Published November 2021 | Version v1
Journal article

Climate policy design, competitiveness and income distribution: A macro-micro assessment for 11 EU countries

  • 1. European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Seville (Spain)
  • 2. Eurofound, Dublin (Ireland)
  • 3. Banco de Portugal, Lisbon (Portugal)

Description

Highlights: • We quantify competitiveness-equity trade-offs in climate policy in EU countries. • Limiting carbon leakage through free permit allocation comes at an equity penalty. • Grandfathering is regressive by raising prices and lowering revenue for transfers. • Impacts across households remain progressive after lump-sum revenue recycling. • Interactions with the social benefit system affect distributional outcomes. Concerns about industry competitiveness and distributional impacts can deter ambitious climate policies. Typically, these issues are studied separately, without giving much attention to the interaction between the two. Here, we explore how carbon leakage reduction measures affect distributional outcomes across households within 11 European countries by combining an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model with a household-level microsimulation model. Quantitative simulations indicate that a free allocation of emission permits to safeguard the competitive position of energy-intensive trade-exposed industries leads to impacts that are slightly more regressive than under full auctioning. We identify three channels that contribute to this effect: higher capital and labour income; lower tax revenue for compensating low-income households; and stronger consumption price increases following from higher carbon prices needed to reach the same emissions target. While these findings suggest a competitiveness-equity trade-off, the results also show that redistributing the revenues from partial permit auctioning on an equal-per-household basis still ensures that climate policy is progressive, indicating that there is room for policy to reconcile competitiveness and equity concerns. Finally, we illustrate that indexing social benefits to consumer price changes mitigates pre-revenue-recycling impact regressivity, but is insufficient to compensate vulnerable households in the absence of other complementary measures.

Availability note (English)

Available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105538

Additional details

Identifiers

DOI
10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105538;
PII
S0140988321004151;

Publishing Information

Journal Title
Energy Economics
Journal Volume
103
Journal Page Range
vp.
ISSN
0140-9883
CODEN
EECODR

INIS

Country of Publication
United Kingdom
Country of Input or Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
INIS RN
53108036
Subject category
S29: ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY;
Descriptors DEI
CLIMATES; COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION; DESIGN; ECONOMY; HOUSEHOLDS; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; LICENSES; RECYCLING; RETAIL PRICES; TAXES
Descriptors DEC
PRICES; SIMULATION

Optional Information

Copyright
Copyright (c) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.