden)

INIS

Country of Publication
Sweden
Country of Input or Organization
Sweden
INIS RN
40012531
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Resource subtype / Literary indicator
Non-conventional Literature, Conference
Descriptors DEI
ECONOMICS; ELECTRIC POWER; LIABILITIES; NUCLEAR INDUSTRY; NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS; OWNERSHIP; PRICES; RADIATION PROTECTION; REGULATIONS
Descriptors DEC
INDUSTRY; LAWS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; POWER; POWER PLANTS; THERMAL POWER PLANTS

Optional Information

Notes
34 refs.